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This thesis studies the shared access and stability issues in a spectrum commons
among a group of spatially distributed transmit-receive (Tx-Rx) user pairs. These
users with built-in intelligence are able to learn the local spectrum dynamics and
other users’ decisions, and then dynamically adapt their transmission parameters
to exploit the spatial and temporal spectrum opportunities. As a result of their
selfish nature, the built-in intelligence should jointly consider the stability issues
concerning whether the whole network converges to an equilibrium solution during
interactions, which also provides efficiency and fairness for the users. We study
how to manage the spectrum access problem for such autonomous and spatially
distributed Tx-Rx pairs with the objective to achieve efficient spectrum sharing
with fairness and scalability.
Chapter 1 gives some background of the thesis, including dynamic spectrum
access, multi-agent systems, Aloha-type and CSMA-type random access games,
device-to-device communications, etc. The motivations and contributions of the
thesis are also outlined.
In Chapter 2 we introduce the spatial Aloha model in single channel and multi-
channel scenarios, and state the problems to be solved. Then we introduce the ideal
CSMA network (ICN) model which is the basis for our study in Chapter 7.
As an initial attempt to address the shared access and stability issues in a
spectrum commons, we first investigate slotted Aloha type of random access with
spatial reuse in Chapter 3. We propose the generalized Aloha games and obtain
the stability conditions for the unique Nash equilibrium (NE) in terms of medium
access probability (MAP), as a result of the users’ autonomous and selfish strategic
interactions.
Based on the stability conditions, we develop a heuristic algorithm in Chapter
4 to approach the Pareto front in spatial Aloha networks. Each user repeatedly
measures its current throughput and adjusts its target rate based on a set of pre-
installed rules, so that a fair and close-to-Pareto-front operating point can be found.
The algorithm is implemented in a fully ditributed manner, which requires no in-
formation exchange among the users.
The drawback of the heuristic algorithm is the transient fluctuations and long
convergence time. To provide faster and more smooth convergence to a stable
operating point, we apply the control theoretic approach to spatial Aloha networks
xi
in Chapter 5. Based on a sufficient stability condition in Chapter 3, we define a
local parameter R which indicates the cumulative radio intensity level within each
user’s one-hop communication range. The users first self-organize into several non-
overlapping neighborhoods, each of which elects the user with the highest node
degree as the local leader. By ensuring R ≤ 2 at the local leaders, the stability of
network can be guaranteed even when each user has only local information. We
propose each local leader to use R = 2 as the constant reference signal to its built-in
proportional and integral (PI) controller. The PI parameters are adaptively tuned
to provide fast and smooth convergence, regardless of the network size or user
densities. We validate through simulations that the proposed scheme achieves fair
and close-to-Pareto-front throughputs.
After investigating the single-channel scenario, we then extend to multi-channel
spatial Aloha networks in Chapter 6. We propose a multi-leader Stackelberg game
to solve the joint MAP tuning and spatial channel selection problem. Compared to
existing method of pre-allocating MAPs, the proposed game further improves the
overall network throughput by iteratively tuning the MAPs toward max-min fair
throughputs in each sub-network.
Finally, we leverage on the ICN model in the context of overlay D2D communi-
cations in Chapter 7, and investigate how the commons spectrum can be efficiently
and fairly shared among the self-interested spatial CSMA users with heterogeneous
rate requirements. A Stackelberg game is proposed in which the base station acts
as the Stackelberg leader to regulate the individual payoff by modifying the service
price, so that the total D2D throughput can be maximized.
In summary, this thesis provides theoretical guidance for managing the shared
access to a spectrum commons, with insights into how the spatially distributed Tx-
Rx pairs can share the commons spectrum with stability, efficiency, fairness and
scalability. Some future directions are discussed in Chapter 8.
xii
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aij element in the interference matrix, i.e., aij = [A]ij
N number of users
N set of users: {1, 2, · · · , N}
Ni number of neighbors for user i, i.e., Ni =
∑
j aij
RN N -dimensional real space
Γ N -dimensional real subspace Γ ⊂ RN
qi medium access probability (MAP) of user i
q vector of MAPs for N users
θi normalized throughput of user i
θ vector of throughputs for N users
yi target rate of user i
y vector of target rates for N users
 component-wise less than or equal to
J Jacobian matrix
det(J) determinant of Jacobian matrix
Ψ neighborhood region Ψ ⊂ RN of the NE in generalized Aloha games
I region of the initial iteration point q(0) in generalized Aloha games
Λ(q) Lyapunov function in generalized Aloha games
Ω set of elected leaders in the SALE scheme
Rl Radio Intensity Metric (RIM) of user l
Rl,sp set-point or the desired RIM value of user l
Hl height of a tree l in the interference graph
{KP,l, KI,l} proportional and integral parameters for the PI controller in user l
dPareto distance of the current throughput to the Pareto front
LS number of bits in a packet of slotted Aloha
xvii
LF number of time slots in a frame in the SALE scheme
LND number of time slots to estimate node degree in the SALE scheme
G number of mutually disconnected subnets
G set of mutually disconnected subnets: {1, 2, · · · , G}
Mg set of users in the subnet g ∈ G
lg ID of elected leader in subnet g ∈ G
K number of available orthogonal channels
K set of available channels, i.e., K = {1, 2, · · · , K}
ci ci ∈ K is the channel selected by user i
tcd countdown (backoff) time
ttr transmission time
λ rate of transition from backoff to transmission: λ = 1/E[tcd]
µ rate of transition from transmission to backoff: µ = 1/E[ttr]
ρ access intensity, i.e., ratio of mean transmission time to mean countdown
time: ρ = E[ttr]/E[tcd] = λ/µ
ρ access intensity of N links: ρ = [ρ1, ρ2, · · · , ρN ]
r transmission aggressiveness: the natural logarithm of ρ, i.e., r = loge ρ
rmax upper limit on transmission aggressiveness
r transmission aggressiveness of N links: r = [r1, r2, · · · , rN ] = loge ρ
si state of link i: si = 1 if link i is transmitting and si = 0 otherwise
s system state of N links: s = [s1, s2, · · · , sN ] or simply a string s =
s1s2 · · · sN
S set of feasible system states
ps probability of the system state s ∈ S
C¯ feasible throughput region in the ICN model
C strictly feasible throughput region in the ICN model
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SALE Spatial Aloha via local Leader Election
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1.1 Dynamic Spectrum Access
The increasing demand for wireless communication, along with the poor utilization
efficiency in the conventional static spectrum allocation scheme, has triggered the
development of dynamic spectrum access schemes [1]. One of the critical enabling
technologies for a dynamic spectrum access network is cognitive radios (CRs). By
properly designing the built-in intelligence, CRs will discipline themselves and be
able to make dynamic adaptations when accessing the spectrum to improve overall
system performance.
1.1.1 Cognitive Radios
According to Simon Haykin’s definition [3], a CR is an intelligent wireless communi-
cation device which is capable in using the understanding-by-building methodology
to learn from its surrounding radio environment and adapt its internal system states
according to the learned statistical behaviors observed in the incoming radio fre-
quency (RF) stimuli. In other words, by sensing the RF stimuli or monitoring the
transmission outcomes, a newly arrived CR can learn from its surrounding environ-
ment and gather necessary information such as transmission frequency, bandwidth,
interference level, etc. After a CR gathers its needed information from the radio
environment, it can dynamically adapt its transmission parameters to exploit the
spatial and temporal spectrum opportunities, hopefully without significant degra-
dation to the performance of existing users. The design of CRs bears two primary
objectives: 1) highly reliable communications whenever and wherever needed; 2)
efficient utilization of the radio spectrum.
This thesis focuses on the spectrum sharing problems among a group of spatially
1
distributed transmit-receive (Tx-Rx) user pairs. We use the concept of CRs in the
broadest sense and refer them as intelligent wireless communication users, which are
able to learn from RF environment and other users’ behaviors before adapting their
transmission parameters to achieve a certain performance objective. If such intelli-
gent users participate in sharing a common spectrum for transmission, they should
be able to make intelligent decisions on spectrum access and choose transmission
parameters based on learned spectrum dynamics and their competitors’ decisions.
As a result of their autonomous behaviors and interactions, stability issues arise
concerning whether the whole network converges to an equilibrium solution which
also provides efficiency and fairness for the users. We therefore study how to man-
age the spectrum access problem for such autonomous and spatially distributed
Tx-Rx pairs with the objective to achieve efficient spectrum sharing with fairness
and scalability.
1.1.2 Dynamic Spectrum Access Models
As opposed to the current static spectrum management policy, the term dynamic
spectrum access has broad connotations that encompass various approaches to spec-
trum reforms that try to improve spectrum utilization [1]. As shown in Fig. 1.1,
dynamic spectrum access strategies can be broadly categorized under three models:












Figure 1.1: A Taxonomy of Dynamic Spectrum Access [1]
In the dynamic exclusive use model, spectrum bands are licensed to services for
exclusive use, which maintains the basic structure of the current spectrum manage-
ment policy. What is different is the additional flexibility in dynamically allocating
spectrum to improve spectrum efficiency. Specifically, spectrum property rights [4]
and dynamic spectrum allocation [5] are proposed under this model. Spectrum
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property rights allow the license holders to trade spectrum and freely adopt tech-
nologies to provide services. The spectrum resource utilization is thus regulated by
economy and market and driven toward the most profitable use. In the other ap-
proach known as dynamic spectrum allocation, improvement of spectrum efficiency
is achieved through dynamically assigning the spectrum according to the spatial
and temporal traffic statistics of different services [1].
The hierarchical access model consists of both primary users (licensees) and
secondary users (unlicensed users), with the secondary users having a lower ac-
cess priority. In this model, the licensed spectrum is opened to the secondary
users with restrictions on the interference caused to the primary users. Spectrum
underlay and spectrum overlay are considered for spectrum sharing between pri-
mary users and secondary users [6]. Spectrum underlay restricts the transmission
power of secondary users such that they operate below the noise floor of primary
users [7]. Transmission with extremely low power is possible for the secondary users
by spreading the transmitted signal over a wide frequency band (UWB) [8]. On the
other hand, spectrum overlay, also known as opportunistic spectrum access, does
not restrict the transmission power of the secondary users, but rather restricting
when and where they may transmit [1]. This approach exploits the spatial and
temporal spectrum opportunities by enabling the secondary users to identify and
access the spectrum white space in an opportunistic manner. Therefore, there exists
a trade-off between the services provided to the secondary users and the protection
provided to the primary users from secondary interference.
The open sharing model will be discussed in the next subsection.
1.1.3 Spectrum Commons
The open sharing model, also known as spectrum commons [9–13], treats the spec-
trum as an open resource for peer users to share among themselves. An example
of this model is the unlicensed industrial, scientific and medical (ISM) radio band,
which brings up the success of wireless operating systems such as WiFi, Bluetooth,
RFID, ZigBee, etc [14]. However, open sharing without regulations may lead to
the overuse of the time, frequency and power units, and eventually the users would
suffer from a “tragedy of the commons” [15] due to increasing interference.
Actually, there are distinctions between the ideas of “open access” and “com-
mons”, although they are often used interchangeably. A commons is a resource
that is owned or controlled jointly by a group of individuals [16]. It is characterized
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by the restrictions on who uses the resource, and when and how. The owner or
controller of the commons is the person or group of persons that establishes and
enforces these restrictions. On the other hand, open access is a regime in which
anyone has access to an unowned resource without limitations; no one controls ac-
cess to the resource under open access [16]. Therefore, open access is subject to
over-exploitation and degradation of a finite resource if the users have no incentive
to preserve. Based on the above discussion, the tragedy does not befall commons
generally but rather “unmanaged commons” [17].
To improve the efficiency of the spectrum usage, [13] suggests basic proto-
cols/etiquettes to be set by either government or industry standardization, and the
commons spectrum should only be shared among those wireless users which con-
form to these protocols/etiquettes. The design of such protocols/etiquettes should
follow three general principles: efficiency, fairness, and incentive compatibility [18].
A resource allocation is efficient if it is impossible to improve the performance of a
user without degrading the performance of some other users (also known as Pareto
optimality [19]). Usually many efficient operating points exist, each representing a
different performance trade-off among the users. Fairness is related to the relative
performance among the users, based on different criteria such as max-min fairness,
proportional fairness, etc [20, 21]. Finally, an allocation is incentive compatible or
self-enforcing if no user has incentive to deviate from such an operating point,
which means that no intervention from an external authority is needed [18]. This
is particularly important for new technologies such as CRs, which equip users with
cognitive capability and self-adaptivity to make autonomous decisions about spec-
trum usage based on learned environment characteristics and interactions among
the users. Both centralized [22, 23] and decentralized [18, 24–27] spectrum sharing
approaches have been proposed under the spectrum commons model.
1.2 Multi-Agent Systems
The key component of dynamic spectrum access is how to provide efficient and fair
spectrum allocation or scheduling solutions for the users [28]. For autonomous Tx-
Rx pairs which are participating in sharing a commons spectrum for transmission,
they should be able to make intelligent decisions on spectrum usage and choose
transmission parameters based on learned spectrum dynamics and their competi-
tors’ decisions. We therefore study how to manage the spectrum access problem
for such autonomous and spatially distributed Tx-Rx pairs with the objective to
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achieve efficient spectrum sharing with fairness and scalability.
A network consisting of autonomous and spatially distributed Tx-Rx user pairs
is essentially a multi-agent system [29]. The users are said to be autonomous if they
are capable of making independent decisions about what to do in order to satisfy
their design objectives. In reality, the spatially distributed users only possess local
views, i.e., no user has a full global view of the network, or the network is too large
for a user to gather all information and make practical use of such knowledge. How
each individual can make a decision on the transmission parameters with partial
network knowledge so as to approach the design objective, and how much partial
knowledge is required are the two main design challenges.
A multi-agent system may target at a global objective but solve it distributively
[30]. In such settings there is no concern about the individual preferences, but rather
it may be advantageous to distribute the task among multiple users, whose actions
may require coordination. Examples of such problems can be found in [20, 21, 31].
The effective mathematical tool in use is the distributed optimization techniques
[30,32].
On the other hand, a multi-agent system may also embrace issues of competi-
tion as well as coordination. The key mathematical tool to model the problems
is game theory, which models strategic interactions among the users using formal-
ized incentive structures. Game theory provides models for efficient self-enforcing
distributed design. The formulated game model should also be able to derive well
defined equilibrium criteria to study the optimality of game outcomes under vari-
ous game settings (static versus dynamic, complete versus incomplete information,
non-cooperative versus cooperative, etc) [28]. More details will be reviewed in the
next subsection.
1.2.1 Game Theory
Game theory is often described as a branch of applied mathematics and economics
that studies situations where multiple players (self-interested agents) interact and
make decisions in an attempt to maximize their own benefits. The essential feature
is that game theory provides a formal mathematical approach to modeling these
social situations in which all agents participate and interact. A game consists of a
set of players, a set of moves (or strategies) available to those players and a complete
set of payoffs for every combination of strategies available. All possible outcomes
are thus encapsulated in the mathematical model of the game.
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To enable efficient dynamic spectrum sharing, the behaviors and interactions
among network users have to be thoroughly investigated and analyzed. Game theory
has been used to study the competition and cooperation among rational decision
makers, and thus has excellent match when applied to dynamic spectrum sharing
problems [28].
The advantages of using game theoretical framework to analyze dynamic spec-
tum sharing are multifold [28]. First of all, by modelling dynamic spectrum sharing
as games, the strategic interactions among network users can be expressed in a for-
mal game structure, by which the theoretical results from game theory can be fully
utilized. Moreover, since the optimization for heterogeneous network users is a dis-
tributed multi-objective optimization problem with each individual user having its
own objective and constraints, the problem is difficult to analyze and solve. Game
theory equips us with well defined equilibrium solutions to evaluate the system opti-
mality under various network scenarios. Finally, non-cooperative games [33] can be
used to analyze the selfish behaviors of network users, which inspires us to look for
ways to design incentive compatible or self-enforcing protocols to achieve efficient
and fair spectrum sharing.
1.2.2 Nash Equilibrium
An important solution concept to non-cooperative games is the Nash equilibrium
(NE) [34]. A NE, named after John Nash, is a set of strategies, one for each player,
such that no player has an incentive to change its action unilaterally. If each player
has chosen a strategy and no player can benefit by changing its strategy while the
other players keep theirs unchanged, then the current set of strategies and payoffs
constitute a NE.
Formally, we can define s−i = (s1, · · · , si−1, si+1, · · · , sN) as a strategy profile
of N players without player i (also known as the opponent of i). Thus we can
write s = (si, s−i) as the strategy profile of all N players. If the players other than
i (whom we denote as -i) were to commit to play s−i, a player who is intent on
maximizing its own payoff ui would be faced with the problem of determining its
best strategy from its strategy set Si in response to s−i, or best response. Therefore
we have the following definitions.
Definition 1.1. (Best response) Player i’s best response to other players’ strat-
egy s−i is a strategy s∗i ∈ Si such that ui(s∗i , s−i) ≥ ui(si, s−i) for all strategies
si ∈ Si.
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Definition 1.2. (Nash equilibrium) A strategy profile s = (s1, · · · , sN) is a Nash
equilibrium if, for all players i, si is a best response to s−i.
In the above definitions, a NE is defined as a strategy profile (i.e., vector of play-
ers’ strategies) in which each player’s strategy is the best response to the strategies
of all the other players. Based on this definition, no selfish player has incentive
to unilaterally change its strategy when operating at the NE. However, this so-
lution concept for a non-cooperative game is essentially confined to searching for
an equilibrium condition. It does not teach us about the underlying dynamics in-
volved in establishing that equilibrium, or whether such dynamics are converging
or diverging at the equilibrium due to disturbances (e.g., introduced by parameter
estimation errors) [3]. The following subsection will review existing work on the
dynamic stability of the NEs in non-cooperative spectrum access games.
1.2.3 Stability Issues
Existing game models in communication networks have adopted various game dy-
namics and stability concepts such as Markov decision process (MDP) and stochas-
tic stability [35,36], which appear in a Markov game or stochastic game introduced
by Shapley in [37]. A stochastic game is played in a sequence of stages. At the
beginning of each stage, the game is in a certain state which follows a Markov pro-
cess, i.e., in the next stage the game would move to a new random state whose
distribution depends on the previous state and the actions chosen by the players.
The procedure is repeated at the new state and play continues for a finite or infinite
number of stages. The payoffs obtained in each stage depend on the state and the
current actions of the players. The total payoff of a player is often taken to be the
discounted sum of the stage payoffs or the limit inferior of the averages of the stage
payoffs [35]. The corresponding equilibrium concept is the Markov perfect equi-
librium (MPE) in which each player’s chosen action depends only on the current
state [33].
For example, in [38] [39], MacKenzie and Wicker consider the slotted Aloha
protocol as a stochastic game between users contending for a conventional collision
channel where no two or more users are allowed to transmit simultaneously. In
their work, an infinite users’ model is adopted with a finite packet arrival rate, and
all users are assumed to be indistinguishable. In this game, the state represents
the number of users currently contending for the channel, and this information is
assumed to be known to all users. A strategy in this game is a mapping from
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the number of backlogged users to a medium access probability (MAP). The total
payoff of a user is the discounted sum of the stage payoffs. The authors then
prove the existence of an MPE in such a game using the Glicksberg-Fan fixed
point theorem [40, 41]. The stability of the equilibrium is analyzed based on the
drift analysis of a Markov chain and the selfish behavior of users when the number
of backlogged users goes to infinity. The authors conclude that, the equilibrium
strategy is stable given that the total packet arrival rate of the Aloha system is
less than a certain value determined by the cost parameter. Moreover, for the
optimal value of the cost parameter, the throughput of a slotted-Aloha system with
non-cooperative users can be as high as the throughput of a centrally controlled
system. This result is generalized in [42] to show that the same result holds for
multi-packet reception channels that allow more than one packet to be successfully
received simultaneously.
Besides MDP and its stochastic stability, some other game models in commu-
nication networks have formulated the game as a nonlinear system and studied its
asymptotic stability using Lyapunov functions [43,44]. The authors in [45] formulate
a random access game consisting of N wireless nodes in a wireless local area network
(WLAN) [14] with contention-based medium access. Three types of repeated play
have been considered for the distributed strategy update mechanism to achieve the
NE, namely, best response, gradient play, and Jacobi play. The simplest update
mechanism is the best response strategy: at each iteration, every player chooses the
best response to the actions of other players in the previous iteration. The authors
restrict the discussion to supermodular games [46] with the problem-specific payoff
function and prove its convergence. Another dynamic is the gradient play [47], i.e.,
each player adjusts its strategy gradually in a gradient direction that improves its
current payoff. In gradient play, nobody must know the game, his rivals, their pref-
erences or actions; no one looks for large size improvements, i.e., nobody makes a
great leap towards a best response. Each player simply observes its marginal payoff
persistently and use restricted stepsize to update its strategy. Despite that players
know little and update slowly, the gradient play does enjoy remarkable stability
(see [47] for more details). The third update scheme is Jacobi play [48]. In Jacobi
play, each player adjusts its current strategy gradually towards the best response
strategy, i.e., the player does not make a great leap towards a best response within
one single iteration, but instead applies a discount factor  ≤ 1 to the stepsize. An-
other example that uses the Jacobi play is the Aloha game model proposed by Jin
and Kesidis [49]. The dynamics of the Jacobi play is approximated by a continuous-
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time nonlinear system whose asymptotic stability at the equilibrium is studied by
constructing a Lyapunov function [43,44].
The next two sections review some types of random access games which are
based on the Lyapunov stability concept.
1.3 Aloha-Type Random Access Games
Game theoretic approaches have been widely used to design multiple access proto-
cols in wireless networks. In [50], the authors provide a comprehensive review of
the game models developed for different multiple access schemes, including both
contention-free and random access schemes. For contention-free schemes, time-
division multiple access (TDMA) [51–53], frequency-division multiple access (FDMA)
[54–56], and code-division multiple access (CDMA) [57–59] are reviewed. For
contention-based channel access, Aloha and carrier sense multiple access (CSMA)-
based game models are discussed.
This thesis focuses on random access based game models in wireless networks.
In the following subsections, we would review certain classes of Aloha games and
channel selection games in Aloha-type of random access networks. CSMA-type
random access games will be reviewed in Section 1.4.
1.3.1 Aloha Games
In [50], several channel access games in ALOHA-like protocols are presented. A
good example is the Aloha games proposed by MacKenzie and Wicker in [38, 39].
An alternative Aloha game model is proposed by Jin and Kesidis [49], whereby
a group of heterogeneous users in a fully connected network share a conventional
collision channel and transmit via slotted Aloha. Each user in this game attempts
to obtain a target rate by updating its MAP in response to observed activities. The
authors further assume in [60] that, for users with inelastic bandwidth requirements,
each user’s target rate depends on its utility function and its willingness to pay,
and they propose a pricing strategy to control the behavior of the users (in order
to bring their target rates within the feasible region). This Aloha game model
is further investigated in [61–63]. In [61], the authors investigate the effects of
altruistic behavior on the stability of equilibrium points in a two-player game. In
[62], the authors generalize the model and propose a generic networking game with
applications to circuit-switched networks. In [63], Menache and Shimkin extend the
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model by incorporating time-varying channel conditions to the channel model.
The conditions for the existence and stability of the equilibrium solutions have
been well studied in these works. However, the results of these studies are more
suitably applied to the fully connected uplink random access channel. In the context
of spatially distributed Tx-Rx pairs, it is likely that not all players will interfere
with each other. In these scenarios, we normally have to deal with a non-fully
connected network, where the presence of a connected edge means that the two
players are not allowed to transmit together. There also remain fundamental issues
for such partially connected networks which are not addressed. For example, among
all equilibrium solutions, does there exist an equilibrium point which is optimal
to all players, or a solution which always favors different subgroups of players?
Furthermore, if a global optimal solution does exist for all players, how to converge
to that equilibrium point during implementation?
An important concept associated with partially connected networks is spatial
reuse. Spatial reuse, also known as frequency reuse, is a powerful technique to
improve the area spectral efficiency of multi-user communication systems. Cellular
systems are examples whereby radios exploit the power falloff with distance and
reuse the same frequency for transmission at spatially separated locations [64, 65].
Similar ideas can be applied to users in a distributed wireless network, where differ-
ent transmit-receive pairs at a distance away are allowed to transmit simultaneously,
with the objective to maximize system capacity whilst still meeting all the transmis-
sion quality requirements [66–69]. When spatial reuse is considered in a distributed
wireless network where the autonomous Tx-Rx user pairs compete for transmission
in the common collision channel using slotted Aloha, how to model the interactions
and competitions among the users? Does there exist a stable equilibrium operating
point? What about the efficiency and fairness of such an equilibrium, if they ex-
ist? How to approach the Pareto-front throughput solution using only limited local
information?
The above challenges motivate our design of Aloha games with spatial reuse
in Chapter 3, as well as a heuristic algorithm (Chapter 4) and a control theoretic
method (Chapter 5) to approach the Pareto optimal throughput solution in the
proposed games.
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1.3.2 Channel Selection Games in Multi-Channel Aloha Net-
works with Spatial Reuse
To further improve network performance, multiple collision channels can be con-
sidered in Aloha networks with spatial reuse. Chen and Huang in [70] study the
random access based distributed spectrum sharing problem with spatial reuse. Each
user is allowed to access only one channel in each slot, under the assumption that
the MAPs are fixed and pre-allocated. The problem is formulated as a spatial chan-
nel selection game, in which each user is a player who chooses one channel to access
in order to maximize its own expected throughput. The game is shown to be a
potential game [71] and thus possesses a NE and the finite improvement property
(FIP). A game is said to be a potential game if the incentive of all players to change
their strategy can be expressed using a single global function called the potential
function, which is a special form of the Lyapunov function [72]. The FIP refers to
the property that asynchronous player updating (where players switch channels to
increase payoffs) always converges to a NE.
However, the method in [70] relies on the assumption that the MAPs are fixed
and pre-allocated, but the efficiency and fairness of such allocations are not dis-
cussed. A better design is to let the users jointly optimize the MAPs and channel
selection to maximize individual user throughput. This is a highly non-trivial prob-
lem since the setting of the MAPs would affect each user’s expected throughput,
intertwine with the channel selection decisions and thus affect the final location of
the NE.
This challenging problem has been partially solved by Cohen et al. in [73],
although no spatial reuse has been considered. The sub-game of channel selection
under fixed MAP constraints is also shown to be a potential game, and thus the
convergence to a NE is guaranteed. The authors then formulate the problem of
choosing the MAPs as a single-leader Stackelberg game [33]. The classic Stackelberg
games are a class of non-cooperative games in which a single “leader”, who makes
the first move in the game, anticipates the actions of the “follower” based on a model
of how the follower would respond to the actions of the leader. Since no spatial reuse
is considered, the users are homogeneous in the sense that each user’s transmission
will affect all remaining users in the network. Therefore, a single elected leader is
sufficient to manage the network, which mandates all MAPs to be the same and
sets this common MAP value to maximize the sum-rate at the NE of the sub-game.
When spatial reuse is considered, heterogeneous MAPs are generally observed
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due to the non-uniform node degrees. Therefore, multiple leaders at different spatial
locations might be a proper extension to better manage the network and handle the
joint MAP tuning and channel selection problem in a local region. This motivates
our design of a multi-leader Stackelberg game [74] in Chapter 6, which jointly
considers the MAP tuning and channel selection problem in multi-channel Aloha
networks with spatial reuse.
1.4 CSMA-Type Random Access Games
1.4.1 CSMA Games
In random access games, wireless users share a common channel and want to max-
imize their payoffs independently. A recent survey on applying game theory to
CSMA can be found in [75], where several non-cooperative contention control games
in CSMA methods are presented. Using game theory and the NE concept, it is
shown in [76] that the current IEEE 802.11 standard does not work well if there are
selfish users trying to maximize their performance by unfairly accessing the channel,
as this reduces the ability of other users to access it. Besides fairness, the stability
of strategic interactions among the self-interested users is also an important issue.
The authors in [77, 78] model the exponential backoff protocol in 802.11 standards
as a non-cooperative game in which links try to maximize their payoff function in
the form of reward for successful transmission. After proving the existence of the
NE, it has been shown that the obtained NE may not be unique and steady. There-
fore, it becomes a motivation for designing medium access mechanisms so that the
strategic interactions among the self-interested users would finally converge to a
stable steady-state operating point.
The game presented in [79] is one of the first research works proposing a fair
non-cooperative game model for 802.11 distributed coordination function (DCF)
[80] mechanism. Authors of [45, 81–83] define a general game-theoretic model to
capture the distributed nature of contention control and wireless users’ interactions
in CSMA. In these games, the strategy of a player is usually the MAP or equivalently
the size of the contention window, and the payoff function is a combination of
the channel access gain and the packet collision cost. The wireless users estimate
their collision probabilities through observing idle time slots between transmissions
as well as unsuccessful transmissions, and then accordingly adjust their MAPs.
The utility functions of the users are designed to achieve a good trade-off between
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efficiency and fairness. Gradient play is adopted as the game dynamics whose
convergence to the steady-state NE is proved by constructing a proper Lyapunov
function. In another CSMA game model, Jin and Kesidis [84] analyze the non-
cooperative user behaviors in CSMA wireless networks where users have the freedom
to choose the contention window sizes according to the network congestion level.
The existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium point are investigated, as well as
a distributed iterative method to converge to the equilibrium.
However, as commented by [75], most of the proposed CSMA games assume
all-inclusive carrier sensing, i.e., each user hears transmissions of all the other users.
The analysis in the above game models cannot be directly applied in the presence
of spatial reuse.
1.4.2 Spatial CSMA Networks
When spatial reuse is considered in CSMA methods, the carrier-sense relationships
among the CSMA users become non-all-inclusive, i.e., each CSMA user may only
sense a subset, but not all other users. In [85], Bianchi proposes a simple model
that accounts for all exponential backoff protocol details and allows computation
of saturation throughput of IEEE 802.11 DCF [80]. Although simulations in [85]
demonstrate high accuracy, the model does not consider the network topology and
could not characterize the collisions that result from the other active nodes in the
neighborhood of the transmitter. As commented by Liew et al. [86], it is extremely
difficult to extend the analytic methods for all-inclusive carrier-sense networks (e.g.,
[85, 87–89]) to the non-all-inclusive case because of the inhomogeneity in the state
spaces of the CSMA users. In fact, the problem of computing user throughputs in
a spatial CSMA network is shown to be NP-hard [86].
In order to perform tractable analysis, existing literature [86,90–92] have adopted
an ideal CSMA network (ICN) model to capture the essence of the CSMA mecha-
nism under spatial reuse. Boorstyn et al. in [90] first consider the spatial CSMA
network model with exponential idle and transmission times. They use a Markov
model to efficiently analyze the throughput of CSMA networks with arbitrary topol-
ogy. Wang and Kar in [91] model the throughput of the CSMA network using the
same line of analysis, but they further take into account the RTS/CTS exchange in
the CSMA network and their result is readily extended to the throughput analysis
of the IEEE 802.11 DCF. The effectiveness of the throughput analysis is verified by
simulation investigations.
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The throughput analysis in [90,91] corresponds to a subclass of the ICN model,
which models the backoff and transmission processes with exponential distributions
so that backoff and transmission processes are memory-less and can be analyzed
using a continuous time-reversible Markov chain. In practical CSMA protocols,
the backoff process is controlled by a counter and has “memory”. The general
ICN model in [86] takes this memory effect into account. It is proved that the
link throughputs in ICN are insensitive to this memory effect and to the detailed
distributions of the backoff countdown and transmission times given the ratio of
their means. This result enables the use of ICN in practical CSMA networks.
Backoff collisions are unavoidable in practical networks, especially when the
network is highly populated. The ICN model is an idealized model that removes
such collisions by adopting a continuous-time countdown process [93]. In other
words, it models a system in which the “minislot” used in the countdown backoff
process is very small, and that carrier sensing is instantaneous. In [94], Kai and Liew
propose a generalized ICN model for a perturbation analysis that tries to capture
the effects of backoff collisions. However, as is pointed out in [94, Section V], the
effects of collisions are not significant as far as the link throughputs are concerned.
More specifically, the original ICN model already yields good approximations with
errors within 10% even though it does not incorporate the collision effects. Jiang
and Walrand in [95] extend the ICN model to an “almost” time-reversible Markov
chain which takes into account the cost of collisions and overheads. The idea is to
use RTS/CTS handshaking so that the collision period will be comparatively small
under a sufficiently large holding time.
In summary, ICN is a proper mathematical model for the throughput analysis
in spatial CSMA networks. The ICN model will be formally introduced in Section
2.4.
1.4.3 Managing Spatial CSMA Users with Heterogeneous
Rate Requirements
Based on the ICN model, people are interested in the resource allocation problem
in spatial CSMA networks for efficient spectrum sharing. In particular, Jiang and
Walrand [92] develop an elegant distributed CSMA algorithm for throughput and
total utility maximization based on the ICN model after making assumptions about
concavity and monotonicity of the user utility functions. Their work removes the
need for knowledge of the underlying link topology and their transmission param-
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eters can be updated distributively. However, the approach implicitly assumes a
best effort transmission to achieve total utility maximization and there is no explicit
treatment if users have heterogeneous rate requirements and different willingness to
pay. In other words, while optimizing the sum-rate, there is no mechanism to weigh
the individual user utility so as to differentiate the services. Moreover, the global
optimization approach does not reflect the fact that users are selfish and behave
non-altruistically in maximizing their own payoff. In fact, Cagalj et al. have shown
that even the presence of a few selfish users may lead such a CSMA network to
collapse [96], while proper pricing or penalty mechanisms lead to overall improve-
ment [97]. Indeed, when users with heterogeneous rate requirements coexist in the
network and the collective target rates are outside the feasible throughput region,
the self-interested actions by the CSMA users would lead the network into heavily
congested status.
In Chapter 7 we incorporate a game theoretic framework into the ICN model
to harness the selfish behaviors of a group of non-cooperative spatially distributed
CSMA users with heterogeneous rate requirements.
1.5 Device-to-Device Communication
A prospective application background of the spatial CSMA network is overlay
Device-to-Device (D2D) communication. In this section we give a brief introduction
on D2D communication, and discussed the settings used in our work in Chapter 7.
The growing popularity of smartphones and tablets has resulted in the increasing
demand for high data rate services, and a huge amount of data traffic normally needs
to be transmitted through cellular networks, which in turn leads to severe traffic
overload problems. Recently, D2D communication has emerged as a new data-
oﬄoading solution by enabling direct communication between two mobile users
without traversing the base station (BS) or core network [98].
D2D communication can be implemented over the cellular spectrum (i.e. in-
band) or the unlicensed spectrum (i.e. outband). Inband D2D can be further
classified into spectrum overlay and spectrum underlay. In the overlay scenario, the
cellular and D2D transmitters use orthogonal time/frequency resources or alternate
channels, while in the underlay scenario the D2D transmitters opportunistically ac-
cess the time/frequency resources occupied by cellular users. The rate performance
is evaluated in [99] for both overlay and underlay scenarios. It is observed that D2D
mobiles in both scenarios can enjoy much higher data rate than regular cellular mo-
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biles. As for cellular mobiles in the overlay scenario, their rate performance also
improves due to the oﬄoading capability of D2D communication. Besides perfor-
mance improvement over the pure cellular mode, inband overlay D2D is also more
tractable in analysis since it does not interfere with regular cellular mobiles or suffer
from random interference from unlicensed band.
In the licensed spectrum, a potential D2D pair can communicate through con-
ventional cellular mode (relay through the BS), dedicated D2D mode (spectrum
overlay), or underlay sharing mode (share with cellular users). Game theoretic
approaches have been applied in D2D communications for mode selection and re-
source management [100]. In particular, Cai et al. [101] model the spectrum sharing
mode selection as a coalition formation game, and propose a distributed coalition
formation algorithm to improve the total achievable rate. Wu et al. [102] study the
underlay spectrum sharing problem among potential D2D pairs and cellular users
with quality-of-service requirements. A coalition formation game and a distributed
coalition formation algorithm are proposed to decide for the most energy-efficient
spectrum sharing strategy. The focus of these works is to look for efficient spectrum
sharing solutions among the D2D pairs and cellular users, and spectrum underlay
is adopted in the sharing mode under the constraints on the amount of mutual
interference. Our work focuses on spectrum overlay mode, in which the number of
orthogonal channels is limited and there are multiple D2D pairs sharing a common
channel via distributed transmission scheduling.
In [99] the authors use a simple spatial Aloha access scheme to support D2D
scheduling. In Chapter 7 we assume that all D2D links use CSMA as the multiple
access scheme to share a dedicated inband overlay channel. Spatial reuse is consid-
ered, i.e., different transmit-receive (Tx-Rx) pairs at a sufficient distance away that
do not cause interference are allowed to transmit simultaneously [86], with the ob-
jective to achieve higher throughput while still meeting all the transmission quality
requirements for the channel access of the individual link. Although D2D commu-
nication does not route the data traffic through the cellular network, the available
network infrastructure can still be an effective means to exert light control over all
the D2D links when performing resource allocation. In our model in Chapter 7, the
D2D links have heterogeneous service requirements and different willingness to pay,
and the central entity (e.g., evolved node B (eNB)) [98] controls the transmission
behaviors of all links by modifying the price per unit service rate.
A simple example is given in Fig. 1.2, where there are three D2D links and a
single BS oversees/controls them in the control plane. Each D2D link consists of
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D2D link D2D link
D2D link
BS
Figure 1.2: An Example of Overlay D2D Communications. The solid arrow represents the
data communication of a D2D link; the dashed arrow represents the control information
exchange between a D2D transmitter and the BS.
a Tx-Rx pair, and hence the D2D links resemble the situation where distributed
pairs are transmitting. The involvement of the cellular network in the control plane
is the key difference between our system model with that defined in Mobile Ad-
hoc NETworks (MANET) [103]. Moreover, D2D communication is mainly used
for single-hop communications [98], which does not inherit the multihop routing
problem of MANET [104,105].
1.6 Discussions on Interference Model
There are two popular interference models, namely, the physical model and the
protocol model [106]. Under the physical model, a transmission is considered suc-
cessful if and only if the signal to interference and noise ratio (SINR) exceeds a
certain threshold, where the interference includes all other concurrent transmis-
sions. Under the protocol model, a transmission is successful if and only if the
receiving node is in the transmission range of the corresponding transmitting node
and is out of the interference range of all other transmitting nodes.
The physical model is considered to be a better characterization of interference
(but also more difficult to analyze) than the protocol model. The main difficul-
ties are two folds. First, SINR is a non-convex function of transmitting powers;
an optimization problem in the physical model is usually non-convex and NP-hard
in general [107]. Second, the aggregated interference at a receiver may vary sig-
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nificantly with respect to time according to the transmission behaviors of all its
neighbors, which makes the analysis difficult.
To circumvent the complexity issue associated with the physical model for large-
sized networks, the protocol model has been widely used by researchers in wireless
networking community as a way to simplify the mathematical characterization of
the physical layer. Under the protocol model, the impact of interference from a
transmitting node is binary and is solely determined by whether or not a receiver
falls within the interference range of this transmitting node. Due to such simpli-
fication, the protocol model can be easily applied to analyse large-sized wireless
ad-hoc and sensor networks [108–111]. However, since the protocol model has not
accounted for aggregated interference from multiple interfering nodes, the accuracy
of characterizing interference is compromised.
For both the protocol model and the physical model, power control is an effective
physical layer technique to control the network topology so as to increase spatial
reuse through controlling the effect of interference. With the power control capabil-
ity, we could adjust the transmission power and thus reduce the interference range
of some transmission so as to achieve scheduling feasibility for other transmissions.
However, the enlarged design space also introduces much more complexity in the
mathematical modelling, problem formulation and solution procedure.
The authors in [112] [113] have developed a formal mathematical model for link
scheduling feasibility under the influence of power control. This model extends ex-
isting protocol interference model for wireless networks where power control (and
thus transmission range and interference range) is now part of the optimization
space. Based on this model, the joint power control, scheduling and flow routing
problem is formulated as a mixed integer nonlinear programming (MINLP) prob-
lem. They develop a centralized solution procedure based on the branch-and-bound
technique. The authors in [107] further consider the joint power control, scheduling
and flow routing problem based on the physical interference model. The prob-
lem is also formulated as a MINLP and branch-and-bound technique is used as a
centralized solution procedure. However, since the formulated MINLP is NP-hard
in general, it cannot be directly applied in practice, but rather as a performance
benchmark for other algorithms developed for practical implementation.
The authors in [114] [115] further consider the problem about how to correctly
use the protocol interference model for wireless networks and try to bridge the gap
between protocol and physical models. The physical model is widely considered
as a reference model for physical layer behaviour but its application is limited by
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its complexity. On the other hand, the protocol model is simple but the accuracy
is compromised. The authors in [114] [115] propose a new concept called “reality
check” and present a method of using a protocol model with reality check for wireless
networks. Subsequently, they show that by appropriate setting of the interference
range in the protocol model, it is possible to narrow the solution gap between the
two models. The simulation results confirm that this gap is indeed small (or even
negligible). Therefore, their proposed method of joint reality check and interference
range setting retains the protocol model as a viable approach to analyse wireless
networks.
Similarly, in the domain of dynamic spectrum management, the authors in [116]
show that if the conflict graphs are optimized properly, they can produce spec-
trum allocations that closely match those derived from the physical interference
model. The authors further propose Physical confLict grAph geNerator (PLAN),
a systematic framework to produce conflict graphs based on physical interference
characteristics. PLAN first applies an analytical framework to derive the criterion
for identifying conflicting neighbors, capturing the cumulative effect of interference.
PLAN then applies a local conflict adjustment algorithm to address heterogeneous
interference conditions and improve spectrum allocation efficiency.
In this thesis, the interference relationship is characterized by the interference
matrix, which corresponds to the conflict graph in the protocol model. The tech-
niques in [114] [115] [116] can be used to generate an appropriate conflict graph
which caters for the aggregated physical interference to some extent and bridges
the gap between protocol and physical models.
1.7 Motivations and Contributions
This thesis studies the spectrum sharing problems among a group of spatially dis-
tributed Tx-Rx user pairs in a spectrum commons. The users are able to make
intelligent decisions on spectrum usage and choose transmission parameters based
on learned spectrum dynamics and their competitors’ decisions. As a result of
their autonomous and intelligent behaviors and interactions, stability issues arise
concerning whether the whole network would converge to an equilibrium solution
which also provides efficiency and fairness for the users. We therefore study how to
manage the spectrum access problem for such autonomous and spatially distributed
users with the objective to achieve efficient spectrum sharing with fairness and scal-
ability. As discussed in Section 1.1.3, basic spectrum sharing rules are needed in a
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spectrum commons, which should follow three general principles: efficiency, fairness,
and incentive compatibility.
To design incentive compatible spectrum sharing rules, non-cooperative games
can be used to analyze the self-interested behaviors of the users (i.e., game players).
An important solution concept to non-cooperative games is NE, which is incentive
compatible for all players since no one has the incentive to deviate from such an
equilibrium point. Stability issues arise when the users act non-altruistically in
maximizing their own benefits. First of all, we need to know whether a NE exists
for the game. Secondly, to search for the NE(s) of the game, we need to carefully
design the underlying dynamics so that the game converges to the NE(s), i.e., the
strategic interactions among the intelligent and self-interested users would converge
to a steady-state equilibrium point. More desirably, the NE should be “stable” so
that the game converges back to the NE after being perturbed by small disturbances
(e.g., introduced by parameter estimation errors). Finally, we need to consider the
efficiency and fairness of the NE. It is desirable to design the spectrum sharing rules
so that the network operating point is incentive compatible, being on or close to
the Pareto front, while providing a certain degree of fairness among the users.
1.7.1 Generalized Aloha Games
As a starting point, we first investigate the spectrum commons model with dis-
tributed Tx-Rx user pairs competing for transmission in a single random access
channel. CSMA-type random access could be used, in which the users sense the
channel first and then transmit in the absence of other traffic [14]. Alternatively,
if there is no sensing before each transmission, Aloha-type random access could be
used [14]. We first focus on the slotted-Aloha-type random access scheme of the
distributed user pairs.
Aloha games study the MAPs of a group of non-cooperative users which share
a channel to transmit via the slotted Aloha protocol. Chapter 3 extends the Aloha
games to spatial reuse scenarios, and studies the system equilibrium and perfor-
mance. Specifically, fixed point theory and order theory are used to prove the exis-
tence of a least fixed point as the unique NE of the game and the optimal choice of
all players. The Krasovskii’s method is used to construct a Lyapunov function and
obtain the conditions to examine the stability of the NE. Simulations show that
the theories derived are applicable to large-scale distributed systems of complicated
network topologies. An empirical relationship between the network connectivity
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and the achievable total throughput is finally obtained through simulations.
1.7.2 Heuristic Algorithm to Approach Pareto Front
In Chapter 4, we go beyond the generalized Aloha game, and study how future
autonomous radios can make use of the developed theory to improve the overall
system performance [117]. The most challenging issue is that, the Pareto-front [19]
target rate is determined by the network as a whole, while in a distributed network
each user usually has only limited local information and hence does not know how
to achieve the Pareto-front throughput. As a result, if some or all the users are over-
demanding, the resulting network can be unstable due to congestions. However, if
the users set low target rates, the network is stable but the channel is not fully
exploited. The challenge lies in how users can determine their equilibrium MAPs as
a result of competing among themselves and yet still maintaining network stability.
In the generalized Aloha game, we derive the stability condition of the NE, which
can be used to test whether a certain target rate is within the feasible throughput
region. However, this testing condition requires complete knowledge on the net-
work topology, which is neither practical nor scalable for an individual player to
implement. Therefore, we need to design a self-adaptive algorithm for the players to
self-adjust their target rates based on a set of pre-installed rules so that the network
always approaches Pareto optimal bandwidth utilization automatically. In Chapter
4, we implement such an algorithm in a fully distributed manner, which requires
no information exchange among the players. Each player repeatedly measures its
current throughput and uses the measured value to make myopic best response to
the current channel idle rate. Our simulations show that the system indeed achieves
close to Pareto optimal performance while guaranteeing a certain degree of fairness.
The algorithm is robust and can handle various practical issues such as the dynamic
arrival/departure of players, parameter estimation errors, etc.
1.7.3 Clustering-based Control Theoretic Approach
In the algorithm proposed in Chapter 4, the distributed users heuristically search
for Pareto-front target rates, and the system indeed settles down with a target
rate that is close to the Pareto front. However, the users using such a heuristic
approach have to monitor the channel activities continuously, and will experience
several fluctuations before settling down since the network has to be driven into
the unstable region to detect the crossing of the Pareto front. As the network
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size increases, the system will experience more fluctuations and take longer time to
converge. Hence it is worth to look into how to design a fast self-adaptive network
rigorously.
The objective of Chapter 5 is to develop an intelligent algorithm to be embedded
into the transceivers so that all users know how to self-tune their MAPs to achieve
overall Pareto optimality in terms of network throughput under spatial reuse while
maintaining network stability. While the optimal solution requires each user to
have complete information about the network, our proposed scheme in Chapter 5
only requires users to have local information.
The fundamental of our proposed scheme is that the users will first self-organize
into a number of non-overlapping neighborhoods, and the user with the maximum
node degree in each neighborhood is elected as the local leader. Each local leader
then adjusts its MAP according to a parameter R which indicates the radio intensity
level in its neighboring region, whereas the remaining users in the neighborhood
simply follow the same MAP value. We show that by ensuring R ≤ 2 at the local
leaders, the stability of the entire network can be assured even when each user only
has partial network information. For practical implementation, we propose each
local leader to use R = 2 as the constant reference signal to its built-in proportional
and integral (PI) controller. The settings of the control parameters are discussed
and we validate through simulations that the proposed method is able to achieve
close-to-Pareto-front throughput.
1.7.4 Joint MAP Tuning and Channel Selection Games in
Multi-Channel Spatial Aloha
To further improve the network performance, multiple collision channels can be
considered in Aloha networks with spatial reuse. However, as discussed in Sec-
tion 1.3.2, the problem of joint MAP tuning and channel selection has not been
addressed, which motivates our design in Chapter 5.
Chapter 5 uses the multi-channel spatial Aloha model to describe a distributed
autonomous wireless network where a group of Tx-Rx user pairs share multiple
collision channels via slotted-Aloha-type random access. The design objective is to
enable each autonomous user i to select a channel ci and decide a MAP qi to improve
its throughput, while providing a certain degree of fairness among the users. Game
theoretic approaches are applied, where each user i is a player who chooses the
strategy (ci, qi) to improve its own throughput. To search for a NE, a multi-leader
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Stackelberg game is formulated to iteratively obtain a solution on each dimension of
the (ci, qi) strategy. Initially, multiple Stackelberg leaders are elected to manage the
MAPs of all players. Then under the resulting MAP profile, each player iteratively
chooses its channel to improve its throughput. An oscillation resolving mechanism
is further proposed to stabilize the design in some special cases where the operating
points of some players in a local region would oscillate between the two dimensions
of the myopic search.
Compared to existing methods of pre-allocating MAPs, the proposed game fur-
ther improves the overall network throughput by iteratively tuning the MAPs to-
ward max-min throughput in each subnet. Simulation results show that the pro-
posed game gradually improves the total throughput until reaching a NE, which
also provides good throughput fairness for the players.
1.7.5 A Stackelberg Game Model for Spatial CSMA Net-
works
Slotted-Aloha-type random access has been used in the above works. In Chapter
7, we investigate another type of random access scheme, i.e., CSMA, under spatial
reuse.
Chapter 7 studies the performance of overlay D2D communication links via
CSMA-type random access. We assume that the D2D links have heterogeneous
rate requirements and different willingness to pay, and each of them acts non-
altruistically to achieve its target rate while maximizing its own payoff. Spatial
reuse is allowed if the links are not interfering with each other. A non-cooperative
game model is used to address the resource allocation among the D2D links, at
the same time leveraging on the ICN model to address the physical channel access
issue. We propose a Stackelberg game in which the base station in the cellular
network acts as a Stackelberg leader to regulate the individual payoff by modifying
the unit service price so that the total D2D throughput is maximized. The problem
is shown to be quasi-convex and can be solved by a sequence of equivalent convex
optimization problems. The pricing strategies are designed so that the network
always operates within the feasible throughput region. The results are verified by
simulations.
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1.8 Organization of the Thesis
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2 we introduce the spatial
Aloha model in single channel and multi-channel scenarios, which lays the basis for
the studies in Chapter 3 to Chapter 6. Then we introduce the ICN model which
will be used in Chapter 7.
Chapter 3 to Chapter 7 are dedicated to each of the contributions in Section
1.7.1 to Section 1.7.5, respectively. Then we summarize the thesis in Chapter 8 and
point out possible future research directions.
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Chapter 2
System Models and Problem State-
ments
In this chapter we first introduce the spatial reuse model in distributed wireless
networks. Then we introduce the spatial Aloha model in single channel and multi-
channel scenarios, and state the problems to be solved. Finally we introduce the
ICN model which is the basis for our study in Chapter 7.
2.1 Spatial Reuse Model
Consider a distributed wireless network with N transmitters, where each transmit-
ter has its unique designated receiver. Each Tx-Rx user pair shares a common
collision channel with other users, via slotted-Aloha or CSMA type of random ac-
cess. Spatial reuse is considered, i.e., if the users are located sufficiently far apart,
then they can transmit in the same frequency band simultaneously without causing
any performance degradation to each other. Such a spatial reuse model can be
characterized by an “interference graph” as in [70], or similarly by an “contention
graph” as in [86]. The interference estimation methods in [118] can be applied to
obtain the interference graph.
As an example, three Tx-Rx pairs and their equivalent interference graph are
shown in Fig. 2.1, where users 1 and 3 can transmit concurrently without collisions
but neither of them can transmit together with user 2. Such interference relations
















Figure 2.1: 3 Transmit-Receive Pairs and the corresponding Interference (Contention)
Graph [2]. In the upper part of the figure, the solid-thick arrow represents the trans-
mission from a transmitter to its designated receiver; the solid-thin (dash-thin) arrow
represents the non-negligible (negligible) interference from a transmitter to other unin-
tended receivers.
in which a12 = 1 means user 2 is a neighbor of user 1, a13 = 0 means user 3 is not
a neighbor of user 1, etc. By default, aii = 0,∀i.
The interference matrix characterizes the spatial distribution and frequency
reuse capability of the users. Each user has different neighboring users who di-
rectly affect its transmission. For a successful transmission for user i, i ∈ N =
{1, 2, · · · , N}, all of user i’s neighbors (user j with aij = 1), should not transmit.
We assume that every user’s transmission queue is continuously backlogged, i.e., the
transmitter of every user always has a packet to transmit to its designated receiver.
2.2 Single-Channel Spatial Aloha
We first consider a distributed wireless network in which a group of Tx-Rx pairs
share a common collision channel via slotted-Aloha-type random access. These Tx-
Rx user pairs are allowed to reuse the channel if they receive negligible interference
from others. With the defined interference matrix in Section 2.1, if we assume





(1− qj), ∀i ∈ N . (2.1)
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The equation indicates that for a successful transmission for user i, all those users
which will interfere with its transmission (user j where aij = 1), should not transmit.
It can be seen that the equations obtained here do not have a symmetric structure
since the MAPs of some of the users are missing in some of the equations, depending
on the network interference topology. This is unlike the relationship obtained from
a fully connected network [49], where aij = 1, ∀i 6= j; in this situation, the equations
exhibit symmetric structures.
As a starting point, we first investigate the spectrum commons model with
distributed Tx-Rx user pairs competing for transmission in a single collision channel
using slotted Aloha. Under such a scenario, an autonomous user would naturally
want to transmit more and obtain higher bandwidth utilization. This results in
competition among the users on the common collision channel. If everyone wants
to transmit more, the contention level will be high and all pairs will suffer, whilst if
everyone transmits at a lower probability, the bandwidth is not fully exploited. Our
objective is to develop tailored algorithms so that each user has self-autonomous
capability to enable the network to operate at one stable equilibrium solution that
is close to the Pareto-front [19] throughput.
Challenges arise in the above problem. First of all, how to model the interactions
and behaviors of the users if each of them is interested in maximizing its own
benefit? If a non-cooperative game model is adopted, how to formulate the game
under spatial reuse? In the formulated game, does there exist a NE? Is it the unique
NE? Furthermore, if a NE exists, how to design the underlying dynamics so that
the game would converge to the NE? More desirably, is the NE “stable” in the
sense that the game would converge back to the NE after being perturbed by small
disturbances (e.g., introduced by parameter estimation errors)? These questions
will be addressed in Chapter 3.
Secondly, we need to consider the efficiency and fairness of the NE. In particu-
lar, how to approach the Pareto-front throughput solution using only limited local
information, while providing a certain degree of fairness for the users? This is a
challenging problem. Since the users are inter-connected either directly or indi-
rectly, the network stability condition, and hence the achievable throughput region
and Pareto front, would most likely involve having complete information of the
network (including the complete topology information and the MAPs of all users).
However, in reality, the spatially distributed users only possess local views, i.e., no
user has a full global view of the network, or the network is too complex for a user
to gather all information and make practical use of such knowledge. Moreover, even
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if the Pareto front is known, we also need to design the spectrum sharing rules so
that the final operating point not only is close to the Pareto front, but also provides
a certain degree of fairness for the users.
The above challenges motivate our design of a heuristic algorithm to be presented
in Chapter 4 and a control theoretic method to be presented in Chapter 5. We will
also show that our solutions achieve close-to-Pareto-front throughputs while at the
same time taking into account the fairness issues among the users.
2.3 Multi-Channel Spatial Aloha
In some situations, multiple channels could be available for transmission. The
autonomous radios are allowed to decide not only the MAP but also the channel
it can transmit on. Consider a distributed wireless network with N transmitters,
where each transmitter has its unique designated receiver. Each Tx-Rx user pair
selects one of the K orthogonal channels for transmission, and shares channel access
with other users via slotted-Aloha. We make the following assumptions:
• In each time slot each user is allowed to access a single channel.
• Every user’s transmission queue is continuously backlogged, i.e., the transmit-
ter of every user always has a packet to transmit to its designated receiver.
• Each user perfectly estimates the load on all channels [73] (i.e., monitors the
channel utilization for a sufficient time, or by enabling local information exchange
about MAP).
• For simplicity, we assume that the channel conditions of all the channels at
all the users remain stable for a relatively long period of time.
If the users are located sufficiently far apart, then they can transmit in the same
frequency band simultaneously without causing any performance degradation to
each other. For the example in Fig. 2.1, users 1 and 3 can transmit concurrently
without collisions but neither of them can transmit together with user 2, given
that these users are sharing the same channel. Such interference relations can be
characterized by an interference matrix A, as introduced in Section 2.1. With
the interference matrix, assuming that each user i chooses a MAP qi, then the
throughput θi in the single channel case can be obtained as in (2.1).
Then we generalize to the case with K orthogonal channels. Hereafter, we
assume the network starts with all users transmitting in one of the channels, where
the interference matrix A is applied. Only those neighboring users transmitting on









Figure 2.2: 4 Users Topology
these users among all channels. We shall adopt the following notations. Denote K =
{1, 2, · · · , K} as the available channel set, and ci ∈ K as the channel selected by user
i,∀i ∈ N . Since we assume that all users experience the same channel conditions
on all channels, the neighboring relationship remains. After the channel allocation,
all users are partitioned into G groups, where each groupMg(g ∈ G = {1, · · · , G})
corresponds to a connected sub-network, and ∪Gg=1Mg = N . These subnets are
disconnected from others, i.e., Mg1 ∩Mg2 = Ø,∀g1, g2 ∈ G, g1 6= g2, either because
they operate on different channels, or they are on the same channel but spatially




(1− qj),∀i ∈ N . (2.2)
For example, consider the interference graph in Fig. 2.2a, with the corresponding
interference matrix A =

0 1 0 0
1 0 1 1
0 1 0 1
0 1 1 0
 . Now assume that two channels are available
and the channel allocation is c = (1, 2, 1, 1) as indicated in Fig. 2.2b. Then there
are 3 subnets, i.e., M1 = {1}, M2 = {2} and M3 = {3, 4}. The throughput for
each user, according to (2.2), is θ1 = q1, θ2 = q2, θ3 = q3(1 − q4), θ4 = q4(1 − q3),
respectively.
We further observe that, under a certain channel allocation profile, we can im-
prove the users’ throughputs and provide a certain degree of fairness by properly
managing the MAPs of the users. For the example in Fig. 2.2b, we can tune up
the MAPs as q = (1, 1, 1/2, 1/2) so that max-min throughput is achieved in each
subnet, i.e., θ = (1, 1, 1/4, 1/4).
Problems arise in the above settings. Specifically, how to enable the autonomous
users to properly choose their channels and tune their MAPs so that the network
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throughput is improved while providing a certain degree of fairness for the users?
In the above distributed wireless network model where users make autonomous
decisions based on local information, how to model and analyze such strategic in-
teractions? These questions will be addressed in Chapter 5, in which we propose
to use a game-theoretic approach to handle the joint MAP tuning and channel
selection problem.
2.4 Spatial CSMA
Slotted-Aloha-type random access has been used in the above models. In this
section, we introduce another type of random access scheme, i.e., CSMA, under
spatial reuse.
2.4.1 Spatial Reuse and Contention Graph
Consider the situation where there are N D2D links (i.e., Tx-Rx pairs) in the
network sharing a dedicated inband overlay channel via CSMA-type random access.
These D2D links can transmit in the same frequency band simultaneously if they
do not cause any performance degradation to each other. We assume that the
CSMA network is hidden-node-free, which can be achieved by properly setting the
carrier-sensing power threshold as in [119] [120]. Such a spatial reuse model can be
characterized by a “contention graph” as in [86]. For simplicity, only a connected
network is considered, and if the network is not connected, then it can be divided
into several independent connected sub-networks and dealt with separately. We
assume that the contention graph is un-directed and the transmission queue of each
D2D link is continuously backlogged, i.e., the transmitter of every D2D link always
has a packet to transmit to its designated receiver. An example for three D2D links
is shown in Fig. 2.1, where D2D links 1 and 3 can transmit concurrently without
collisions but neither of them can transmit together with link 2. In such cases, link
2 is a neighbor of link 1, but link 3 is not.
2.4.2 Ideal CSMA Network Model
In the CSMA random access method, a link senses the channel before transmitting.
Based on such a carrier-sensing relationship, a link will refrain from transmitting
if any of its neighbors is transmitting. In the ICN model, each link maintains a
countdown timer, whose value tcd is modelled as a continuous random variable with
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an arbitrary distribution [86]. The timer value tcd counts down if the channel is
sensed as idle, and is frozen if the channel is sensed as busy. When the channel
becomes idle again, the countdown of tcd resumes until tcd = 0, upon which the
link transmits a packet. The transmission time ttr is a random variable with an
arbitrary distribution. For simplicity, we have adopted uniform distributions for
both tcd and ttr in our simulations.
At any time, a link is either transmitting or idle. Denote the state of link i
as si ∈ {0, 1}, where si = 1 if link i is transmitting and si = 0 otherwise. When
si = 0, link i is either actively counting down or frozen, depending on whether a
neighboring link j is transmitting or not. We shall denote the system state of a
N -link ICN by a N -tuple binary vector s = [s1, s2, · · · , sN ] or simply by a string
s1s2 · · · sN . Notice that si = sj = 1 is not allowed if links i and j are neighbors,
for the reasons that they can sense each other and the probability of them counting
down to zero simultaneously is negligibly small under ICN due to the adopted
continuous random variables [86]. Therefore, each feasible state corresponds to an
independent set [86] of the contention graph.
As an example, for the contention graph in Fig. 2.1, the five independent sets
are Ø, {1}, {2}, {3}, {1, 3}. By default, we also include Ø, which corresponds to
s = 0, as an independent set. The collection of these feasible system states are
denoted by the set
S = {[0, 0, 0], [1, 0, 0], [0, 1, 0], [0, 0, 1], [1, 0, 1]}. (2.3)
If we denote the state s with sj = 0,∀j ∈ N = {1, 2, · · · , N} as e0, and the state s
with si = 1, sj = 0,∀j 6= i as ei, then S can be denoted as
S = {e0, e1, e2, e3, e1 + e3}. (2.4)
2.4.3 Stationary Distribution
Here we summarize the stationary distribution of the system states based on the
results in [86]. If the transmission time and countdown time are exponentially
distributed, then the system state s(t) is a time-reversible Markov process. The
state transition diagram of the example in Fig. 2.1 is shown in Fig. 2.3, where
there are 5 feasible system states. Each transition from a state in the left to a
state in the right represents the beginning of a link transmission, while the reverse



























Figure 2.3: State Transition Diagram for Fig. 2.1
transition from 001 to 101 represents the beginning of link 1’s transmission while
link 3 is transmitting. Similarly, the transition from 101 to 001 represents the
ending of link 1’s transmission while link 3 continues its transmission.
The transition rate of a link from idle state to transmission state is λ = 1/E[tcd],
while the transition rate from transmission state to idle state is µ = 1/E[ttr].
Therefore, a higher rate λ and a lower rate µ would suggest a higher intensity of
the link to access the channel. The access intensity (AI) [86] of a link is then
defined as the ratio of its mean transmission time to its mean countdown time:
ρ = E[ttr]/E[tcd] = λ/µ. Note that a higher value of AI suggests a higher intensity
to access the channel. We further introduce the transmission aggressiveness (TA)
[92], which is defined as the natural logarithm of AI ρ, i.e., r = loge ρ. Since
natural logarithm is a monotonically increasing function, a higher value of AI would
correspond to a higher value of TA, which suggests the link is more aggressive to
transmit.
Given a profile of AIs ρ = [ρ1, ρ2, · · · , ρN ], the stationary probability of the state
s ∈ S is shown in [86] to be given by
ps = 1/Z ·
∏
i:si=1












means that for each state s, only those transmitting links are involved in the mul-
tiplication. Collectively, we can write the state probability distribution as a vector
p = [ps1 , ps2 , · · · , ps|S| ], where |S| is the cardinality of the set S, i.e., the number of
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feasible states.
Similarly, if we replace AIs by TAs and define a profile of TAs r = [r1, r2, · · · , rN ] =
loge ρ for all links, the stationary state probabilities are given by
ps = 1/Z · exp(
∑N







As an illustration, consider the state transition diagram in Fig. 2.3. Since
the system state is a time-reversible Markov process, the stationary probability
distribution should satisfy
p100 = ρ1 · p000,
p010 = ρ2 · p000,
p001 = ρ3 · p000,
p101 = ρ1 · p001 = ρ3 · p100 = ρ1 · ρ3 · p000,
p000 + p100 + p010 + p001 + p101 = 1.
(2.9)
Solving the equations in (2.9) yields
p000 = 1/(1 + ρ1 + ρ2 + ρ3 + ρ1ρ3) = 1/Z, (2.10)
where Z is given in (2.6). Once Z is evaluated, other state probabilities can be
easily computed.
Despite the idealized assumption about instantaneous sensing and continuous
backoff time, the ICN model does capture the essence of CSMA under spatial reuse.
It is shown in [86] that the stationary probability distribution in (2.5) holds even if
both the transmission time and countdown time are not exponentially distributed,
given that the ratio of their mean ρi = E[ttr,i]/E[tcd,i] for each link i ∈ N re-
mains unchanged. On the other hand, in the discrete time model, the stationary
probability distribution will deviate from (2.5) due to collisions. Fortunately, when
RTS/CTS handshaking is used and under the same TAs, the stationary distribu-
tion will approach that given in (2.5) since the collision period will be comparatively
small for a sufficiently large holding time [95].
Finally, it then follows from (2.7) and (2.8) that the throughput or mean service
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,∀i ∈ N , (2.11)
which is the sum of the stationary state probabilities defined in (2.7) in which link
i is actively transmitting (i.e., si = 1). In vector form, if we define the vector




where s is the N -dimensional vector used to represent a system state.
2.4.4 Problem Statement
Based on the above ICN model, the discussion in this subsection is on how to
efficiently model the resulting D2D network if the CSMA channel access mechanism
is adopted by all D2D links. If the objective of the network is to maximize the sum-
rate of all transmitting links, and the BS gives no control on the admission and
transmission of links, then [92] has successfully solved this problem. The solution
is computed in a completely distributed manner. However, as pointed out earlier
in Section 1.4, such a fully cooperative model is too idealistic and there is no
consideration on the utility heterogeneity and selfish behaviors of the links. In fact,
Cagalj et al. have shown that even the presence of a few selfish users may lead the
CSMA network to collapse [96], while proper pricing or penalty mechanisms lead to
overall improvement [97]. Therefore, it may be better to build a pricing framework
so that each link tries to maximize its payoff function when competing for resources,
rather than someone tries to take advantage when the network is in operation and
drive the network to unstable states. Furthermore, maximizing the sum-rate may
not distribute the resources according to demand because links with low demand
may be assigned to transmit at higher rate due to its spatial location.
To address the above concerns, in Chapter 7 we incorporate a game theoretic
framework into the ICN model to harness the selfish behaviors of a group of non-




Aloha Games with Spatial Reuse
3.1 Introduction
A detailed review on Aloha games has been made in Section 1.3.1. In this chapter,
the Aloha game model in [49] is generalized to include the spatial reuse capability,
named as a generalized Aloha game. Unlike the model in [49], the use of spatial
reuse here distorts the symmetric structure in the expressions to evaluate the NE
solution. As a result, a new Lyapunov function needs to be constructed to prove
the convergence of a generalized Aloha game.
Also notice that our generalized Aloha game is different from the multi-packet
reception (MPR) Aloha game model in [42], although they both allow multiple
packets to be successfully received simultaneously. In [42], the users are assumed
to be indistinguishable; every user knows the current number of backlogged users
in the system; the MPR model is possible by enabling multiple captures in a single
channel, or single capture via the use of multiple parallel channels; the stability
conditions and stability region of the equilibrium strategy are based on the drift
analysis of a Markov chain and the selfish behavior of users when the number of
backlogged users goes to infinity. On the other hand, the generalized Aloha game in
this chapter assumes that users are heterogeneous in their bandwidth requirements
and their neighboring user environment; users have information about the MAPs
of others; the MPR capability comes from the spatial reuse of a conventional Aloha
collision channel; the stability issues are based on the Lyapunov stability analysis
of a nonlinear system.
We introduce the model for the generalized Aloha game in Section 3.2, followed
by some mathematical fundamentals on fixed point theory and order theory in
Section 3.3. We next discuss the existence of a NE in Section 3.4. In particular,
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we use fixed point theory and order theory to prove the existence of a least fixed
point in the generalized Aloha game, which is the unique NE of the game and the
most energy-efficient operating point for all players. In Section 3.5, we propose
a method to prove the stability of the NE. The Krasovskii’s method is used to
construct the Lyapunov function and obtain the conditions to examine the stability
of the NE. After obtaining the conditions to test for system stability, we summarize
how to dynamically converge to the least fixed point in game iterations. Section
3.6 shows through simulations that the generalized Aloha game is applicable to
large-scale distributed systems with complicated network topologies. An empirical
relationship between the achievable total throughput and the network connectivity
is finally obtained through our simulations. We conclude the chapter in Section 3.7.
3.2 Model for Aloha Games with Spatial Reuse
With the interference matrix defined in Section 2.1, we can now study the behavior
of a generalized Aloha game. The objective of the game is for player i to select a
suitable MAP qi so that player i achieves its target rate yi, ∀i ∈ N = {1, 2, · · · , N},
with the lowest possible transmission energy, i.e., each player uses the smallest MAP
as it could to attain its target rate. The target rate combination y = [y1, · · · , yN ]
is controlled by certain pricing strategies [60] or some commonly agreed adjusting





(1− qj), ∀i ∈ N . (3.1)
The equation indicates that for a successful transmission for player i, all those
players which will interfere with its transmission (player j where aij = 1), should not
transmit. It can be seen that the equations obtained here do not have a symmetric
structure since the MAPs of some of the players are missing in some of the equations,
depending on the network interference topology. This is unlike the relationship
obtained from a fully connected network [49], where aij = 1,∀i 6= j; in this situation,
the equations exhibit symmetric structures. We now formally state the generalized
Aloha game as follows:
Players : Distributed Tx-Rx pairs, i ∈ N , who compete for a single collision
channel to transmit via slotted-Aloha-type random access scheme.
Actions : Each player i chooses a MAP qi ∈ [0, 1], ∀i ∈ N .
Objectives : Each player i (i ∈ N ) aims to minimize the transmission energy
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consumption in attaining its target rate yi, i.e.,
min qi





The solution of a generalized Aloha game is NE, which is defined as an action
profile (in our case, q∗ = [q∗1, · · · , q∗N ]) in which each action is a best response to
the actions of all the other players [34]. To be qualified as a NE of the generalized
Aloha game, the constraints of all players have to be satisfied first, or in other words,
we can directly examine the solutions to the set of equations in (3.1). Interesting
questions arise related to the problem. By definition, since all the MAPs are real-
valued and cannot exceed 1, some of the solutions to (3.1) that do not satisfy these
constraints should be discarded. Among the remaining solutions, is there an optimal
one existing for all players, or multiple solutions each favoring different subgroups
of players? In case if there are multiple solutions to (3.1), how to make the players
reach the consensus to choose the same solution? If the consensus can be made,
how to dynamically reach that solution in game iterations?
Suppose the iterative approach in [49] is applied to (3.1) to find out the solutions,







, 1}, ∀i ∈ N . (3.3)
If a solution q
s
= [qs,1, qs,2, · · · , qs,N ] exists, it should satisfy
qs,i = min{ yi∏
aij=1
(1− qs,j) , 1}, ∀i ∈ N . (3.4)
Besides satisfying the equality constraints in (3.1), if there exist multiple feasible
solutions, we will prove in Section 3.4 that there exists an optimal solution which
enable each player to operate with the minimal MAP. This optimal solution q∗ is
then the unique NE of the generalized Aloha game defined in (3.2). Mathematically,
if we introduce a binary relation “” between two real-valued vectors a, b, which is
defined as component-wise less than or equal to, i.e., a  b⇔ ai ≤ bi,∀i ∈ N , then
the NE q∗, as compared to other solutions q
s





In this section, we introduce the Brouwer’s fixed-point theorem (in order to prove
the existence of solutions to (3.4)), the Kleene fixed-point theorem (in order to prove
the existence of a least fixed point, which is later shown to be the unique NE of the
game), and some related definitions. These proofs involve an N -dimensional vector
function F = (f1, f2, · · · , fN)T , whose component fi(q)(i ∈ N ) is a real-valued
function of q ∈ Γ, where Γ ⊂ RN .
Theorem 3.1 (Brouwer’s fixed-point theorem [121]). Every continuous vector func-
tion F from a convex compact set Γ (where Γ ⊂ RN) to Γ itself has a fixed point,
i.e., there is a point q ∈ Γ such that F (q) = q.
Definition 3.1. A binary relation over a set Γ ⊂ RN is a collection of ordered
pairs in Γ.
Definition 3.2. A binary relation “” over a set Γ ⊂ RN is a partial order if it
is reflexive, antisymmetric, and transitive, i.e., ∀a, b, c ∈ Γ,
(a) reflexivity: a  a;
(b) antisymmetry: if a  b and b  a, then a = b;
(c) transitivity: if a  b and b  c, then a  c.
Definition 3.3. A subset S of a partially ordered set (Γ, ) is called directed if,
for any a, b ∈ S, there is c ∈ S such that a  c and b  c.
Definition 3.4. A partially ordered set (Γ, ) is said to be complete, and hence
a complete partial order, if there is a least element of Γ (denoted by ⊥) and
every directed subset S ⊂ Γ has a least upper bound supS ∈ Γ.
Definition 3.5. Let (Γ, ) be a partially ordered set. A vector function F : Γ→ Γ
is monotonic or order-preserving if whenever a  b, we have F (a)  F (b).
Definition 3.6. Given a partially ordered set (Γ, ), a vector function F : Γ→ Γ
is Scott-continuous if, for every directed subset S of Γ, supF (S) = F (supS) ∈ Γ.
Theorem 3.2 (Kleene fixed-point theorem [122] [123]). Let (Γ, ) be a complete
partial order, and let F : Γ→ Γ be a Scott-continuous vector function. Then F has
a least fixed point, which is the supremum of the ascending Kleene chain of F.
The ascending Kleene chain of F is the chain
⊥ F (⊥)  F (F (⊥))  · · ·  F n(⊥)  · · ·
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obtained by iterating F on the least element ⊥ of Γ.
Expressed in a formula, the theorem states that
LFP(F ) = sup
n→∞
F n(⊥) (3.5)
where LFP denotes the least fixed point, which is less than or equal to all other
fixed points by some partial order.
3.4 Equilibrium of the Generalized Aloha Game
In this section, we prove the existence of solutions to (3.4), and the existence of a
least fixed point which would later be shown to be the unique NE in the generalized
Aloha game. We specify the aforementioned N -dimensional vector function F =
(f1, f2, · · · , fN)T , whose component fi is defined as a real function given by
fi(q) = min{ yi∏
aij=1
(1− qj) , 1}, ∀i ∈ N . (3.6)
The function fi maps q = [q1, · · · , qN ] ∈ [0, 1]N into the ith component of the vector
function F . The reason to define (3.6) will become clearer shortly.
3.4.1 Existence of Solutions
The equations defined in (3.6) and Brouwer’s fixed-point theorem are used to ex-
amine the existence of solutions to (3.4). From definition, the fixed point of the
vector function F , q
s
= (qs,1, qs,2, · · · , qs,N), is given by solving F (qs) = qs, or
fi(qs) = qs,i,∀i ∈ N . By substituting such a relationship into (3.6), it results in
the solution having the same form as that obtained in (3.4). This means that the
solution to (3.4) can be understood as a fixed point to the defined vector function
F . Since the continuous vector function F maps a point q from the convex compact







), i.e., (3.4) follows.
It is now clear why (3.6) is defined, as the fixed point behavior of (3.6) is equiv-
alent to the original equality constraints defined in (3.1) except that we explicitly
include the bound qi = 1 in (3.6) to ensure that F maps into a compact set. One
issue to take note is that by using (3.6) to replace (3.1), an extraneous solution
q
s
= 1 is introduced to the original equality constraints defined in (3.1). This so-
lution is not desirable since all players continuously transmit and all transmissions
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will result in contention. Fortunately, this undesirable solution to (3.1) can be easily
identified and discarded.
Since the fixed points are proper only if they exist in (0, 1)N , we focus on such
solutions in the following discussion. We will show that if multiple fixed points exist
in (0, 1)N , there should exist a most energy-efficient one.
3.4.2 Existence of a Least Fixed Point
In the discussion for the generalized Aloha game, the following properties about
“” over the set Γ hold:
(a) By Definitions 3.1 & 3.2, the binary relation “” over the set Γ = [0, 1]N is
a partial order, since it is reflexive, antisymmetric, and transitive.
(b) By Definitions 3.3 & 3.4, the partially ordered set (Γ, ) is a complete partial
order. The least element of Γ is given by 0. For every directed subset S ⊂ Γ, the
least upper bound of S is the largest element in S, thus supS ∈ Γ. Therefore, (Γ,
) is a complete partial order.
We are now ready to prove the following propositions.
Proposition 3.1. The vector function F in (3.6) is an order-preserving function
over the complete partial order (Γ, ).
For any two vectors q, p ∈ Γ, where q  p, we have
min{ yi∏
aij=1
(1− qj) , 1} ≤ min{
yi∏
aij=1
(1− pj) , 1},
for i ∈ N . According to Definition 3.5, the proposition holds.
Proposition 3.2. For the vector function F defined by (3.6), if there exist multiple
fixed points in (0, 1)N , then a least fixed point exists, which is less than or equal to
all other fixed points, according to the partial order “” over the set Γ.
According to Definition 3.6, the vector function F defined by (3.6) is Scott-
continuous, because for every directed subset S of Γ, supF (S) = F (supS) ∈ Γ,
which follows from the order-preserving properties of F .
In summary, by Kleene fixed-point theorem, the vector function F defined by
(3.6) has a least fixed point, which is less than or equal to all other fixed points, in
the partial order “”. Moreover, the least fixed point can be obtained by iterating
F on the least element of Γ, i.e.,





Eq.(3.7) suggests that the players can choose initial MAPs q(0) = 0 to reach the least
fixed point by game iteration. Actually we are able to prove that the initial MAPs
q(0) can be set as any point in the set I ≡ [0, y1]× [0, y2]× · · · [0, yN ], i.e., q(0)  y.
This can be done using Kleene fixed-point theorem. By replacing Γ ≡ [0, 1]N with
Γ′ ≡ [q(0)1 , 1]× [q(0)2 , 1]× · · · [q(0)N , 1], one can easily use the earlier approach to show
that Γ′ is convex and compact, and can verify that (Γ′, ) is a complete partial
order. Moreover, from the structure of the continuous vector function F defined by
(3.6), one easily sees that F (q)  y  q(0), therefore F maps a point q from Γ′ to
Γ′ itself. Finally, one can also verify that F : Γ′ → Γ′ is a Scott-continuous vector
function. Therefore, by Kleene fixed-point theorem, the least fixed point can be
obtained by iterating F on the least element of Γ′, i.e.,
LFP(F ) = sup
n→∞
F n(q(0)), q(0) ∈ I. (3.8)
Notice that the actual feasible region for initial MAPs is larger than I. Later
in Section 3.6.1 we will numerically show that, for a stable NE, there exists a
neighborhood Ψ of this NE such that the system starting from any point in Ψ will
converge to this NE. However, while the value of the least fixed point is not known
at the point of evaluating, it might be sufficient to look for initial probabilities just
from the region I.
3.4.4 Discussion
The existence of a least fixed point is of great significance. If there exist multiple
fixed points (i.e., multiple solutions to (3.1)) in Γ, every selfish player will choose
the fixed point which is best for itself. If the least fixed point exists, then the MAP
for every player will be the least at this point, thus this fixed point is also the most
energy-efficient for every player. As a result, every player will choose this fixed
point as the operating point. Therefore, the least fixed point is the unique NE of
the generalized Aloha game. Finally, we have proved that the players can choose
any initial MAPs q(0) ∈ I to reach the least fixed point by game iteration. These
results have not been pointed out in the existing work published in [49] [60], where
the Aloha game model is first brought up.
On the other hand, (3.8) does not guarantee that such an iteration process is
stable, i.e., the solution may still diverge due to small disturbance at this fixed
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point. In the next section, we will discuss the method to prove the stability of the
NE.
3.5 Stability of the Equilibrium Point
This section investigates the stability of a generalized Aloha game defined by the
iteration process in (3.3). Stability is a desired property of the NE. A stable NE
can absorb small disturbances within a certain neighborhood Ψ, e.g., due to the
inaccuracy in estimating other players’ MAPs. On the other hand, if a NE is
not stable, then the game iteration process will diverge to some undesirable states
such as q = 1, which unfortunately leads to network congestion and results in
zero throughputs for everyone. Another motivation is that by understanding the
conditions to maintain network stability, we hope to acquire good knowledge to
design the intelligence inside future self-autonomous radios. We will discuss this in
section 3.6 using an example.
To prove the stability of the resulting NE, we follow the pattern from [49] and
approximate the generalized Aloha game by the Jacobi update scheme:
q(m+1) = q(m) + (F (q(m))− q(m)) (3.9)
where  is a fixed small positive number and F is defined by (3.6). For sufficiently
small , (3.9) can be approximated by a continuous-time game:
q˙(t) = g(q(t)) = F (q(t))− q(t) (3.10)
In the presence of spatial reuse, functions defined in (3.6) do not have a sym-
metric structure since the MAPs of some of the players are missing in some of the
equations, depending on the network interference topology. As a result, the Lya-
punov function Λ(q) in [49] is no longer applicable to the scenarios with spatial
reuse. Therefore, it is necessary to develop a more general Lyapunov function to
examine the stability of the solutions.
3.5.1 Krasovskii’s Method
We use a new method to construct a Lyapunov function to prove system stability,
namely the Krasovskii’s method [44].
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Theorem 3.3 (Krasovskii’s Method). Consider the non-linear system defined by
x˙ = g(x), with the equilibrium point of interest being the origin. Let J(x) denote
the Jacobian matrix of the system, i.e., J(x) = ∂g/∂x. If the matrix B(x) =
J(x) + JT (x) is negative definite in a neighborhood Ψ, then the equilibrium at the
origin is asymptotically stable. A Lyapunov function for this system is given by
Λ(x) = gT (x)g(x).
Define C(q) = −B(q) = −[J(q) + JT (q)], where J(q) is the Jacobian matrix of
the system in (3.10). For those fixed points in (0, 1)N , the entries of J(q) can be
calculated as follows:




−1 i = j
0 i 6= j, aij = 0
fi(q)
1−qj i 6= j, aij = 1
=
{
−1 i = j
aijfi(q)
1−qj i 6= j
(3.11)
Notice that at a fixed point in (0, 1)N , q˙(t) = g(q(t)) = F (q(t))− q(t) = 0, i.e.,
qs,i = fi(qs) =
yi∏
aij=1
(1− qs,j) . (3.12)
Therefore, the entries of C(q
s




)]ij = −[J(qs) + JT (qs)]ij
=
{




1−qs,i i 6= j
(3.13)
An equivalent condition for the positive definiteness of C(q
s
) is stated in Lemma
3.1 [124].
Lemma 3.1. The real-valued square matrix CN×N is positive definite if and only
if detCi > 0 for i = 1, 2, · · · , N , where Ci is the leading principal sub-matrix of C
determined by the first i rows and columns.












1− qs,i ) < 2, ∀i ∈ N . (3.14)
If C(q
s
) is positive definite, according to the Krasovskii’s method, the follow-
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ing proposition holds with the corresponding Lyapunov function being Λ(q) =
gT (q)g(q).
Proposition 3.3. If there is a fixed point q
s
∈ [0, 1]N with C(q
s
) being positive
definite, then there is a neighborhood Ψ ⊂ [0, 1]N of q
s
such that: for any initial
MAPs q(0) ∈ Ψ, the function q(t) obeying the dynamics (3.10) will converge to
q
s
∈ Ψ as t→∞.
For sufficiently small , Proposition 3.3 can be adjusted to make a statement
about the convergence of (3.9) at a fixed point q
s
. Following the postulation in [49],
we also postulate that the fixed points that are stable for (3.10) are also stable when
 = 1, i.e., for the original iteration (3.3).
In summary, we can verify the positive definiteness of C(q∗) in order to judge the
stability of the NE q∗ in a generalized Aloha game. Certain necessary and sufficient
conditions could be used, e.g., Lemma 3.1. Alternatively, the sufficient condition
given in (3.14) can also be used, which is easier to implement and gives almost the
same bound.
3.5.2 Stability Comparison between Multiple Fixed Points
Stability is a desired property of the NE. The price of instability is that the whole
network would be congested and nobody can transmit successfully. This subsection
compares the stability of the fixed points. Specifically, the following proposition
suggests that the least fixed point is more likely to be stable than other fixed points.
Therefore, the least fixed point not only is optimal in terms of energy efficiency, but
also carries less risk of instability.
Proposition 3.4. If the least fixed point is not stable in Aloha games, nor are other
fixed points.
Proof: Let’s investigate the entries of C(q
s
) from (3.13) first.
cij = [C(qs)]ij =
{




1−qs,i i 6= j
(3.15)
When i 6= j, cij is a non-increasing function of qs in the partial order “”, i.e.,




, then cij(qs) ≥ cij(ps),∀i 6= j.
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where x ∈ RN is the variable, and q
s
is a parameter.
Now suppose the least fixed point q∗ is not stable, i.e., C(q∗) is not positive
definite. According to the definition of positive definiteness [124], ∃x 6= 0, x ∈ RN ,
such that h(x, q∗) ≤ 0.
Since cij ≤ 0,∀i 6= j, we can always find an x with xixj ≥ 0, ∀i 6= j, such that
h(x, q∗) ≤ 0. For such a given x and any other fixed point p
s
 q∗, we have






∗)− cij(ps)) ≥ 0. (3.17)
Consequently, h(x, p
s
) ≤ h(x, q∗) ≤ 0, i.e., C(p
s
) is not positive definite. There-
fore, if the least fixed point is not stable, nor are other fixed points.
In summary, we only need to focus on the stability of the least fixed point. If
it is not stable, then no stable equilibrium point exists; if it is stable, then it will
be the choice of all players, and the behavior of the remaining fixed points may not
be of our concern since they are not energy efficient even if the solution is stable.
The reason behind this can be easily interpreted as follows. If each player transmits
more often but achieves the same throughput, it is just an indication that it is likely
there are more collisions in the network and hence more likely that the network will
become congested.
3.5.3 How to Dynamically Converge to the Least Fixed
Point
We summarize our results. First, we construct an interference matrix A based
on a given distribution of players. Second, for a given target rate combination
y = [y1, · · · , yN ], we iteratively calculate the least fixed point q∗ of the vector
function F defined in (3.6) by choosing the initial point q(0) ∈ I. Third, we judge
the stability of q∗ by verifying the positive definiteness of the matrix C(q∗) given in
(3.13), based on Proposition 3.3. Finally, if the least fixed point q∗ is stable, then
all players can arrive at this equilibrium point through iterations, by choosing any
initial point from the set I.
In short, for a combination of target rates satisfying the stability conditions
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given by Proposition 3.3, all players can reach the least fixed point (i.e., the unique
NE of the game) as a stable operating point, by choosing any initial MAPs q(0) ∈ I,
among which 0 and y are two convenient choices.
3.6 Simulation Studies
In Section 3.6.1, we first demonstrate the existence of the least fixed point and the
use of the Krasovskii’s method to check its stability by using the three-player chain-
like topology. The actual iteration process is simulated so as to test the stability
of the fixed points predicted by the Krasovskii’s method. The Region of Attraction
(RoA) of the least fixed point is estimated by using the Lyapunov function. Then
we study the behavior of the fixed points with one varying parameter yi. Moreover,
the combinations of maximum achievable target rates for the players are plotted.
Finally, we go beyond the defined game and give simple illustrations on how future
autonomous players can make use of the developed theory to improve the overall
system sum-rate. In Section 3.6.2, our theory is applied to more complicated net-
work topologies to examine the maximum achievable target rates, with the objective
to understand the relationship between the spatial reuse capability and the network
connectivity.
3.6.1 Three-player Chain-like Topology
Least Fixed Point
We use the three-player chain-like topology in Fig. 2.1 as an illustration. Assume
y1 = y2 = y3 = 0.15, then the fixed points can be obtained by solving (3.1), which
yields 3 solutions: [qs,1, qs,2, qs,3] = [0.1952, 0.2316, 0.1952], [0.5451, 0.7248, 0.5451],
[1.4097, 0.8936, 1.4097]. Obviously the third solution is not feasible because two
of the MAPs are greater than 1. The first two solutions are in [0, 1]3 and are the
feasible solutions to (3.1). Denote the first solution as q∗ and second solution as p
s
.
It is obvious that q∗  p
s
. Therefore, q∗ is the least fixed point.
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Krasovskii’s Method
The system dynamics is given by:
q˙1 = g1(q) = min{y1/(1− q2), 1} − q1
q˙2 = g2(q) = min{y2/(1− q1)(1− q3), 1} − q2
q˙3 = g3(q) = min{y3/(1− q2), 1} − q3
(3.18)
The entries of C(q
s
) evaluated at a fixed point q
s


























We now verify the stability of q∗ and p
s
using the Krasovskii’s method by ex-
amining whether C(q
s
) given by (3.19) is positive definite. It can be claimed that




The iteration process of the generalized Aloha Game is given by (3.3). To verify
the above claim about the stability of q∗ and p
s
using the Krasovskii’s method, set










separately, and run the process to see its actual performance.
We see from Fig. 3.1 that the iteration starting at P0 converges to q∗ within
10 iterations. On the other hand, we also see that the iteration starting at p
s
ends
up oscillating between two points, [0.1952, 1, 0.1952] and [1, 0.2316, 1]. Therefore,
q∗ is stable while p
s
is not. This is consistent with the previous claim using the
Krasovskii’s method.
Region of Attraction of the Least Fixed Point
The Region of Attraction (RoA) is defined as the set of all initial points from which
the system will converge to the equilibrium point as time goes to infinity [43]. As
was commented in [43], finding the exact RoA analytically might be difficult or even
impossible. However, the Lyapunov function can be used to estimate the RoA. From
Theorem 3.3 and Proposition 3.3, if the least fixed point is verified to be stable,
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Figure 3.1: The Iteration Process. P0 converges to q∗; p
s
is unstable.
then the neighborhood Ψ specified using the Krasovskii’s method is within the RoA.
Therefore, for the three-player chain-like topology with y1 = y2 = y3 = 0.15, we
estimate the RoA for the least fixed point ( i.e., the NE q∗), by verifying the positive
definiteness of C(q).
In Fig. 3.2, the region under the mesh surface provides an estimate of the RoA of
the NE q∗. Clearly the region I (the cuboid near the origin) defined in Section 3.4.3
is within the RoA and can be obtained much easier. However, such an estimation
is still quite conservative. For the described game iteration process, we actually
observe that the set of points satisfying q ≺ p
s
are all within the RoA of the NE q∗.
Bifurcation of the Fixed Points
For the three-player chain-like topology, we study here the behavior of the fixed
points with y2 varying, while keeping y1 = y3 = 0.15. For different values of y2, we
solve (3.1), and plot the solutions accordingly in Fig. 3.3 (denote the least fixed
point as q∗, the second fixed point as p
s
; the third solution is outside [0, 1]3).
From Fig. 3.3 we observe that, as y2 increases from 0 to 0.246, there exist
two real-valued fixed points q∗, p
s
with q∗  p
s
. We verify using the Krasovskii’s
method that q∗ is stable while p
s




obtain a critical equilibrium q∗
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Figure 3.2: Estimation of the Region of Attraction for the NE q∗
zero eigenvalue of the Jacobian matrix J(q∗
c
). If y2 further increases, the fixed points
disappear, i.e., there is no real-valued fixed point in [0, 1]3 (except the extraneous
one q
s
= 1 introduced by including the bound qi = 1 in (3.6)). This phenomenon is
mathematically named as Fold Bifurcation [125]. This bifurcation is characterized
by a single bifurcation condition that the Jacobian matrix J(q∗
c
) has a codimension-
one zero eigenvalue at the critical equilibrium point [125].
Similar simulations with y1 or y3 being the varying parameter have been carried
out, and we observe similar fold bifurcation of the fixed points. Therefore, for the
three-player chain-like topology, we postulate that at most one stable fixed point
exists and it is the least fixed point.
We also extend the simulations to cases with more players and different topolo-
gies. Due to computational complexity of calculating all the solutions of (3.1), we
only examine cases with no more than 8 players. We observe three interesting phe-
nomena: (1) there are at most two real-valued fixed points in (0, 1)N ; (2) these two
fixed points exhibit fold bifurcation with any of the target rate yi being selected as
the varying parameter and the remaining fixed; (3) among these two fixed points,
the least fixed point is stable while the other is not, before they coincide and disap-
pear. However, a rigorous mathematical proof of such bifurcation behavior of the
fixed points is still difficult, and might require further investigation.
In the next two subsections, we demonstrate how to extend the results obtained
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Figure 3.3: Bifurcation of the Fixed Points (y2 is the varying parameter, y1 = y3 = 0.15)
from the stability study and apply beyond the described game.
Feasible Region of Target Rates
We compare the maximum achievable target rates between a three-player chain-like
topology and a fully connected topology (conventional Aloha games). We vary the
combinations of the players’ target rates [y1, y2, y3] and use the iterative approach
to evaluate the least fixed point until the stability of this point cannot be achieved.
We then plot the contour of y2 for some given [y1, y3].
From Fig. 3.4, it can be seen that the maximum achievable target rates in three-
player chain-like topology are larger than those of the fully connected topology. For
example, notice that [y1, y3] = [0.15, 0.15] is below the target rate contour y2 = 0.15
of the chain-like topology, thus the combination [y1, y2, y3] = [0.15, 0.15, 0.15] is
achievable and a stable NE can be found. However, the same combination is not
achievable for the fully connected topology.
An alternative way of illustrating the feasible target rate region (the region
under the mesh surface) for the three-player chain-like topology is shown in Fig.
3.5. The upper boundary of this feasible region is the Pareto front [19], i.e., each





























y2 in fully−connected network
y2 in chain−like network
Figure 3.4: Contour Plot of the Maximum Achievable Target Rate






















Figure 3.5: Feasible Target Rate Region for the 3-Player Chain-like Topology
Improving System Sum-Rate
Now suppose the three players have chosen [y1, y2, y3] = [0.15, 0.15, 0.15] as their
target rates. According to the previous results, they will arrive at a stable oper-
ating point q∗=[0.1952, 0.2316, 0.1952]. At this operating point which is the NE,
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kmax or bmax y q
∗ Σyi
original
demand 1 [0.15,0.15,0.15] [0.1952,0.2316,0.1952] 0.45
y → ky 1.27 [0.1905,0.1905,0.1905] [0.3336,0.4290,0.3336] 0.5715
q∗ → bq∗ 1.94 [0.2086,0.1734,0.2086] [0.3787,0.4493,0.3787] 0.5905
Table 3.1: Improving Sum-Rate by Proper Pricing Strategies
since the network is not fully loaded, intelligent players have the opportunity to
further increase their throughputs until the network becomes critically stable, so
as to achieve a better spectrum utilization efficiency. In the process of adjusting,
all players should also ensure that the process is still governed by the underlying
stability conditions defined by the generalized Aloha game.
There are many ways to achieve this and we will get different sum rates and
fairness for all players. Two direct ways are: (a) each player proportionally increases
its demand from yi to kyi, where k ≥ 1. (b) each player proportionally increases its
MAP from q∗i to bq
∗
i , where b ≥ 1. The results are summarized in Table 3.1.
This example shows that we can increase the sum rate of all players by proper
pricing strategies or some commonly agreed target-rate adjusting rules which guar-
antee certain criteria of fairness and maintain network stability. Conversely, the
pricing strategies or target-rate adjusting rules can also be used to bring the target
rates of the players back to the feasible region, if the players are over demanding
and the resulting network is congested. The rationale behind this study is as fol-
lows. For future autonomous radios which compete to transmit like in the ISM
band, we would like each device to equip with intelligence so that while competing
to transmit, each transmission pair is also governed by the underlying rules so that
maximum throughput can be achieved without affecting the network stability. This
will result in a win-win situation for all transmission pairs. More vigorous design
approach can be found in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5.
3.6.2 Spatial Reuse Gain versus Connectivity
Consider a distributed network with N players, which are randomly placed in a
square region of a given area. One half of the players will have transmission range
of 5 unit length, while the other half of players have transmission range of 3 unit
length. For simplicity, we assume that all the distances between any transmitter
and its designated receiver are much smaller than the distances between any two
transmitters, so that a Tx-Rx user pair can be represented by a single node in the
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topology. We further assume that those players who are in each other’s transmission
range will have significant interference on each other, and the two nodes are said
to be connected. The interference matrix can then be constructed based on the
generated network topology.
Performance as Player Density Increases
Player density is defined as the number of players per unit area. We first set
N = 20, and the player density is increased by decreasing the spatial area under
consideration. For each given player density, we run the simulation 100 times.
Each time a random topology is generated, and for simplicity, we assume that all
players have the same target rate. We increase this common target rate in steps
of 0.001, and run the Krasovskii’s method until the least fixed point is no longer
stable. Consequently, this NE corresponds to the MAPs for the players to achieve
the maximum target rate.
Fig. 3.6 shows that both the average throughput and the average MAP decrease
as the player density increases. The average throughput curve gradually approaches
the lower limit in which all players are fully connected (which is equivalent to the
conventional Aloha games).
Performance as Number of Players Increases
In this subsection we fix the player density at 0.1, and increase the number of players
by increasing the spatial area.
Fig. 3.7a shows that the average throughput and MAP for the players decrease
as the number of players increases, for both fully connected network and the gener-
alized Aloha game. It can be seen that the average throughput in the generalized
Aloha game is significantly higher than that in a fully connected network. The
achievable average throughput of the fully connected network drops below 0.01
when there are more than 40 players. This is comparatively low when compared to
the generalized Aloha game, whose average throughput stays above 0.04 even when
there are 100 players. We skip the simulation for the fully connected network when
the number of players is more than 50.
Fig. 3.7b shows that the total throughput for the generalized Aloha game in-
creases almost linearly as the number of players increases. On the other hand, the
total throughput for the fully connected network remains at a low level around 0.37.
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Network Performance as Player Density Increases




















Throughput of fully−connected network
Figure 3.6: Effect of the Player Density on the Average Throughput (20 players in de-
creasing spatial area)
Relationship between Total Throughput and Connectivity
Define connectivity as the total number of links in the current network versus the
total number of links in the fully connected case. In particular, connectivity equals
to 1 in the conventional Aloha games. Connectivity therefore serves as an indication
of spatial reuse capability. From the above observations, it can be seen that if the
network is nearly fully connected, i.e., most of the players are within the interference
range of each other, its throughput resembles to that of a conventional Aloha game.
As the network connectivity drops, either due to decreased player density or due
to a larger spatial area compared to the transmission range, the total achievable
throughput increases, indicating an increased spatial reuse capability. We therefore
postulate that there could exist a relationship between the reuse capability versus
the network connectivity. We will use the data from the above two subsections, and
present the relationship between total throughput and connectivity.
Fig. 3.8 shows that the total throughput decreases as the connectivity in-
creases, regardless of the number of players involved. The relationship between
total throughput (Y ) and connectivity (X ) can be approximated by an empirical
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b. Performance as No. of Players Increases
 
 




















Avg. Throughput with spatial reuse
Avg. Trans. Prob. with spatial reuse
Avg. Throughput of fully connected network
Avg. Trans. Prob. of fully connected network
(a)
(b)
Figure 3.7: Effect of the Number of Players on the Average Throughput (Player density
= 0.1, increase spatial area)














Relationship between Total Throughput and Connectivity
 
 
number of players = 20
number of players = 40
number of players = 60
number of players = 80
number of players = 100
Y = 0.37 ∗X−0.82
Y = 0.95 ∗X−0.47




0.95 ∗X−0.47 0.001 ≤ X < 0.1
0.37 ∗X−0.82 0.1 ≤ X ≤ 1 (3.20)
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Notice that when connectivity is sufficiently low (below 0.001), the network
actually degenerates into several independent connected sub-networks, whose con-
nectivity is higher than the original network. In that case, we can apply the above
formula separately to each connected sub-network.
3.7 Conclusions
In this chapter, we extend the slotted Aloha games to spatial reuse scenarios,
namely, generalized Aloha games. We use fixed point theory and order theory
to prove the existence of a unique NE in the generalized Aloha game. In particu-
lar, we use the Kleene fixed-point theorem to prove the existence of a least fixed
point, which is the unique NE of the game and the most energy-efficient operating
point for all players. We then propose to use the Krasovskii’s method to prove the
stability of the NE. After obtaining the conditions for system stability, we further
prove that if the least fixed point is not stable, nor are other fixed points. These
findings ensure the ease in finding the NE of a generalized Aloha game as we only
need to focus on the least fixed point. If this point is stable, then all players can
arrive at this NE through game iteration, by conveniently choosing 0 or y as the
initial point.
We then show through simulation that the theory derived can be applied to
large-scale distributed systems with complicated network topologies to study the
maximum achievable throughput. An empirical relationship between the network
connectivity and the achievable total throughput is finally obtained through simu-
lations.
Pricing strategies or some target-rate adjusting rules are required to bring the
target rates within the feasible region. This chapter has not yet addressed such
issues for the generalized Aloha game, despite the simple illustration via the example
of the three-player chain-like topology. Extension to this work could be the design
of pricing strategies or target-rate adjusting rules for the players in a distributed
manner to bring the target rates within the feasible region, or more desirably, toward
an optimal combination of target rates which maximizes the total throughput of all




A Heuristic Algorithm to Approach
Pareto Front in Spatial Aloha Net-
works
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we go beyond the generalized Aloha game in Chapter 3, and study
how future autonomous radios can make use of the developed theory in decision
making to improve the overall system performance. For example, consider the sce-
narios where autonomous Tx-Rx user pairs (i.e., players) are competing among
themselves to transmit over the channel. If some or all the players are over-
demanding (total target rate beyond the network capacity), the resulting network
is unstable and all pairs will suffer from network congestions. On the other hand, if
the players set a low target rate, the network is stable but the bandwidth is not fully
exploited. We therefore call for a set of target-rate adjusting rules which are com-
monly agreed by the players, and enable the players to improve their throughputs
without affecting the network stability. This will result in a win-win situation for
all transmission pairs. In order to accomplish such goals, we therefore develop an
autonomous Pareto optimality achieving algorithm beyond the generalized Aloha
game.
Our main contributions in this chapter are as follows. First of all, we implement
the algorithm in a fully distributed manner, which requires no information exchange
among the players. As is commented in [50], the cost of information gathering needs
to be considered when designing games in communication networks. In our algo-
rithm, each player measures its current throughput and uses it to make myopic
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best response to the current channel idle rate. Therefore, there is no communica-
tion overheads in performing information exchange among the players. Moreover,
channel sensing is necessary and needs to be performed only once for a player to
set its initial target rates when it joins the network. Secondly, we design a set of
target-rate adjusting rules to control the players’ behaviors in a distributed manner.
Each player uses its measured throughput to dynamically adjust its target rate so
that all players have their throughputs adaptively approaching the Pareto optimal
bandwidth utilization. The predefined rules can be set to guarantee certain criteria
of fairness. Finally, the algorithm is robust and can handle various practical issues
such as dynamic arrival/departure of players, parameter estimation errors, etc.
We present the details of our algorithm in Section 4.2, then we describe how the
measured throughput can be obtained from practical channel collision scenarios in
Section 4.3. We test our algorithm through simulations in Section 4.4 and conclude
the chapter in Section 4.5.
4.2 Fully Distributed Algorithm
From the analytical results in Chapter 3, we know that there exists a feasible region
of the target rate combination y. The upper boundary of this feasible region is the
Pareto front [19]. We illustrate the feasible target rate region (the region under the
mesh surface) for the 3-player chain-like topology in Fig. 4.1. Each point on the
surface is a target rate combination that achieves the Pareto optimal bandwidth
utilization.
The overall design objective is to achieve Pareto optimal bandwidth utilization
for all players. While all the players self-adjust their target rates to approach the
Pareto front, it is necessary to guarantee system stability with a predefined way
of maintaining certain fairness among the players. The general ideas behind such
target rate adjustment are as follows:
1) Suppose the initial target rate combination y
init
is within the feasible region
(as illustrated in Fig. 4.1). After the system is stabilized and y
init
is achieved, the
players find that there is room to increase their transmission rates, thus repeatedly
increasing the target rates in some predefined manner until reaching a point y
div
beyond the Pareto front.
2) Since y
div
is outside the feasible region, the system will diverge to q = 1,
and θ = 0. We can then reduce y
div
in some predefined manner to bring it back
to the feasible region. We can refine the steps of decrement so that the target rate
58






















Figure 4.1: Feasible Target Rate Region, 3-Player Chain-like Topology
combination will come to a point y
Pareto
on the Pareto front.
3) We should guarantee certain criteria of fairness among the players. For ex-
ample, a player with a larger target rate should increase less when the target rate










The above target rate adjusting mechanism is designed to provide best effort
transmissions for users with elastic traffic. This is different from [60] which is de-
signed for users with inelastic bandwidth requirements, though they both try to
adjust the target rates to maintain system stability and achieve better bandwidth
utilization. Another difference is that the target rate adjustment in [60] is centrally
controlled by network pricing strategies. As a result, our model can find its appli-
cations when distributed Tx-Rx pairs are competing among themselves to transmit
over the channel. If everyone wants to transmit more, the interference level will
be high and all pairs will suffer, whilst if everyone transmits at a low probability,
the bandwidth is not fully exploited. Therefore, we would like each device to equip
with intelligence so that while competing to transmit, each transmission pair is also
governed by the underlying rules so that maximum throughput can be achieved
without affecting the network stability.
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4.2.1 System Diagram
In the channel collision model, each player i transmits with a certain probability qi.
Simultaneously transmitted packets are either successful or in collision according
to the relationship specified by the interference matrix. Then each player i can
monitor its successful rate (throughput) θi, and use it to 1) make myopic best
response to the current channel idle rate; 2) dynamically adjust its target rate from
yi,init according some pre-installed target-rate adjusting rules. For the example of
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Figure 4.2: System Diagram for 3-Player Chain-like Topology
4.2.2 Myopic Best Response to Channel Idle Rate
The channel idle rate of player i’s neighborhood is defined as the probability that




Given a target rate yi, player i’s myopic best response to the channel idle rate in the
(m+ 1)th iteration is given in (3.3). Since a fully distributed algorithm requires no
information exchange among the players, xi should be estimated by player i itself.
For the initial channel idle rate x
(0)
i , a one-time channel sensing is needed,
i.e., player i listens to the channel for some time and counts the number of idle
slots to obtain x
(0)
i . Afterwards, player i starts transmitting, and x
(m)
i , (m ≥ 1)
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can be obtained from the measured throughput θ
(m)
i , which requires no chan-








(1− q(m)j ) = q(m)i x(m)i , we then have x(m)i = θ(m)i /q(m)i .
4.2.3 Pre-Installed Target-Rate Adjusting Rules
Initializing Target Rates
When player i powers on, it first synchronizes to its neighbors. Then player i sets
its initial target rate yi,init based on x
(0)
i . During the one-time sensing process,
player i also finds the number of active neighbors, i.e., Ni =
∑
j aij. Then player i
uses x
1/Ni
i to calculate the geometric mean of 1− qj,∀j with aij = 1. Player i then
assumes the MAP of every of its neighbors to be q¯−i := 1− x1/Nii .
In terms of fairness, we set player i’s initial target rate in approximation to
the average target rate of its neighbors. Since the achieved throughput of a player
is no larger than its MAP due to collisions, therefore, under the current q¯−i, we
guess the average target rate of player i’s neighbors y¯−i ≤ q¯−i. Therefore, we design
yi,init = q¯
γ
−i, in which the exponent parameter γ ≥ 1 so that yi,init ≤ q¯−i.
We also apply a minimum and a maximum initial target rate minit and Minit
(0 < minit < Minit ≤ 1). minit is needed in the case that none of player i’s neighbors
are active when player i powers on, and hence player i attempts to transmit with
a small initial target rate. Minit is used to proportionally control the size of the
increment. Therefore, the Target Rate Initializing Curve is designed as:
yi,init = max{minit,Minit · q¯γ−i}, γ ≥ 1. (4.1)
Increase Target Rates from Inside to Outside the Feasible Region
After the system stabilizes and y
init
is achieved, we can increase the target rates by
a step size, and wait for the system to stabilize again. Then we increase the target
rates again until the system diverges (with target rate combination y
div
).
Based on fairness criteria, the player who currently has a larger target rate
should increase less in the above process. Conversely, the player who has a smaller
target rate deserves a larger step size. The Target Rate Increment Curve is given
in (4.2). Minc is used to proportionally control the increment size, while (1 − yi)α
is used so that the increment steps are refined and gradually decrease as the target
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rate increases.
∆i,inc = Minc · (1− yi)α, α ≥ 1, 0 < Minc ≤ 1. (4.2)
Reduce Target Rates from Outside the Feasible Region to the Pareto
Front
Since the system diverges under y
div
, we reduce the target rates by a step size and
wait for the system to stabilize. If the system still diverges, we reduce the target
rates again until the system becomes stable (with target rate combination y
Pareto
).
Based on fairness criteria, the player who currently has a larger target rate
should decrease more. The Target Rate Decrement Curve is given in (4.3). Mdec
is used to proportionally control the size of decrement, while yβi is used so that the
decrement steps are refined and gradually decrease as the target rate decreases.
∆i,dec = Mdec · yβi , β ≥ 1, 0 < Mdec ≤ 1. (4.3)
When player i detects divergence and reduces its target rate from yi to y
′
i, it
will lock the MAP qi = y
′
i for some time, so that the previously high contention it
caused to other players will be removed.
Increase Target Rates again when Channel Idle Rate Significantly Rises
The system finally settles down and achieves maximum bandwidth utilization y
Pareto
.
Later when some of player i’s neighbors leave the collision channel, player i might
detect significant rise of the channel idle rate. In such cases, it will attempt to
increase its target rate again. The curve in (4.2) can be used again to increase the
target rates. An alternative way is to predict the amount of increment currently
available for player i, and set the increment accordingly.
The amount of increment available for player i is upper bounded by ( xi
xi,inf
−1)yi.
xi,inf is the lowest value of xi recorded whenever the system is stable. In other words,
xi,inf stands for the highest level of contention under which the system is still stable.
(xi,inf should be reset to 1 and recorded again when divergence happens.) If we
observe that xi = b · xi,inf , (b ≥ Mrise > 1), i.e., there is a significant rise of the
channel idle rate, and we keep qi unchanged, then ideally we can achieve a higher
throughput θ′i = qi · xi = qi · b · xi,inf = b · θi. Therefore, the amount of increment
available for player i is upper bounded by ( xi
xi,inf
− 1)yi.
Another design principle is based on fairness criteria. The player who has a
62
larger target rate should increase less aggressively, although it might have a larger
amount of increment available. Therefore, we apply a factor of (1 − yi)ρ, ρ ≥ 0 to
the target rate increment. Finally, the Target Rate Increment Curve (Channel Idle
Rate Rises) is given in (4.4).
∆i,inc2 = (xi/xi,inf − 1)yi · (1− yi)ρ, ρ ≥ 0 (4.4)
4.2.4 Measured Throughput Characteristics
The measured signal is the throughput θi that player i achieves during one iteration
time. We need to characterize it to judge the convergence or divergence of the
system.
When the system is converging, the absolute gap between the target rate and
the measured throughput will diminish with time, and finally go to 0 when the
system becomes stable. The dynamic characteristics is |yi − θ(m)i | ≤ |yi − θ(m−1)i |.
The steady-state characteristics is |yi − θi| ≤ mgap, where mgap is a small positive
threshold value.
When the system is diverging, the measured throughput θi is less than the
target rate yi, and θi keeps decreasing until it becomes 0. During the diverging
process, the dynamic characteristics is yi − θ(m)i > yi − θ(m−1)i > 0. If θi drops
below a certain threshold, i.e., yi− θi ≥Mgap > 0, player i will judge the system as
diverging. Another scenario for player i to judge system divergence is that player i
has reached the dead-end situation, i.e., qi = 1, θi = 0.
4.3 Modelling Practical Packet Collisions
4.3.1 Estimating Throughput
So far we have been using the mathematical model in (2.1) to model the channel
collisions. We now describe how player i’s throughput can be estimated from prac-
tical packet collision scenarios. Suppose each iteration consists of LI slots. In the
mth iteration, player i generates bq(m)i · LIc packets, and randomly scatter these
packets in the LI slots. We then use the interference matrix to judge the status
of each player’s packets, i.e., successful or in collision. Then player i counts the
number of successful packets N
(m)





suc,i/LI . This θˆi is used as the measured throughput in our
algorithm.
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4.3.2 Measures Taken to Handle Estimation Error
1) The estimation error of θˆi compared to its genuine value θi is mainly affected
by the iteration length LI . The larger LI is, the smaller the estimation error.
However, a larger LI also means that it takes longer time (even with the same
number of iterations) for the system to converge.
2) We apply a Lq-taps mean-value filter to player i’s MAP qi, so as to smooth
out the trembling effect introduced by the estimation error of θˆi.
3) We compose every LB iterations as a block, and assume the players to be block
synchronized. Player i makes a judgement about system convergence or divergence
at the end of each block. The measured throughput is averaged over each block to
reduce the effects of the estimation error. In this way, the judgements made will
result in smaller errors.
4.4 Simulation Studies
We implement our scheme for N = 11 players with an interference topology given
in Fig. 4.3. The parameters for the target rate adjusting curves are: γ=1.5,
minit=0.01, Minit=0.8; α=25, Minc=0.02; β=1.2, Mdec=0.2; ρ=0.35, Mrise=1.1.
The threshold parameters for the measured throughput characteristics are: mgap=0.005,
Mgap=0.025. The parameters for the practical packet collision model are: LI=2000,
Lq=10, LB=4. Suppose the channel bit rate is 20Mbps and the packet length is 100
bits, then the slot time is 5µs. In this case, LI=2000 means that iterations take












Figure 4.3: Interference Topology for 11 Players
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The simulation consists of 3 phases. Phase 1 : Player 1 ∼ 10 power on se-
quentially at iterations = 1, 10, 20, 30, · · · , 90, while player 11 remains at power-off.
Phase 2 : Player 11 powers on at iterations = 2000. Phase 3 : Player 1 powers off
at iterations = 4000. The results are plotted in Fig. 4.4.































































Figure 4.4: Behaviors of Player 1 and Player 11
Phase 1 : Player 1 ∼ 10 power on sequentially, and the system settles down
within 1000 iterations. Upon starting up, player 1 attempts transmitting with a
small initial target rate. Then it gradually increases the target rate in diminishing
steps until the system diverges. When divergence is detected, player 1 reduces its
target rate in diminishing steps. The procedure repeats until the system becomes
stable and achieves yˆ
Pareto
close to the Pareto front. Notice that there exists a
trade-off between the convergence time and the distance to the Pareto front. If we
decrease the target rate in very small steps, then yˆ
Pareto
will be very close to the
Pareto front. However, the system will experience a longer period of divergence
before it settles down.
We can use the analytical method in Chapter 3 to find the “distance” between
yˆ
Pareto
and the Pareto front, i.e., we proportionally increase yˆ
Pareto
until it is not
achievable according to the analytical method. The increased ratio k(k ≥ 1) then
indicates such distance. For phase 1, k = 1.05. In addition, the mean value and
standard deviation of yˆ
Pareto
is 0.0689 and 0.0093 respectively. The standard de-
viation is small compared to the mean value, thus suggesting a certain degree of
fairness among the players. Finally, the estimation error of θˆi is well handled, and
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the steady state error between the average θˆi and yi is close to 0.
Phase 2 : Player 11 sets y11,init close to the current target rates of its neighbors.
As player 11 gradually increases its target rate and raises the contention level of
its neighbors, the system diverges some time later. Both players 1 and 11 detect
divergence and reduce their target rates. The process repeats until the system
stabilizes with k = 1.08. The mean value and standard deviation of yˆ
Pareto
is
0.0653 and 0.0131 respectively.
Phase 3 : Player 1 powers off and player 11 detects significant rise of the channel
idle rate, thus increasing its target rate based on the prediction given in (4.4).
The system finally stabilizes again with k = 1.09. The mean value and standard
deviation of yˆ
Pareto
is 0.0770 and 0.0100 respectively.
Brief summary : Phase 1 illustrates the target-rate adjusting rules envisioned
at the beginning of Section 4.2. The target rate increment process and decrement
process are illustrated. After the adjustment, the system stabilizes and achieves
close to Pareto optimal bandwidth utilization (distance to Pareto front k = 1.05,
close to 1). Phase 2 demonstrates the dynamics in the players’ throughputs when
a new player enters the system. The newly entered player chooses a proper initial
target rate close to the average value of its neighbors. Moreover, after dynamic
target rate adjustment, the system becomes stable again and achieves close to Pareto
optimal performance (k = 1.08). Phase 3 demonstrates the case when an existing
player leaves the system. The remaining players are able to detect the bandwidth
opportunity left over by the leaving player, and adjust their target rates accordingly
so that the system still operates at a point close to the Pareto front (k = 1.09).
Finally, the standard deviation of yˆ
Pareto
is small compared to its mean value in
Phase 1 ∼ 3 respectively, suggesting a certain degree of fairness among the players.
4.5 Conclusions
This chapter goes beyond the Aloha games with spatial reuse in Chapter 3, and
develops an autonomous Pareto optimality achieving algorithm that enables the
players to maximize their throughputs without affecting the network stability. The
algorithm is implemented in a fully distributed manner, which requires no infor-
mation exchange among the players. Our simulations show that the system indeed
achieves close to Pareto optimal performance while guaranteeing a certain degree
of fairness. The algorithm is robust and can handle various practical issues such as
the dynamic arrival/departure of players, parameter estimation errors, etc.
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Chapter 5
Efficient and Scalable Distributed
Autonomous Spatial Aloha Networks
via Local Leader Election
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we consider a distributed wireless network in which a group of Tx-Rx
user pairs share a common collision channel via slotted-Aloha-type random access.
These users are allowed to reuse the channel if they receive negligible interference
from others. Such a network model is studied using stochastic geometry by Baccelli
et al. in [126], and named as spatial Aloha. In [126], the Poisson bipolar network
model has been used, where the locations of the transmitters are modeled as a
homogeneous Poisson point process. Based on the assumption of homogeneity,
the network-wide performance of a large distributed network can be derived from
the statistical average performance of a typical user. These approaches predict
the achievable performance of the network but give no information about network
stability during its operation. Indeed, it is mathematically challenging to obtain the
stability conditions of the equilibrium solutions due to the nonsymmetric structure
in the equations formulated for a partially connected network. How to enable
the autonomous users to self-behave yet achieve high efficiency, good fairness and
operation stability becomes the design objectives. This motivates our work in this
chapter.
For better utilization of spatial reuse and network scalability, clustering is used in
our design. Clustering algorithms in wireless networks typically appear in the con-
text of ad hoc [127] [128] and sensor networks [129], where a flat network topology
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is divided into a set of connected clusters that cover all nodes in the network. These
algorithms are mainly designed to perform cluster-based routing and to achieve scal-
able network management, whereas our proposed clustering method tries to resolve
the concurrent transmission issue among Tx-Rx pairs, and focuses on the attainable
throughput and the stability of the spatial Aloha network. In [130], a cluster of
sensor nodes operating in slotted Aloha is studied. The authors consider the issue of
partitioning the nodes and available frequencies into groups so as to maximize the
system throughput. However, the setting is different from ours since we focus on the
single channel case and with spatial reuse. In [131], the authors study the effect of
clustered topologies on the throughput of spatial Aloha using stochastic geometry.
The results suggest that if the nodes have local information about their topologi-
cal neighborhood, then the system performance can be improved if the nodes can
locally adjust their transmission parameters, which also motivates this work.
Instead of viewing the distributed network from the statistical perspective, we
zoom into the micro-level design of a deployed network with any given topology.
We specifically develop tailored algorithms so that each user has self-autonomous
capability to enable the network to operate at one stable equilibrium solution that
is close to the Pareto-front [19] throughput predicted by the generalized Aloha
games in Chapter 3. In the algorithm proposed in Chapter 4, the distributed users
heuristically search for Pareto-front target rates, and the system indeed settles down
with a target rate that is close to the Pareto front. However, the users using such
a heuristic approach have to monitor the channel activities continuously, and will
experience several fluctuations before settling down since the network has to be
driven into the unstable region to detect the crossing of the Pareto front. As the
network size increases, the system will experience more fluctuations and take longer
time to converge. Hence it is worth to look into how to design a fast self-adaptive
network rigorously.
To provide faster convergence to a stable operating point that is close to the
Pareto-front throughput predicted by the generalized Aloha game, we apply the
control theoretic approach to update the MAPs of spatial Aloha networks in this
chapter. The control theoretic approach is used to provide reliable and optimal
configuration of 802.11 WLANs [132], however, no spatial reuse is considered as
only one common access point is used. Similar approaches have also been applied to
implement the Distributed Opportunistic Scheduling (DOS) algorithm [133], where
each node contends for the channel with a certain access probability and gives up the
transmission opportunity if the channel quality is below a certain threshold. The
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authors further propose a game-theoretic approach to design a decentralized penalty
mechanism to control selfish users [134]. However, although the PHY layer channel
quality is jointly considered with the MAC layer channel contention in DOS, spatial
reuse has not been included in their study. PI controllers are adopted in the above
works. Other applications of PI controllers include the design of feedback-based
clock synchronization in wireless sensor networks [135].
The novelties of our proposed Spatial Aloha via local Leader Election (SALE)
scheme [136] are listed as follows:
• Each user can self-regulate its transmission parameter to ensure that the net-
work always operates in the stable region and yet achieves close-to-Pareto-front
throughput, by using only local information about its neighbors.
• Rigorous theoretical reasoning for a condition to achieve the above objective.
By using the stability conditions derived in the generalized Aloha game [2], we
show that a local parameter Radio Intensity Metric (RIM), denoted as R, can be
used to indicate the cumulative radio intensity level of each user within its one-hop
communication range — a RIM value of less than or equal to 2 for all users can
guarantee network stability.
• The implementation aspects including the integration of PI controllers on local
leaders are addressed. As commented by [132], one of the key issues in building the
control system is to discover a constant reference signal which relates to the desired
system performance (e.g., maximum throughputs). Specifically, a user which has
the maximum node degree in a certain neighborhood is elected as the local leader,
and the remaining users in this neighborhood follow the same value of MAP. Each
local leader adjusts its MAP according to the value of RIM computed based on its
local information, and uses R=2 as the constant reference signal in its built-in PI
controller.
• Fast and smooth tuning of MAP. The PI parameters in the controller are
designed to achieve a good trade-off between fast convergence and the transient
behavior. On the contrary, the heuristic algorithm in Chapter 4 is an engineering
approach with no guarantee in convergence rate, and the network operating point
would experience several fluctuations before settling down.
• Fast convergence regardless of the number of users or user densities, which
is guaranteed by the Ziegler-Nichols rules (see Section 5.3.3) that adapt the PI
parameters to various user densities (associated with different node degree at the
local leader).
• Low complexity, high scalability and low signalling overhead compared to the
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heuristic algorithm. See Section 5.3.6.
• Extensive simulations are performed to verify that the proposed SALE scheme
has much faster convergence rate, better scalability and better fairness than the
heuristic algorithm, while achieving close-to-Pareto-front throughputs.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. We investigate the throughput
optimality conditions in spatial Aloha Networks and introduce the design param-
eter RIM in Section 5.2. Based on RIM, we design the control system for the
SALE scheme in Section 5.3. Then we evaluate the system performance through
simulations in Section 5.4. We conclude the chapter in Section 5.5.
5.2 Throughput Optimality Conditions
In this section, we explain how a local parameter RIM can be defined and utilized
by each user in the spatial Aloha network to judge for system optimality using only
local information.
5.2.1 Optimal Conditions
For any MAP vector q = [q1, q2, · · · , qN ] ∈ [0, 1]N , the N equations in (2.1) define
a vector function θ(q) = [θ1, θ2, · · · , θN ], whose value space is an N -dimensional
region. The upper boundary (θi > 0,∀i ∈ N ) of this region is formed by the critical
values of θ(q), with the critical points q ∈ (0, 1)N . Mathematically, this corresponds
to the Jacobian matrix J = δθ
δq
being singular [137], i.e., the determinant of J at the
critical point is 0:
det(J) = | δθ
δq












1− q1 −a12q1 · · · −a1Nq1





−aN1qN −aN2qN · · · 1− qN
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
. (5.2)
Similar derivations for the maximum throughputs of the original Aloha system
(centralized, no spatial reuse) can be found in Section III-B of [138] by Abramson.
Notice that when the network is fully connected, i.e., aij = 1,∀i 6= j, (5.1) is
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equivalent to formula (26) (27) in [138]. In a very specific case, if all MAPs are
equal to q in a fully connected network of N users, then the maximum throughput
is achieved at q = 1/N .
Since D(q) involves all the MAPs and the complete interference matrix A, it is
not possible for an individual user to test for this optimal condition. In practice,
generally only local information about neighbors is readily available for each user.
To acquire information beyond this will require large transmission overheads and the
design will suffer from large delay. We therefore shall look for certain sub-optimal
yet locally implementable testing conditions. The optimal condition in (5.1) gives
the maximum throughput boundary and can be used to benchmark the optimality
of any sub-optimal schemes.
5.2.2 Sub-optimal Conditions
From the analytical results in Chapter 3, a sufficient condition for a target rate y to
be feasible is that we can find a corresponding operating point q so that the matrix
C(q) is positive definite. We retrospect on the analysis in Section 3.5 and find a









1− qi ) < 2, ∀i ∈ N . (5.3)
Here we define Ri as the Radio Intensity Metric (RIM) for user i. In other words, if
(5.3) is satisfied, the corresponding target rate y is achievable, i.e., at the operating
point q, the throughput θi equals to the target rate yi,∀i ∈ N , or the target rate
falls within the feasible region (but not necessarily on the maximum throughput
boundary). The converse of this, on the other hand, is not necessarily true.
We now examine the physical meaning of RIM. Firstly, RIM is a local metric
since Ri consists of qi and the qj terms with aij = 1, i.e., each user i only needs the
information about its neighbors to calculate the parameter Ri. Secondly, from (5.3)
we observe that Ri is related to the number of user i’s neighbors, i.e., Ni =
∑
j∈N aij.
Also notice that Ri is monotonic with respect to qi and qj(aij = 1). In other words,
the more neighbors with the higher MAPs, the larger the value of Ri. Therefore,
RIM can be used to indicate the cumulative radio intensity level in the neighborhood
of user i.
After all the Ri,∀i ∈ N are obtained, the condition (5.3) is sub-optimal to (5.1)
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but is now locally implementable. The basic implementation idea is to tune the
MAPs of all users so that the condition (5.3) is critically satisfied, hence achieving
a sub-optimal network throughput. In other words, the MAPs of all users are tuned
so that Rl = 2, ∀l ∈ Ω;Rj < 2,∀j 6∈ Ω, where Ω is a certain subset of N . Such an
idea will be incorporated into our proposed scheme in Section 5.3.
5.3 The SALE Scheme
In this section we present the design principle for our proposed scalable and efficient
scheme using (5.3), named as Spatial Aloha via local Leader Election (SALE). In
the SALE scheme, the users will first self-organize into a number of non-overlapped
neighborhoods. There are many ways to approach the Pareto front surface defined
in (5.1). One possible way is for the users in each neighborhood to adopt the same
MAP to fulfill the fairness criterion, as it is also easier to analyze and implement.
5.3.1 Local Leader Election under Equal MAP
From the definition of RIM in (5.3), if we assume equal MAP in user i’s neighboring
region, then the value of Ri is related to the number of user i’s neighbors given by
Ni =
∑
j∈N aij. In graph theory [139], Ni is also known as the node degree of
user i. Therefore, if the MAPs of all users in a certain neighborhood are the same
and gradually increase from zero, then the one with the highest node degree in
this neighborhood will dissatisfy the condition (5.3) first (here we assume that the
interference relationship among users is symmetric, i.e., aij = aji, ∀i, j). Therefore,
unless the users have homogeneous node degrees (regular graph), their RIM values
cannot reach 2 at the same time. We call the user with a locally highest RIM value as
a local leader. The key principle behind the proposed scheme is to identify these local
leaders, since they are most likely to cause network instability due to interference
from more neighbors. Mathematically, this means that the RIM of the local leader
is more likely to exceed 2 than any of the followers in the same neighborhood. If
we keep the RIM for the local leader(s) at 2, all the followers will have a RIM
not exceeding 2 and according to (5.3), the network will be operating in the stable
region. We next introduce how to identify these local leaders, which consists of two









Figure 5.1: 9 Users Topology
Preliminary Local Leader Election
Only two rounds of information exchange among each user and its neighbors are
needed to complete the preliminary local leader election process. In the first round,
each user i broadcasts its identity number (ID) i to its neighbors. After the first
round of broadcasting, each user i will be able to count its node degree Ni. In
the second round, each user i broadcasts its ID i and its node degree Ni to its
neighbors. Then user i will compare its node degree (and ID) with those of its
neighbors. If Ni is the largest, then user i will be aware of its role as a local leader
(for simplicity, when two or more candidates are connected, the one with lower ID
wins). Otherwise, user i acts as a follower of one of its neighbors k who has the
highest node degree (or neighbor which has the same node degree but lower ID).
Such a user k is called the parent of user i, and user i is a child of user k. Note
that a parent need not be the local leader. For the example in Fig. 5.1, user 2 is
the parent of user 6, but is also a child of leader 1. As a result, the whole network
is grouped into several disjoint trees [139] (previously we have been using the term
“neighborhood”), with each local leader being the root of the tree, and the users
with no children being the leaves. The tree containing leader l is thus called tree
l, which behaves like an independent neighborhood. The height Hl of tree l is the
length from the root to a leaf which is the farthest away. For the example in Fig.
5.1, there are two trees with leaders 1 and 7 being the roots respectively. The
child-parent relationship is denoted by dashed blue arrows. Tree 7 has a height of
1, while tree 1 has a height of 2, with the longest path being 6→ 2→ 1.
A remark to make here is that there is no requirement for each user to have
the knowledge for neighbors beyond two hops. Although a neighborhood may have
users at two or more hops away, there is no need for each node to know who is in
the neighborhood. Once the child-parent relationship has been identified, all users
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who can trace back to the same local leader define a neighborhood. The concept of
a neighborhood or disjoint tree is just a virtual concept to explain the grouping of
users who move as a group while adjusting their MAPs.
Leadership Validation
The essential property of a local leader l is that it has the locally highest RIM value
Rl. Therefore, if Rl ≤ 2, then all its neighbors would have a RIM value no greater
than 2, hence the stability condition in (7) is satisfied. The preliminary local leader
elected in the above process is the one with the highest node degree. When multiple
candidates are connected, the one with the smallest ID is elected. However, choosing
candidates based on smaller ID might not always guarantee the leader to have a
locally highest RIM value, in cases when the tree under consideration is affected by
other trees (more details will be discussed in Section 5.3.4). We therefore introduce
a leadership validation mechanism to handle these exceptions.
During each iteration of update, all users monitor their own RIM values. If a
user l1 finds that Rl1 > 2, then it declares leadership and activates its PI controller
to achieve Rl1 = 2. If there is a preliminary leader l2 connected to user l1 which
hears the leadership declaration, the preliminary leader l2 should shut down its PI
controller and regard user l1 as its parent, i.e., both users perform an exchange in
the leadership. If there is no neigboring preliminary leader, user l1 is a new leader
with a separate neighborhood which consists of all its followers. In cases when two
or more connected users declare leadership, the one with smaller ID wins.
An example will be given in Section 5.3.4 to illustrate the leadership validation
process.
5.3.2 Control System Design
So far in the presented approach, although the theory predicts that the network can
operate in the stable region, the MAP tuning process may still exhibit oscillatory
behavior if improperly designed. An example is given by the heuristic algorithm
in Chapter 4, in which a user is able to detect the Pareto front solution provided
that it detects the sudden drop in its throughput when it gradually increases its
MAP. By doing so, the network is already driven out of the stable region and
the long monitoring process to collect the operating parameters will significantly
affect the rate it converges to the steady state solution. To improve the tuning
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Figure 5.2: The SALE Scheme
adapt themselves toward the sub-optimal solution.
In each update iteration, each user i broadcasts its ID i, MAP qi and node
degree Ni to its neighbors. After the broadcasting, each user is able to compute
its RIM value as in (5.3). Assume that the elected local leaders make up the set
Ω. Each local leader l ∈ Ω sets its referenced RIM Rl,sp to 2, and uses a PI
controller [140, Ch.10] to adjust its MAP ql in order to achieve Rl = 2. Each
follower j /∈ Ω follows its parent k, and sets qj(t+ 1) = qk(t) (qk ultimately follows
the MAP ql of its local leader l). Notice that when Rl = 2 is achieved, the RIM
of the followers in tree l will not be greater than 2. If Rl = 2,∀l ∈ Ω, then the
conditions in (5.3) will be critically satisfied, thus providing a sub-optimal network
throughput. We will examine in Section 5.3.5 how close the design is to the Pareto
front solution predicted by (5.1).
The control system shown in Fig. 5.2 is designed as follows. For each local
leader l, the use of the PI controller is to eliminate the steady-state error [140, Ch.
10.1] while trying to achieve the desired reference signal Rl,sp = 2. The relationship
between the input error signal el(t) = Rl,sp − Rl(t) and the output ql(t) of the PI
controller in discrete time (sampling time interval = 1) can be expressed as follows:
ql(t) = KP,lel(t) +KI,lσl(t) = KP,lel(t) +KI,l
∑t




n=0el(n) is the integral function, and {KP,l, KI,l} are the propor-
tional and integral parameters for the PI controller in leader l. Alternatively, we
can use the recursive form below which requires no memory on the integral value
σl:
ql(t) = ql(t− 1) +KP,l[el(t)− el(t− 1)] +KI,lel(t), KP,l > 0, KI,l > 0. (5.5)
We can see from (5.4) that ql(t) stops changing after a certain time instant t0,
if and only if el(t) = 2 − Rl(t) = 0,∀t ≥ t0 is achieved, i.e., Rl = 2 is achieved in
the steady states. Taking z-transform on both sides of (5.4), the transfer function
for the PI controller can be obtained as
CPI(z) = Ql(z)/El(z) = KP,l +
KI,l
1− z−1 . (5.6)
The PI controller enables smooth adaptation of the MAP to achieve this desired
RIM value. As commented by [141, p.174], when the goal is to asymptotically
regulate the system output (RIM) to a “set point” (Rl,sp = 2), asymptotic regulation
and disturbance rejection can be achieved by including “integral action” in the
controller. Moreover, by properly tuning the PI parameters, the PI controller can
achieve a good tradeoff between the response speed and stability while guaranteeing
convergence, which is a major challenge when designing adaptive algorithms.
In the following two subsections, we perform the steady-state analysis, transient
analysis, and PI parameter tuning for the above control system. In particular, we
first consider a simple scenario with only one local leader, and then extend to more
general cases with multiple local leaders.
5.3.3 Single Local Leader Case
Consider the simple case where there is only one local leader (thus only one tree) in
the network. For such a network, the node degree is the highest at the local leader
and decreases towards the leaves. For example, if tree 7 in Fig. 5.1 does not exist
and the network only comprises of tree 1, the node degree decreases from the root
(leader 1) towards the leaves (users 3, 4, 5, 6).
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Steady-State Analysis
For the above scenario, the system will finally settle down with all MAPs being








1− ql ) = 2Nl
ql
1− ql = Rl,sp = 2. (5.7)
Therefore, when operating at the steady-state, every user has a MAP equal to
q˜l = 1/(Nl + 1). (5.8)
For the example of tree 1 in Fig. 5.1 (without tree 7), the steady-state MAPs of all
users is equal to q˜1 = 1/(N1 + 1) = 1/(4 + 1) = 0.2.
In a very specific case, when the network is fully connected, the local leader l is
directly connected to all the remaining users, hence q˜l = 1/(Nl + 1) = 1/N , which
coincides with the optimal condition in (5.1). Therefore, for any fully connected
network, the SALE scheme is able to achieve a solution which falls on the Pareto
front.
Throughput Sensitivity on RIM
The throughput at the local leader is
θl = ql(1− ql)Nl . (5.9)
Here we analyse the throughput sensitivity on the value of RIM around 2 at the
local leader. When the RIM value is perturbed by a small value , i.e., Rl = 2 + ,
according to (5.7), we have
ql = (2 + )/(2 + + 2Nl). (5.10)
Therefore, we can take the derivative of θl on the perturbation  to observe the local








= [1− (Nl + 1)ql] · (1− ql)Nl−1 · 2Nl
(2 + + 2Nl)2
. (5.11)
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Therefore, the local sensitivity of the throughput θl on the value of RIM at 2 is 0,
which means that the throughput θl is locally insensitive to small perturbations of
the RIM value around 2.
















|>0 < 0. (5.14)
The results from (5.12) to (5.14) suggest that the throughput θl is being maximized
when  = 0, i.e., when the RIM value Rl = 2. Moreover, (5.13) suggests that
when  < 0 or equivalently Rl < 2, there is a margin for the throughput θl to be
improved since ∂θl
∂
> 0, i.e., the network around the location of user l is operating
at a slightly underload situation. On the other hand, (5.14) suggests that when




i.e., the network around the location of user l is operating at a slightly overload
situation.
Now consider other users in the same neighborhood as user l. Firstly, if other
users have the same node degree as user l (regular graph), then they are homoge-
neous in terms of MAP, RIM, and throughput. Therefore, their throughputs are
also maximized when they have the same RIM value of 2. In such a homogeneous
node degree case, the throughput under the RIM value of 2 would be on the Pareto
front. On the other hand, if another user j has a smaller node degree Nj than that
of user l, i.e., Nj ≤ Nl, then the throughput of user j is
θj = ql(1− ql)Nj , (5.15)
where ql = q˜l = 1/(Nl + 1) is the common MAP value in this neighborhood. Since
∂θj
∂ql







hence user j would be operating at the underload situation. As a result, since the
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Figure 5.3: Block Diagram for the PI Controller at the Local Leader
followers normally do not fully exploit the transmission opportunities, the overall
throughput solution is expected to be below the Pareto front. We will address this
issue again in Section 5.3.5.
Transient Analysis
Before the system converges to the steady-state operating point, there exists a
transient period in which q is varying. Here we use control theory to derive a
sufficient condition to guarantee system stability. The block diagram for the PI
controller at the local leader is shown in Fig. 5.3, where CPI(z) defined in (5.6) is
the transfer function of the PI controller, Gl(z) represents the transfer function of
the spatial Aloha system to be controlled at the local leader l, and z−1 represents
one sample time delay in the z-domain.
Define pl = ql − q˜l and el = Rl,sp − Rl as the input and output of the system
Gl(z), respectively, where q˜l is the desired operating point given in (5.8), and pl
is a small perturbation around q˜l. For simplicity of analysis, we simplify Gl(z) by
assuming no information propagation delay between the leader and its neighbors,
i.e., qj(t) = ql(t), ∀j with al,j = 1. The transfer function Gl(z) can then be obtained
by linearising the non-linear function from (5.7):
Rl = (2Nlql)/(1− ql) (5.17)
about the operating point q˜l. Eq.(5.17) can be expressed using pl and el as:
Rl,sp − el = (2Nl(pl + q˜l))/(1− (pl + q˜l)). (5.18)
Taking the derivative on both sides of (5.18), and evaluating at the operating


























Then we can discretize el(t) and pl(t), and take the z-transform on both sides
of (5.19):
(1− z−1)El(z) = (1− z−1)KlPl(z). (5.21)
The transfer function Gl(z) can then be obtained as:
Gl(z) = El(z)/Pl(z) = Kl. (5.22)
In the following we study the linearized model and ensure its stability by appro-
priately choosing the PI parameters. Note that the stability of the linearized model
guarantees that our system is locally stable, which means that small perturbations
around the desired operating point q˜l can all be absorbed, i.e., the control system
will eventually converge to the operating point q˜l after being perturbed.
According to the control theory [143, eq.(6.22)], we need to check that the
following transfer function is stable:
H(z) = [1− z−1CPI(z)Gl(z)]−1CPI(z), (5.23)
i.e.,
H(z) = [1− z−1 · (KP,l + KI,l
1− z−1 ) ·Kl]





z2 − [1 +Kl(KP,l +KI,l)]z +KlKP,l . (5.24)
According to the Schur-Cohn stability criterion [144, Sec. 3.2], a necessary and
sufficient condition for a discrete-time system H(z) to be stable is that its poles all
lie within the unit circle, i.e., the roots of the characteristic equation:
C(z) = z2 − [1 +Kl(KP,l +KI,l)]z +KlKP,l = 0 (5.25)
all lie within the unit circle in the complex z-domain. Furthermore, for a second
order characteristic equation A(z) = z2 + a1z + a2 = 0, an equivalent stability
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condition is given by the Jury’s stability test [144, Theorem 3.3]:
a2 < 1; a2 > −1 + a1; a2 > −1− a1. (5.26)
If we apply the Jury’s stability test to (5.25), we have:
KlKP,l < 1 (5.27)
KlKP,l > −1− [1 +Kl(KP,l +KI,l)] (5.28)
KlKP,l > −1 + [1 +Kl(KP,l +KI,l)] (5.29)
Since Kl < 0, we only need KP,l > 0 to satisfy (5.27). Eq. (5.29) can be
equivalently reduced to KI,l > 0. From (5.28), we have
−Kl(2KP,l +KI,l) < 2. (5.30)
Hence a sufficient condition to guarantee stability is obtained:{
−Kl(2KP,l +KI,l) < 2,
KP,l > 0, KI,l > 0.
(5.31)
PI Parameter Tuning
In addition to guaranteeing stability, another consideration in selecting {KP,l, KI,l}
is to find a suitable trade-off between fast convergence and the transient oscillations.
Ziegler-Nichols rules [140, Ch. 10.3] can be used for this purpose.
First, we compute the parameter KU , which is defined as the KP,l value that
leads to instability when KI,l = 0; and the parameter TI , which is defined as the
oscillation period under these conditions. Then according to Ziegler-Nichols rules,
KP,l and KI,l can be configured as follows:
KP,l = 0.4KU , (5.32)
KI,l = KP,l/(0.85TI). (5.33)
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To compute KU , we first set KI,l = 0 in (5.30), and we have
KP,l < 1/(−Kl). (5.34)
From (5.34), we take KU as the value where the system may turn unstable:
KU = 1/(−Kl). (5.35)
Then set KP,l according to (5.32),









With the KP,l value that renders the system unstable, a given set of input values
may take great changes up to every time interval, yielding an oscillation period of













In summary, using the {KP,l, KI,l} values given in (5.36) (5.37), the SALE
scheme is guaranteed to converge fast to a stable steady-state operating point given
in (5.8).
5.3.4 Multiple Local Leaders Case
In order to study the scalability of the SALE scheme, we consider more general cases
where there are multiple local leaders in the network. We use the simple example
given in Fig. 5.1, with users 1 and 7 being the local leaders.
Steady-State Analysis
We have illustrated that after the local leader election process, the whole network
is partitioned into several disjoint trees or neighborhoods. However, these trees are
disjoint but their MAPs are not necessarily independent of each other. In our SALE
scheme, the MAPs of all users in tree l are controlled by leader l, who adjusts its ql
based on Rl, which only involves the neighbors of leader l. Therefore, if leader l is
not directly connected to a user in other trees, then the MAP in tree l will not be
affected by other trees. For Fig. 5.1, the MAP in tree 1 is not affected by tree 7,
however, the steady-state MAP of leader 7 is affected by user 5 which is a follower
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in tree 1.
The steady state of the SALE scheme can then be determined as follows. For
those independent trees, the analysis in Section 5.3.3 is readily applied to obtain
the steady states. For leader l1 who is affected by user m in tree l2 (which happens
normally when Nl1 ≤ Nl2), it should wait until the steady state of q˜m = q˜l2 is
calculated before calculating q˜l1 based on Rl1 = 2. To achieve the same RIM
level Rl1 = Rl2 = 2 with a smaller node degree Nl1 ≤ Nl2 , leader l1 should have
q˜l1 ≥ 1/(Nl1 + 1) ≥ q˜l2 in general. For Fig. 5.1, the steady state MAP in tree 1 can















1− q7 . (5.38)
By setting R7 = 2 and substituting in q˜5 = 0.2, we have q˜7 = 0.2598. Thus the
steady state MAP in tree 7 is q˜i = 0.2598,∀i ∈ {7, 8, 9}. It is easily verified that
q˜7 > 1/(N7 + 1) = 0.25 > q˜1. Notice that the steady state MAP in tree 7 is not
trivially equal to 1/(N7 + 1) as in the single leader case. Fortunately, our control
system is able to converge to the steady state automatically.
Now consider adding another user 10 as a neighbor of user 8, as shown in Fig.
5.4. Here user 1 and user 7 are the preliminary local leaders. User 8 now has
the same node degree as user 7, but user 7 is still elected as the preliminary local
leader due to its smaller ID. As shown in the above analysis, the preliminary local
leader 7 would push the MAP in the tree to be q˜i = 0.2598,∀i ∈ {7, 8, 9, 10}, which
achieves R7 = 2 but this would push the RIM of user 8 to R8 = 2.1, which is higher
than 2 and hence should be avoided. Somewhere in the process of following the
MAP of user 7, user 8 should find itself a more suitable local leader than user 7.
This example shows that the leadership should not be finalized simply based on
smaller ID. In such a case, the leadership should be handed over to user 8. For the
above example, in the midst of updating, when user 8 detects R8 > 2, it declares
leadership and activates its PI controller to achieve R8 = 2. The preliminary leader
7 becomes a follower whose parent is the new leader 8. For simplicity, the child-
parent relationship is only adjusted between the new and old leaders, while other
followers stick to their original parent. For example, follower 9’s parent is still user
7. The new child-parent relationship is shown in Fig. 5.4. Notice that after the
leadership handover, the new leader 8 is not connected to any users in tree 1, hence
the MAP in tree 8 becomes independent of tree 1. The equilibrium MAP in the
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Figure 5.4: 10 Users Topology
tree led by leader 8 is 0.25, while R8 = 2 and R7 = 1.91.
Transient Analysis and PI Parameter Tuning
The stability is guaranteed through the following argument. When all trees are
independent, the transient analysis and PI parameter tuning in each tree follow
those in Section 5.3.3, hence stability is guaranteed. Each local leader l has its own
PI controller, with the parameters KP,l, KI,l given in (5.36) and (5.37), respectively.
Again the PI parameter tuning only relies on the local information Nl, hence can
be immediately performed after the local leader election. In particular, the system
transfer function to be controlled at the local leader l1 follows (5.22) after applying
(5.20):
Gl1(z) = Kl1 = −2(Nl1 + 1)2/Nl1 . (5.39)
If leader l1 is affected by user m in tree l2 (e.g., see Fig. 5.1), this happens
normally when Nl1 ≤ Nl2 . In this case, tree l2 is independent of tree l1, but tree
l1 depends on tree l2 through user m. Tree l2 reaches the steady state first, with
q˜m = q˜l2 ≤ 1/(Nl1 + 1), which remains constant afterwards. For tree l1, due to the




















where q˜m is now a constant, i.e., dq˜m/dt = 0. In (5.40), we have used
′ to denote
the respective parameters to differentiate from the independent case. As a result of
fewer neighboring followers, R′l1 reacts more slowly to q
′
l1
than in the independent
case, hence we expect the absolute gain |Kl1| of the system Gl1(z) to decrease.
Specifically, if we apply the same linearisation procedure in Section 5.3.3 to
84











where q˜′l1 is the operating point that achieves R
′
l1
= 2 in (5.40). It can be verified
using Mathematica [145] that |K ′l1| < |Kl1| for all Nl1 ≥ 2 and 0 ≤ q˜m ≤ 1/(Nl1 +1).
Similar results can be verified if leader l1 is affected by more neighbors m1,m2, · · ·
that belong to other trees.
Then the PI parameters {K ′P,l1 , K ′I,l1} that guarantee system stability can be set























Since {KP,l1 , KI,l1} are easy to obtain using Nl1 only, leader l1 uses {KP,l1 , KI,l1} in
practice. More importantly, since the current system G′l1(z) has a smaller absolute
gain |K ′l1| due to fewer neighboring followers, leader l1 is using the less aggres-
sive PI parameters {KP,l1 , KI,l1} (see Section 5.3.3) and hence system stability is
guaranteed.
Throughput Sensitivity on RIM
Following the above settings, assume that the local leader l1 is affected by user m




(1− q′l1)Nl1−1(1− q˜m). (5.44)
When the RIM value in (5.40) is perturbed by a small value  around 2, i.e., R′l1 =





















Notice that when  = 0, i.e., R′l1 = 2, it can be verified from (5.40) that the
operating point q˜′l1 should be no greater than 1/Nl1 . Therefore, the local sensitivity





















Therefore, in such cases there are still some margins for the throughput θ′l1 to
be improved, i.e., the network around the location of leader l1 is operating at a
slightly underload situation. Similar conclusions can be drawn when the leader l1
is affected by more users in other trees. In the next subsection we discuss how close
the throughput solution obtained by SALE is to the Pareto front.
5.3.5 “Distance” to Pareto Front
The Pareto front surface is obtained if we apply the sufficient and necessary test-
ing criteria (5.1) to the network. Any point on this surface is the combination of
throughputs which can be achieved by all users while keeping the network operat-
ing in a stable condition. The solution obtained in SALE generally stays below the
Pareto front due to two reasons. First, the stability criteria (5.3) used in imple-
menting the algorithm is only a sufficient condition. Second, some of the followers
(especially those who are further away from the leader) may not have fully exploited
the transmission opportunities. Hence, the feasible throughput region obtained by
SALE is only a subset to that obtained by using (5.1).
Based on the sensitivity analysis in Section 5.3.3 and Section 5.3.4, in the ho-
mogeneous node degree case (regular graph), the users are homogeneous in terms of
MAP, RIM, and throughput. Since the throughput solution for all users all have a
RIM value of 2, the solution would stay on the Pareto front. However, in most prac-
tical cases where there are variations in the node degrees of users, the local leader
election allows partitioning the network into several local neighborhoods. Each local
leader, which has the highest node degree in its neighborhood, uses a PI controller
to achieve a RIM value of 2. The remaining nodes in the same neighborhood have
a smaller node degree than its local leader, and will have a RIM value no greater
than 2. This suggests that normally the followers are operating at the underload
condition, or at a distance below the Pareto front obtained by using (5.1).
We attempt to characterize such a throughput margin with the optimal one
obtained in (5.1) by defining the “distance to Pareto” dpareto. When we obtain
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a solution θ = [θ1, θ2, · · · , θN ] in the SALE scheme, we continue to move in the
direction d · θ (d ≥ 1, i.e., proportionally increase the throughput of all users) until
we find an operating point q that achieves dpareto · θ, and beyond this point there
is no stable solution. In particular, when dpareto = 1, the solution is on the Pareto
front. As will be shown in the simulation results, the SALE scheme achieves a close-
to-Pareto-front throughput, with dPareto below 1.05 for most of the topologies, i.e.,
we usually can obtain a solution which is less than 5% below the Pareto front.
5.3.6 Complexity, Scalability and Overhead of SALE
We summarize the SALE scheme in Algorithm 5.1. The proposed scheme shows
the following advantages:
Low Implementation Complexity
a) It takes only two rounds of information exchange among each user and its neigh-
bors to complete the preliminary local leader election. b) In each iteration, each
user only needs to broadcast its ID, MAP, and node degree to its neighbors. c)
Each user only uses information about its neighbors to update its MAP in each
iteration. d) Each leader l implements a simple PI controller to adjust its MAP
ql so as to achieve Rl = 2, which corresponds to a throughput close to the Pareto
front. e) The PI parameter tuning can be autonomously done by the local leader
itself based on its node degree Nl, which guarantees stability and fast convergence.
f) Each follower j only needs to find its parent k, and simply sets qj(t+ 1) = qk(t)
in each iteration. g) Only in some situations, there is a need to change the local
leader. Therefore, the SALE scheme can be implemented autonomously with low
complexity.
High Scalability
a) The SALE scheme is fully autonomous without any centralized controller. b)
The whole network is grouped into several disjoint trees, within each tree there
is a local leader controlling the MAPs in this tree. c) The Ziegler-Nichols rules
adapt the PI parameters in (5.36) (5.37) to various user densities (associated with
different node degree Nl at the local leader), thus guaranteeing fast convergence
of MAPs at the local leaders. d) Given a certain user density, if the number of
users increases, the number of local leaders also increases correspondingly, i.e., the
whole network is grouped into more trees. As a result, the average number of users
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Algorithm 5.1 The SALE Scheme
1: Preliminary Local Leader Election:
2: Each user i broadcasts its ID to its neighbors;
3: Each user i counts its number of neighbors (node degree) Ni;
4: Each user i broadcasts its ID and node degree Ni to its neighbors;
5: Each user i compares Ni with the node degrees of its neighbors. If Ni is the largest,
then user i is elected as a local leader. Otherwise, user i is a follower, whose parent
is the neighbor with the largest node degree. In cases when two or more candidates
are connected, the one with smaller ID wins. Assume the local leaders make up a set
Ω ⊂ N .
6: Control System:
7: Rl,sp = 2, KP,l = 0.2Nl/(Nl + 1)
2,KI,l = 2Nl/[17(Nl + 1)
2],∀l ∈ Ω;
8: t = 0, q(t) = 0; Declarei = 0, ∀i ∈ N ;
9: repeat:
10: Each user i broadcasts its MAP qi(t) to its neighbors;
11: Each user i computes Ri(t) =
∑N
j=1,j 6=i[aijqi(t)/(1− qj(t)) + ajiqj(t)/(1− qi(t))];
12: for each local leader l ∈ Ω do:
13: el(t+ 1) = Rl,sp −Rl(t);
14: ql(t+ 1) = ql(t) +KP,l[el(t+ 1)− el(t)] +KI,lel(t+ 1);
15: end for
16: for each follower j 6∈ Ω do:




21: for each user i ∈ N do:
22: if Declarei = 1 then:
23: User i joins Ω and becomes a local leader. In cases when two or more
connected users declare leadership, the one with smaller ID wins.
24: else if user i ∈ Ω and its neighbor declares leadership then:
25: the preliminary leader i quits from Ω, and follow the newly declared leader;
26: end if
27: if Ri(t) > 2 then:
28: mark Declarei = 1 and declare leadership in the next round of broadcast;




33: t = t+ 1;
34: until Convergence, i.e., Rl(t) = Rl,sp, ∀l ∈ Ω.
88
in a tree, as well as the tree height, will not change significantly as the network
size grows. Therefore, when a local leader l reaches the steady state (Rl = 2), the
corresponding MAP ql would not take too many hops to reach all the followers in
tree l. e) As we will see in Section 5.4.4, the SALE scheme converges in around
30 iterations, regardless of the user density or the number of users in the network.
Therefore, the SALE scheme provides fast convergence with high scalability.
Overhead of Information Exchange
The SALE scheme requires local information exchange for leader election and MAP
adaptation. The local leader election requires two rounds of local information ex-
change about node ID and node degree. Thereafter, the MAP adaptation requires
each user to broadcast its ID and MAP to its one-hop neighbors.
As mentioned in [146] to handle the case with information exchange, slotted
Aloha usually has a framed structure consisting of a control phase for the informa-
tion exchange and a normal phase for data transmission. In our case, we embed
the message in the packet header. In a simplified model, assume that each packet
originally (i.e. in the heuristic approach) has a header field and constant packet
size, which at least contains the user ID or address. For the need of our algorithm,
we add three subfields to the header, i.e., node degree subfield, MAP subfield and
leadership declaration subfield, and each occupies 8 bits, 16 bits and 1 bit, respec-
tively. We further assume each packet occupies a time slot and has a packet size
of LS bits, e.g., 250 bytes = 2000 bits, the newly added fractional overhead is then
given by 25/LS=25/2000=0.0125.
The message exchange is realized in the following way. In each time slot, each
user either sends a message to its neighbors according to its MAP, or listens to the
channel to receive a message from its neighbors. Assume that each iteration in the
SALE scheme corresponds to packet transmissions in LF slots which is known as
a frame, and all users are frame-synchronized. Since the transmission of a packet
is subject to collision, some packets (and hence the added subfields) will not be
received correctly by some users. However, for a sufficiently large LF value, each user
is likely to receive at least one packet from all its neighbors and hence gather enough
information about all its neighbors through the subfields embedded in the received
packets. By the end of each iteration, all users then update the MAP subfields for
the next iteration according to the SALE scheme. Since the SALE scheme relies
on an accurate estimation of node degree, we assume that each user counts and
updates its node degree in every LND slots. LND can be chosen to be sufficiently
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large to guarantee an accurate estimation of node degree. In our simulations, we
choose LND = 10LF slots (i.e., 10 iterations) to guarantee an accurate estimation.
5.4 Performance Evaluation
In the simulations we assume the channel bit rate is rb=20 Mbps, and each packet
in slotted Aloha has LS=2000 bits. Then the slot time is LS/rb = 0.1 ms. Each
iteration in the SALE scheme corresponds to a frame of LF = 100 slots (i.e., 10
ms), and the users are frame-synchronized. Each user counts and updates its node
degree in every LND = 10LF = 1000 slots (i.e., 10 iterations).
5.4.1 Parameter Tuning: Stability and Convergence Time
In Section 5.3 we claim that the PI parameters given in (5.36) (5.37) are able to
guarantee system stability as well as fast convergence to the steady-state operating
point. Here we illustrate this by using the example in Fig. 5.4. Three sets of PI
parameters are used in the PI controllers respectively: {KP,l/5, KI,l/5}, {KP,l, KI,l},
and {5KP,l, 5KI,l}, where {KP,l, KI,l} are obtained by (5.36) (5.37). The algorithm
starts with small initial MAPs, e.g., qi = 0.05,∀i. The transient behaviors of R1
are plotted in Fig. 5.5. Notice that each iteration in the SALE scheme corresponds
to packet transmissions in LF = 100 slots. The value of LF is arbitrary and with
the purpose to safe-guard the correct reception of neighbors’ information in each
iteration. This is similar to the use of LND. In fact, instances of message passing
failure in a frame are rarely captured in our simulations. In the rare occasion if
it happens, the transient variations caused by the delay of MAP feedback are well
handled by the control system.
From Fig. 5.5 we can see that {KP,l, KI,l} obtained by (5.36) (5.37) enable
the system to converge to the steady state (R1 = 2) within 30 iterations, i.e.,
0.3s. In contrast, the conservative PI parameters {KP,l/5, KI,l/5} take around 120
iterations (i.e., 1.2s) for the system to converge, while the aggressive PI parameters
{5KP,l, 5KI,l} render the system unstable. Similar results are observed for more
complicated topologies, e.g., the 50 users case in Fig. 5.8 that will be introduced in
Section 5.4.4. Therefore, the PI parameters given by (5.36) (5.37) indeed guarantee
system stability with fast convergence.
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Figure 5.5: Stability and Convergence Time under Different PI Parameters
5.4.2 Steady State, Optimality and Fairness
For the same example given in Fig. 5.4, we demostrate more details about the
steady state, throughput optimality and fairness among the users. The transient
behaviors of RIM Ri, MAP qi and throughput θi are plotted in Fig. 5.6 for users
1, 5, 7 and 8, respectively.
It takes around 40 iterations (i.e., 0.4s) for the system to converge. The pre-
liminary local leader election can be completed in the first 10 iterations, in which
each user counts its own node degree and exchanges information with its neighbors.
Starting from the 11-th iteration, the PI controllers in leader 1 and leader 7 start
working. At the 28-th iteration, user 8 (green line in Fig. 5.6) detects R8 > 2 and
takes over the leadership from the preliminary leader 7 (red diamond in Fig. 5.6).
In the steady state, leader 1 and 8 have R1 = R8 = 2; the follower 5 has R5 = 1.08
and has MAP q˜5 = q˜1 = 0.2; the follower 7 has R7 = 1.91 and MAP q˜7 = q˜8 = 0.25.
Regarding the throughput, generally the users with a higher node degree would
have a lower throughput due to contentions from more neighbors. In this example,
θ1 < θ8 < θ7 < θ5.
The distance to Pareto front dPareto is used to evaluate the throughput opti-
mality. For our SALE scheme applied to Fig. 5.4, dPareto = 1.02, which suggests
only 2% loss between the achieved throughput θ and the Pareto front. Therefore,
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Figure 5.6: Performance of SALE, Topology in Fig. 5.4
although the sub-optimal condition (5.3) is used in our design, the result is very
close to the actual optimal.
We also evaluate the throughput fairness among the users. When spatial reuse
is considered, different users at different spatial locations usually have different
connectivity. As a result, those users with a higher node degree usually receive
more interference and consequently a lower throughput than those with a lower node
degree. Therefore, it is difficult to give an exact measurement of fairness in such
a heterogeneous network. We make an attempt to take this spatial characteristic
into consideration, and weigh each user i’s throughput by Ni + 1 (including user i
and its neighbors), i.e., we define the weighted throughput for each user i as:
θ˜i = (Ni + 1) · θi,∀i ∈ N . (5.48)






N ·∑Ni=1 θ˜i2 . (5.49)
Jain’s index rates the fairness of an array of values θ˜ = [θ˜1, θ˜2, · · · , θ˜N ] where there
are N users and θ˜i is the weighted throughput for the ith user. The result ranges
from 1/N (worst case) to 1 (best case), and it is maximum when all users receive
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Table 5.1: Performance Comparison between the SALE Scheme and the Heuristic Algo-
rithm
Topology Scheme θi Σθi θnet,i Jain(θ˜) dPareto Tconv
Fig. 5.4
SALE 0.1246 1.2459 0.1230 0.9921 1.02 ∼0.4s
Heuristic 0.1158 1.1582 0.1158 0.9685 1.045 ∼60s
Fig. 5.8
SALE 0.0578 2.8888 0.0571 0.9906 1.025 ∼0.4s
Heuristic 0.0535 2.6733 0.0535 0.9593 1.04 ∼90s
the same allocation. For our SALE scheme applied to Fig. 5.4, Jain(θ˜) = 0.9921,
which is close to 1 and suggests good fairness among the users.
5.4.3 Comparison with Heuristic Algorithm
Here we apply the heuristic algorithm in Chapter 4 to the same example in Fig.
5.4 and compare performance with the SALE scheme shown in Fig. 5.6. The
algorithm in Chapter 4 assumes no information exchange among the users, and
the users adapt their MAPs based on the measured throughput and channel idle
rate, which require a relatively accurate estimation. In the simulations we choose
each estimation period to consist of LI = 1000 slots so that the adaptation in the
heuristic algorithm works properly. Since the slot time is 0.1ms, each estimation
period lasts 0.1s.
The transient states of the heuristic algorithm for user 1 are plotted in Fig.
5.7. As the users heuristically search for the Pareto front, the system experiences
several fluctuations before settling down. The convergence time Tconv takes around
600 estimation periods, i.e., around 60s, which is much longer than that of the
SALE scheme. Since other users experience similar transient states as user 1, their
behaviors are not plotted for brevity. The steady-state performance is summarized
in the upper part of Table 5.1 for the SALE scheme and the heuristic algorithm.
Both schemes achieve a throughput θ close to the Pareto front (dPareto = 1.02, 1.045
respectively), while the SALE scheme provides better fairness for the users (the
heuristic algorithm has a lower Jain’s index = 0.9685). Since the SALE scheme has
an additional information exchange overhead of 25/LS=25/2000=0.0125, we also
compare the average net throughput θnet,i in the table. Note that we assume both
approaches use the same header except the three additional subfields in the SALE
scheme, and the common parts of the header are included in computing the net
throughputs.
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Figure 5.7: Performance of the Heuristic Algorithm, Topology in Fig. 5.4
5.4.4 Scalability of SALE
50 Users Case
Consider a distributed network with N users, which are randomly placed in a square
region of a given area. For simplicity, we assume that all the distances between any
transmitter and its designated receiver are much smaller than the distances between
any two transmitters, so that a Tx-Rx pair (user) can be represented by a single
node in the topology. We further assume that all users have transmission range of
5 unit length, and those users who are in each other’s transmission range will have
significant interference on each other, and the two users are said to be connected.
Based on the above assumptions, we can generate a random connected topology
with 50 users in a square region of area 500 (units), as plotted in Fig. 5.8.
We apply the SALE scheme to Fig. 5.8, and the whole network is shown to be
grouped into 4 trees, governed by leaders l ∈ Ω = {11, 17, 27, 42} respectively. The
users in different trees are marked by different shapes and colors, e.g., the largest
tree is marked with red triangles, which is governed by leader 11 with the highest
node degree N11 = 10. For clarity, the child-parent relationship is not shown in
the figure. For comparison, we also apply the heuristic algorithm to the example in
Fig. 5.8. The performances of the two schemes are summarized in the lower part
of Table 5.1.
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Figure 5.8: Randomly Generated Connected Topology with 50 Users
The heuristic algorithm converges in around 90s, longer than the 10 users case
in Fig. 5.4. Therefore, the convergence time increases with the network size in the
heuristic algorithm. In contrast, the SALE scheme still converges in around 0.4s,
thus is more efficient as the network size increases. After the system converges,
both schemes achieve throughputs θ close to the Pareto front (dPareto = 1.025, 1.04
respectively), while the SALE scheme provides better fairness for the users, with a
higher Jain’s index 0.9906 > 0.9593.
100 Users with Various User Density
We define the user density as the number of users per unit area. For the 50 users
case above, the user density is 50/500=0.1. Now we generate a sequence of random
connected topologies with various user density, by randomly scattering 100 users in
a square region of various areas. In particular, when the square region has an area
of 12.5, the network becomes fully connected (the diagonal line length is equal to
the transmission range of 5). We apply the SALE scheme to these topologies and
summarize the results in the upper part of Table 5.2.
As the user density increases from 0.1 to 8 (tend to a fully connected network),
the network is grouped into fewer but bigger trees, and the maximum height of all
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Table 5.2: Scalability of the SALE Scheme
Users Area Density Σθi Jain(θ˜) dPareto Tconv Leaders Max. Hl
100
12.5 8 0.3697 1.0000 1 ∼0.8s 1 1
31.25 3.2 0.4075 0.9998 1.00 ∼0.8s 1 2
62.5 1.6 0.5240 0.9912 1.03 ∼0.8s 1 2
125 0.8 0.9246 0.9881 1.05 ∼0.4s 1 2
250 0.4 1.4922 0.9795 1.055 ∼0.4s 1 4
500 0.2 2.5146 0.9856 1.04 ∼0.4s 2 4
1000 0.1 5.1930 0.9823 1.02 ∼0.4s 5 5
200 2000
0.1
9.9504 0.9800 1.01 ∼0.4s 12 5
400 4000 18.8848 0.9692 1.01 ∼0.4s 22 8
600 6000 27.2568 0.9757 1.02 ∼0.4s 32 5
800 8000 37.2249 0.9771 1.015 ∼0.4s 49 5
1000 10000 45.7275 0.9799 1.01 ∼0.4s 54 5
trees gradually decreases to 1. As the user density increases, the total throughput
decreases due to increased interference from more neighbors experienced by each
user. However, regardless of the user density, the number of iterations for con-
vergence is still around 40 iterations. Such fast convergence is guaranteed by the
Ziegler-Nichols rules which adapt the PI parameters in (5.36) (5.37) to various user
densities (associated with different node degree Nl at the local leader).
Note that as the user density increases above 1.6, the individual throughput
drops significantly, and the probability of packet collision increases and affects the
success rate of passing the subfield information. Hence we have to choose a larger
frame of LF = 200 slots in each iteration for the proposed SALE scheme. As
a result, each iteration in these high-density topologies now takes 20ms and the
convergence time is around 0.8s. Also note that similar problems exist for the
heuristic algorithm in dense topologies, in which the individual user throughput
is relatively small. To acquire a relatively accurate estimation for a small value of
user throughput, a longer estimation period is required so as to suppress the relative
error and keep the variance of the estimated throughput at a low level, in order for
the MAP adaptation in the heuristic algorithm to work properly.
On the other hand, regardless of the user density, the network still achieves close-
to-Pareto-front throughput, with dPareto around 1.05, i.e., only 5% below the Pareto
front. In particular, dPareto is equal to 1 in the fully connected case, thus verifying
the statement in Section 5.3.3 that our SALE scheme achieves a throughput on the
Pareto front in a fully connected network. Finally, the SALE scheme provides good
fairness for all users, with Jain’s index around 0.98 (close to 1).
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200∼1000 Users Cases
Here we keep the user density as 0.1, and increase the number of users by enlarging
the area under consideration. Then we generate a sequence of random connected
topologies with N=200, 400, 600, 800 and 1000, respectively. We apply the SALE
scheme to these topologies and summarize the results in the lower part of Table 5.2.
From Table 5.2 we can see that, as the number of users increases, the number
of local leaders also increases correspondingly, i.e., the whole network is grouped
into more trees. As a result, the average number of users in a tree, as well as the
tree height, will not change significantly as the network size grows. This is verified
in Table 5.2 that the maximum tree height Hl remains around 6 regardless of the
network size. Therefore, when a local leader l reaches the steady state (Rl = 2),
the corresponding MAP ql would only take around 6 hops to reach all the followers
in tree l. From Table 5.2, the SALE scheme converges in around 40 iterations,
i.e., 0.4s, regardless of the network size. Therefore, the SALE scheme provides fast
convergence with high scalability.
In the steady state, the SALE scheme achieves a throughout θ close to the Pareto
front, with dPareto around 1.02 for all cases. Consequently, the total throughput Σθi
increases almost linearly with the number of users in the network. Meanwhile, the
Jain’s index is around 0.97 for all cases, suggesting good fairness among the users.
5.5 Conclusions
This chapter focuses on spatial Aloha networks, and attempts to approach global
optimization of network throughput based on limited spread of local information
and realize the model’s quick convergence and stability. The SALE scheme is in-
troduced, which can be autonomously implemented by users using only local infor-
mation. Specifically, a user with maximum node degree in a certain neighborhood
is elected as the local leader, and the remaining users in this neighborhood simply
follow the same MAP. The SALE scheme makes use of a sufficient condition previ-
ously derived for the spatial Aloha network, which ensures the network to operate
in the stable region if the RIM parameter R at the local leader(s) satisfies R ≤ 2.
In our design, the local leader adjusts its MAP by a build-in PI controller to achieve
R=2. The resulting control system is sustained by mathematical foundations from
control theory, which guarantees fast convergence and network stability. Most im-
portantly, RIM is a local parameter based on only local information, which makes
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the SALE scheme easy and systematic to implement with high scalability. Through
simulations, we validate the fast convergence of the system to a steady-state op-
erating point with close-to-Pareto-front throughputs and good fairness among the
users, while comparing with our previous heuristic algorithm.
98
Chapter 6
Multi-Leader Stackelberg Games in
Multi-Channel Spatial Aloha Net-
works
6.1 Introduction
In Chapters 3 to 5, we have been studying the single channel spatial Aloha model.
To further improve the network performance, multiple collision channels can be
considered. A detailed review on channel selection games in multi-channel Aloha
networks with spatial reuse has been presented in Section 1.3.2.
The main contributions of this chapter are summarized as follows. We study
the multi-channel Aloha networks with spatial reuse, with the objective to enable
each autonomous user i to select a channel ci and decide a MAP qi to improve its
throughput, while providing a certain degree of fairness among the users [148]. We
apply the game theoretic approach to the problem, where each user i is a player
who chooses the strategy (ci, qi) to improve its own throughput. To search for a NE,
a Multi-Leader Stackelberg Game (MLSG) [74] is formulated to iteratively obtain a
solution on each dimension of the (ci, qi) strategy.
First, multiple Stackelberg leaders are elected to manage the MAPs of all players.
Then under the resulting MAP profile, each player iteratively chooses its channel
to improve its throughput. Specifically, assume the current network consists of
several sub-networks. These subnets are disconnected from others, either because
they operate on different channels, or they are on the same channel but spatially
disconnected. First of all, each subnet elects the player with the highest node degree
to be the leader to manage this subnet. Within each subnet, the leader mandates the
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MAPs of all players to be the same, and sets the MAP value to provide localized
max-min throughput fairness for the players in this subnet. Such a myopic best
response update performed by the leader requires only local information within its
subnet. Secondly, under the resulting MAP profile, each player iteratively chooses
its channel to improve its own throughput. The iteration dynamics follow the
formulation in [70], whose convergence is guaranteed under the theory of potential
games. An Oscillation Resolving Mechanism (ORM) is further proposed to stabilize
the design in some special cases where the operating points of some players in a
local region would oscillate between the two dimensions of the myopic search.
Compared to existing methods of pre-allocating MAPs as in [70], our iterative
MAP management explicitly takes into account the localized fairness issue among
the players, and is able to approximately achieve max-min throughput fairness in
each subnet. Moreover, under the above fairness constraint, the MLSG game is
able to further improve the overall network throughput iteratively compared to any
pre-allocated MAPs. Simulation results show that, by playing the MLSG game, the
overall network throughput is gradually improved until a NE is reached, and the
resulting NE provides good throughput fairness for the players.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. We dedicate Section 6.2 to
discuss the MLSG game in details. We evaluate the system performance through
simulations in Section 6.3. We conclude the chapter in Section 6.4.
6.2 Multi-Leader Stackelberg Games
In this section we design a Multi-Leader Stackelberg Game (MLSG), where each
user i is a player who chooses the strategy (ci, qi) to improve its own throughput
in the multi-channel spatial Aloha model introduced in Section 2.3. First, multiple
Stackelberg leaders are elected to manage the MAPs of all players. Then under
the resulting MAP profile, each player iteratively chooses its channel to improve its
own throughput. The process will repeat until a stable solution is obtained.
6.2.1 MAP Management by Multiple Stackelberg Leaders
Assume the current network settles with G subnets, as described in Section 2.3.
Each subnet Mg, g ∈ G elects a player lg ∈ Mg as the leader within this subnet.
Further assume that each leader’s management goal is to provide localized max-min
throughput fairness for the players in its subnet, by mandating a proper common
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(1− qj), ∀i ∈Mg,
qi = qlg ,∀i ∈Mg,
0 ≤ qlg ≤ 1.
(6.1)




θi = qlg(1− qlg)Ni,g ,
0 ≤ qlg ≤ 1,
(6.2)
where Ni,g is the number of neighbors for user i (excluding user i itself) in subnet
Mg, which is also known in graph theory [139] as the node degree of user i in this
subnet. Here we assume that the interference relationship among users is symmetric,
i.e., aij = aji,∀i, j. It is now obvious that the minimum throughput always happens
at the player with the highest node degree in this subnet under the common MAP
constraint. Since the leader lg is responsible for solving the max-min problem in
(6.2), it is natural to elect the player with the highest node degree as the leader lg.
For simplicity, in cases where there are multiple players in this subnet who have
the same highest node degree, the one with the smallest ID is elected as the leader.
The leader lg then solves the max-min problem in (6.2) by actually maximizing its
own throughput:
maxqlg θlg = qlg(1− qlg)Nlg,g
s.t. 0 ≤ qlg ≤ 1.
(6.3)
which yields the optimal solution to (6.2) as:
qlg = 1/(Nlg ,g + 1). (6.4)
We thus formulate the problem of choosing the MAPs and subsequent spatial
channel selection as a multi-leader Stackelberg game [74], where the player lg with
the highest node degree Nlg ,g in each subnetMg, g ∈ G is elected to be the leader to
manage the MAPs in this subnet. Within each subnetMg, the leader lg mandates
the MAPs of all players to be the same, and sets the MAP value as 1/(Nlg ,g + 1) to
provide max-min throughput fairness for the players in this subnet. Such a myopic
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best response update by the leader requires only local information within its subnet.
As a result, a MAP profile of all the players would be generated.
Note that the role of the Stackelberg leader in this chapter is slightly different
from that of the local leader in Chapter 5, although they share some characteristics
such as highest node degree, mandating equal MAP within its subnet, etc. The
key difference lies in the information requirement. The local leader in Chapter 5
requires only one-hop information to make MAP adaptation, while the Stackelberg
leader in this chapter requires local information within its subnet, i.e., it knows the
highest value of node degree within its subnet. We allow the Stackelberg leader to
have the above information so that (6.4) can be used to determine the MAP instead
of using PI controller described in Chapter 5, and focus more on the joint issues
with spatial channel selection. On the other hand, in the multiple-channel scenario,
it is expected that the network can be divided into more non-overlapping subnets,
each of which has fewer users and a lower user density than in the single-channel
scenario. Therefore, the node degree information in a subnet would be relatively
easy to acquire.
6.2.2 Spatial Channel Selection Process
Under the MAP profile resulting from the above MAP management process, each
player then iteratively chooses its channel to improve its own throughput using the
iteration dynamics formulated in [70]. Here we briefly rewrite the spatial channel
selection subgame using our settings and notations:
Players : Distributed Tx-Rx pairs, i ∈ N , who compete for K orthogonal chan-
nels to transmit via slotted-Aloha-type random access scheme.
Strategies : Each player i is allowed to choose a single channel ci ∈ K to access.
Its MAP qi ∈ [0, 1] is assumed to be fixed and given, ∀i ∈ N . We denote c =
[c1, c2, · · · , cN ] as the channel profile and q = [q1, q2, · · · , qN ] as the MAP profile of
all players.
Objectives : Each player i (i ∈ N ) aims to maximize its utility function ui(c, q,A),
which is defined as the logarithm of its throughput θi in its transmitting channel:




= log qi +
∑
j:aij=1,cj=ci
log(1− qj),∀i ∈ N . (6.5)
The solution of the spatial channel selection subgame is a NE of the subgame,
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which is defined as a strategy profile (in our case, c∗ = [c∗1, · · · , c∗N ]) in which each
player i’s channel selection strategy c∗i is a best response to the strategies of all the
other players c∗−i [34], i.e.,




−i, q,A),∀i ∈ N . (6.6)
Assume that asynchronous myopic best response is adopted, i.e., at any given
time, only one player updates its channel selection, which aims to maximize its own
utility defined in (6.5). To make a best response, each player needs to estimate the
load on all channels and choose the one with the highest channel availability. If
we assume that there exists one-hop information exchange about MAPs among the





which is the probability that the k-th channel is available. The myopic best response
by player i is therefore given by
c˜i = arg max
ci∈K
ui(ci, c−i, q,A) = arg max
k∈K
vi(k),∀i ∈ N . (6.8)
Under the above asynchronous myopic best response update, the convergence to a
NE c∗ of the subgame is guaranteed under the theory of potential games [70].
6.2.3 Iterative Play of the MLSG game
The MLSG game is then played iteratively based on the procedure given in the
above two subsections until a NE is reached. Compared to existing methods of pre-
allocating MAPs, the MLSG game further improves the overall network throughput
by iteratively tuning the MAPs toward max-min throughput in each subnet. We
summarize the iteration process of the MLSG game in Algorithm 6.1.
6.2.4 Oscillation Resolving Mechanism
Our simulation results show that convergence to a NE can always be achieved
after a finite number of game plays, except in some cases the operating points of
some players in a local region exhibit oscillation between the two dimensions of
the myopic search. In order to resolve this problem, we introduce an Oscillation
Resolving Mechanism (ORM) to stabilize the design.
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Algorithm 6.1 Iteration Process of the MLSG Game
1: Initialize:
2: Player i stays on channel ci = 1 (channel 1), for all i ∈ N (initially all players are in
the same subnet);
3: Elect the player L with the highest node degree NL as the leader;
4: Player i sets MAP qi = 1/(NL + 1), for all i ∈ N .
5: repeat:
6: repeat:
7: for i = 1, · · · , N players do:
8: Estimate the channel availability vi(k) on each channel k ∈ K;
9: Choose the channel ci = arg maxk∈K vi(k);
10: end for
11: until No player changes its channel.
12:
13: for each connected subnet Mg, g ∈ G do:
14: Elect the player lg ∈Mg with the highest node degree Nlg as the leader,
which broadcasts qlg = 1/(Nlg + 1) to all other players in Mg;
15: Player i sets MAP qi = qlg , for all i ∈Mg;
16: end for
17: (Oscillation Resolving Mechanism)
18: until No player changes its MAP.
Algorithm 6.2 Oscillation Resolving Mechanism
1: for i = 1, · · · , N players do:
2: for t = 2, 3, · · · , Tmax do:
3: Ci(t− 1) = Ci(t);
4: Qi(t− 1) = Qi(t);
5: end for
6: Ci(t) = ci;
7: Qi(t) = qi.
8: for T = 2, 3, · · · , Tmax/2 do:
9: for h = 1, · · · , T do:
10: if Ci(Tmax − h+ 1) = Ci(Tmax − h+ 1− T )
11: and Qi(Tmax − h+ 1) = Qi(Tmax − h+ 1− T )
12: and ∃t, s ∈ {Tmax − T + 1, · · · , Tmax},s.t. Ci(t) 6= Ci(s)
13: and ∃t, s ∈ {Tmax − T + 1, · · · , Tmax},s.t. Qi(t) 6= Qi(s) then




18: if Oscillation detected then




The ORM mechanism is presented in Algorithm 6.2, which should be inserted
in line 17 of Algorithm 6.1. Specifically, each player i keeps the history of its oper-
ating point (ci, qi) for the recent Tmax rounds of the MLSG game play, denoted as
(Ci(t), Qi(t)), t = 1, · · · , Tmax. If the operating points oscillate with a certain period
Ti, then player i would freeze its operating point at the first detected oscillation
point (ci, qi). This simple mechanism stabilizes the whole network.
In the ORM mechanism, different number of comparisons (T ≤ Tmax/2) need
to be performed when determining the oscillation period Ti of different player i.
The procedure to detect the oscillation period Ti for each player i is presented from
line 8 to line 17. To check for the oscillation period T , it requires at most 4T
comparing operations (equal or different). Since we have to check for the value of
T up to Tmax/2, in the worst case, it takes 4 · (2 + Tmax/2) · (Tmax/2 − 1)/2 =
(Tmax + 4)(Tmax/2 − 1) comparing operations, which is in the order of O(T 2max).
The value of Tmax required to capture the maximum possible oscillation period may
depend on the number of users, user density, as well as the specific network topology,
which needs future investigations to rigorously characterize. In the simulations we
performed, we only capture oscillation periods of 2 or 3 happening at only one or
two players.
6.3 Simulation Studies
6.3.1 Illustration of the MLSG Game: 10 Users Case
In this subsection we apply the MLSG game to the interference graph in Fig. 6.1a to
illustrate the iteration process and the improvement over total network throughput.
We first consider the case with K = 2 available channels, and the improvement steps
of the MLSG game are plotted in Fig. 6.2a.
The game converges to a NE after tmove = 10 channel moves (for tmove > 10, no
user is changing its channel and the total throughput remains unchanged thereafter).
It can be seen from Fig. 6.2a that the MLSG game gradually improves the overall
network throughput until reaching a NE. Specifically, there are two sudden rises
in the total throughput, which are brought by two rounds of MAP management
that occur at tmove = 7 ∼ 8 and tmove = 9 ∼ 10 respectively. When tmove ≤ 7, the
users are asynchronously updating their channels to improve their own throughputs,
and the total throughput gradually improves as well. Then the channel selection























































Figure 6.1: 10 Users Topology, with 1∼6 Channels
the total throughput by tuning the MAPs towards max-min throughput in each
subnet. As a result, the total throughput is significantly improved under the fairness
constraint. Similarly, there is another round of spatial channel selection subgame
and MAP tuning between tmove = 8 ∼ 10, and the total throughput is further
improved until converging to a NE.
Notice that the game could actually start with any pre-allocated MAPs as in [70].
However, the pre-allocated MAPs might be unfair if some users are allocated much
larger MAPs than other users in the same subnet. If the game starts with such
unfairly pre-allocated MAPs, then it is possible that the total throughput would
decrease at first, as a result of the MAP management which re-allocates the MAPs to
approximately provide max-min throughput fairness for the users in each subnet.
After that, our MAP management process is able to further improve the total
network throughput iteratively under the fairness constraint.
We then apply the MLSG game to the same interference graph with more avail-
able channels. The improvement steps of total network throughput with K = 2 ∼ 6
channels are plotted in Fig. 6.2b. Similar to the K = 2 case, the MLSG game grad-
ually improves the total network throughput until reaching a NE. In particular, the
sudden rise(s) of the total throughput in each case is a result brought by the MAP
management process.
The final channel allocation results for K = 1, · · · , 6 are plotted in Fig. 6.1,
where we use different colors and shapes to denote different channels, and the leader
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(a) K = 2


































(b) K = 2 ∼ 6
Figure 6.2: Improvement over Total Throughput, N = 10,K = 2 ∼ 6
in each subnet is plotted using a bigger icon than other players. With K increasing
from 1 to 6, the network is partitioned into more subnets with smaller sizes (the
number of subnets G gradually increases from 1 to 10), and the total throughput
of all players gradually increases as well. When K = 6, each player occupies a
single channel without interfering other players, and the total throughput reaches
10 (each player has a throughput of 1).
6.3.2 50 Users Case
Consider a distributed network with N users, which are randomly placed in a square
region of a given area. For simplicity, we assume that all the distances between any
transmitter and its designated receiver are much smaller than the distances between
any two transmitters, so that a Tx-Rx pair (user) can be represented by a single
node in the topology. We further assume that in the single-channel case, all users
have transmission range of 5 unit length, and those users who are in each other’s
transmission range will have significant interference on each other, and the two
users are said to be connected. Based on the above assumptions, we can generate
a random connected topology with 50 users in a square region of area 500 (units),
as plotted in Fig. 6.3.
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Figure 6.3: 50 Users Topology
ORM Mechanism
It happens that player 30 and player 39 in this particular topology have oscillating
operating points when K = 3 in the MLSG game. As indicated in Fig. 6.4a, the
operating points of player 30 and player 39 are (c30, q30) = (1, 1/4) and (c39, q39) =
(3, 1/2) respectively. Given such a MAP profile, player 39 jumps from channel 3 to
channel 1 since v39(1) = 1−q30 = 1−1/4 = 3/4 > v39(3) = 1−q12 = 1−1/2 = 1/2.
After player 39 switches its channel, player 30 jumps from channel 1 to channel 3




























































































(b) N=50, K=3, State 2
Figure 6.4: Oscillation States of the MLSG Game
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Figure 6.5: Improvement over Total Throughput, N = 50,K = 2 ∼ 7
1/4) = 3/8. Then the channel selection subgame converges, with players 30 and 39
swapping their channels. After that, the MAPs of players 30 and 39 are swapped
as well, as a result of the MAP management process. Now the subgame restarts
with a new state as indicated in Fig. 6.4b. The only difference with Fig. 6.4a is
that players 30 and 39 have swapped their operating points. In this way, there are
Nosc = 2 players (players 30 and 39) whose operating points are oscillating with a
period Tosc of 2 rounds of the MLSG game play.
Fortunately, we can apply the ORM mechanism to stabilize the network. In the
above scenario, player 30 and player 39 both detect oscillation of their operating
points, thus both of them freeze their operating points at the state in Fig. 6.4b, and
the network is stabilized. The total number of channel moves before convergence is
tmove = 51.
Improvement over total throughput
Similar to Section 6.3.1, we apply the MLSG game to the interference graph in
Fig. 6.3 with more available channels. The improvement steps of total network
throughput with K = 2 ∼ 7 channels are plotted in Fig. 6.5, which shows that the
MLSG game converges after tmove ≈ 50 channel moves (no oscillation is detected
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Table 6.1: MLSG Game (N = 100,K = 5)
area D Σθi G tmove Nosc Tosc
12.5 8 1.89 5 80 0 -
25 4 2.10 5 102 0 -
50 2 3.10 5 142 0 -
100 1 5.34 5 160 0 -
200 0.5 16.96 21 195 3 2
400 0.25 32.02 42 111 2 3
1000 0.1 83.50 89 81 0 -
except the K = 3 case, which is stabilized by ORM). Similar to the 10 users case in
Fig. 6.2b, the MLSG game gradually improves the total network throughput until
reaching a NE. In particular, the sudden rise(s) of the total throughput in each
case is a result of the MAP management process which iteratively tunes the MAPs
towards max-min throughput in each subnet. As a result, the total throughput is
significantly improved under the fairness constraint.
6.3.3 100 Users with Various User Density
We define the user density D as the number of users per unit area. For the 50
users case above, the user density is D=50/500=0.1. Now we generate a sequence
of random connected topologies with various user density, by randomly scattering
100 users in a square region of various areas. In particular, when the square region
has an area of 12.5, the network becomes fully connected (the diagonal line length
is equal to the transmission range of 5). We apply the MLSG games to these
topologies with K=5 and summarize the results in Table 6.1.
It can be seen that the MLSG game converges after a finite number of channel
moves. Oscillation is detected in two cases (D = 0.25 and D = 0.5) in the MLSG
game, and the ORM mechanism is applied to stabilize the network. Table 6.1 also
shows that as the user density decreases from 8 to 0.1 ( from a fully connected
network to a network with lower connectivity), the network is partitioned into
more subnets with smaller sizes (the number of subnets G gradually increases). As
a result of spatial reuse, the total throughput increases due to decreased interference
from fewer neighbors experienced by each user.
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6.4 Conclusions
We study the multi-channel spatial Aloha network with the objective to enable
each autonomous user i to select a channel ci and decide a MAP qi to improve its
throughput, while providing a certain degree of fairness among the users. Game
theoretic approaches are applied, where each user i is a player who chooses the
strategy (ci, qi) to improve its own throughput. To search for a NE, a MLSG game
is formulated to iteratively obtain a solution on each dimension of the (ci, qi) strat-
egy. An ORM mechanism is proposed to stabilize the design in some special cases
where the operating points of some players in a local region would oscillate between
the two dimensions of the myopic search. Compared to existing methods of pre-
allocating MAPs, the MLSG game further improves the overall network throughput
by iteratively tuning the MAPs toward max-min throughput in each subnet. Sim-
ulation results show that the MLSG game gradually improves the total throughput
until reaching a NE, which also provides good throughput fairness for the players.
The focus of this chapter is more on the game theoretic formulation to model
the selfish user behaviors in the joint channel selection and MAP tuning problem.
We have only considered the case with static topology during the course of the game
play. In the future we need to further investigate the non-deterministic scenarios





A Stackelberg Game Model for
Overlay D2D Transmission with
Heterogeneous Rate Requirements
7.1 Introduction
Slotted Aloha random access has been used in the above works. In this chapter,
we investigate another type of random access scheme, i.e., CSMA, under spatial
reuse. We formulate the problem by applying the spectrum commons to overlay
D2D communication, i.e., we assume that all D2D links use CSMA as the multiple
access scheme to share a dedicated inband overlay channel.
Recall from Section 1.1.3 that a spectrum commons is characterized by the
restrictions on who uses the spectrum, and when and how. The owner or controller
of the spectrum commons in our settings is the cellular operator who establishes
and enforces these restrictions, while the users of the spectrum commons are the
D2D links who conform to these restrictions when sharing the spectrum.
Specifically, although D2D communication does not route the data traffic through
the cellular network, the available network infrastructure can still be an effective
means to exert light control over all the D2D links when performing resource al-
location. In our model in Chapter 7, the D2D links have heterogeneous service
requirements and different willingness to pay, and the central entity (e.g., eNB) [98]
controls the transmission behaviors of all links by modifying the price per unit
service rate [149].
Our contributions in this chapter are twofold. First of all, we propose a Stack-
elberg game [33] which maximizes the total throughput of the D2D links, where
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these links have heterogeneous utility functions. The BS in the cellular networks
will act as a Stackelberg leader to regulate the D2D link transmissions by modifying
the service price, so that the payoff of each individual D2D link can be maximized
while maintaining the D2D network to function within the feasible throughput re-
gion determined by the CSMA access mechanism. The problem is shown to be
quasi-convex and can be solved by a sequence of equivalent convex optimization
problems. The pricing strategies are designed so that the network always operates
within the feasible throughput region. Secondly, each D2D link will acquire a rate
based on its actual demand and willingness to pay. We explicitly model the possible
selfish behaviors among the D2D links with spatial reuse. Under a given network
price, the transmitter of each D2D link competes for channel usage by choosing its
transmission parameters in order to maximize its own payoff. Such user dynam-
ics are studied in the setting of non-cooperative games, and the resulting CSMA
game model serves as the follower-subgame in the proposed Stackelberg game. An
algorithm is proposed followed by proofs for the existence and convergence of the
equilibrium solution.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Based on the network model
introduced in Section 2.4, the definition of feasible throughput region for a CSMA
network is defined in Section 7.2, while some important properties about these
feasible regions are derived. The Stackelberg game is detailed in Section 7.3. Per-
formance of the proposed game is evaluated through simulations in Section 7.4. We
conclude the chapter in Section 7.5.
The notations used in this chapter are as follows. An underscore in a random
variable · represents a vector, or a system state consisting of the binary status of
the N links. The variable θ is used to denote the throughput from the channel
access point of view, where the solution is controlled by the ICN model. On the
other hand, θ˜ is used to represent a desired throughput from the link layer aspect,
whose value is derived from the price and link utility function. If the final solution
is within the feasible throughput region, these two values should match. There are
two types of equilibrium to be differentiated, the subgame equilibrium is denoted by
a superscript ‘*’ whilst for the Stackelberg game is denoted by a superscript ‘opt’.
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7.2 Feasible Throughput Region in Spatial CSMA
Networks
The spatial CSMA network model has been introduced in Section 2.4. In this
section, we state and derive the key results on ICN which are important to our
proposed game theoretic framework to be presented in Section 7.3.
7.2.1 Feasible and Strictly Feasible Throughput Region
Each feasible system state s ∈ S corresponds to a feasible scheduling vector of link
transmissions. The feasible throughput region is therefore the convex hull [142, pp.
24] of S, namely,
C¯ = {θ|(θ =
∑
s∈S
pss) ∧ (ps ≥ 0,∀s) ∧ (
∑
s∈S
ps = 1)}. (7.1)
Eq.(7.1) shows that the feasible solutions are given by the convex combinations of
the throughputs at these feasible states while fulfilling the probability and proba-
bility distribution constraints. The solutions are fully defined by a polytope whose
vertices are the feasible system states s ∈ S.
The interior of C¯ is the strictly feasible region, denoted as C:
C = {θ|(θ =
∑
s∈S
pss) ∧ (ps > 0,∀s) ∧ (
∑
s∈S
ps = 1)}. (7.2)
Using the contention graph in Fig. 2.1 as an example. The set of feasible system
states S has been given in (2.3). The feasible throughput region is C¯ shown in Fig.
7.1, which is a polyhedron vertexed by the maximum throughput of these states
(the region enclosed by the mesh surface and its intersections with θ1 − θ2, θ1 − θ3
and θ2 − θ3 planes). The strictly feasible region C refers to the inner region of the
polyhedron only.
7.2.2 Transmission Aggressiveness
CSMA is a distributed and randomized way to schedule the transmissions among the
feasible system states. It is shown in [92] using the ICN model that any throughput
in the strictly feasible region can be achieved through a properly chosen Transmis-
sion Aggressiveness (TA) r, which is stated in the following lemma.
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Figure 7.1: Feasible Throughput Region for the Contention Graph in Fig. 2.1
Lemma 7.1 (Lemma 8 in [150]). In the ICN model, for any desired throughput
for all the N links θ˜ = [θ˜1, θ˜2, · · · , θ˜N ] ∈ C (strictly feasible region), there exists a
unique finite-valued r = [r1, r2, · · · , rN ] ∈ RN such that θi(r) = θ˜i, ∀i ∈ N .
A detailed proof can be found in [92] and [150]. Here we only present a sketch
of the proof.
Proof : Given a θ˜ ∈ C, we use the maximum log-likelihood method to estimate
the parameters r∗ which result in θ(r∗) = θ˜, or equivalently, result in the desired




ss. The log-likelihood function
[151] is defined as:








ss and substituting the expression for ps given in (2.7), and
after some manipulations, we have
F (r; θ˜) =
∑N











i=1 siri)] is a log-sum-exp function
and thus is convex in r, the function F (r; θ˜) is concave in r [142, pp. 72]. Therefore,
the max-log-likelihood problem below is a convex optimization problem with r as
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the variables to be solved and θ˜ as the parameters:
max
r
F (r; θ˜) (Maximize log-likelihood). (7.5)
It is then shown in [92] that the max-log-likelihood problem in (7.5) is the dual
problem of the max-entropy problem in (7.6), where −∑s∈S ps loge ps is the entropy
of the distribution vector p, whose element ps is the state probability for the state
s,∀s ∈ S. The max-entropy problem is also a convex optimization problem, with p
as the variables and θ˜ as the parameters.
max
p




s∈S sips = θ˜i,∀i ∈ N ,
ps ≥ 0, ∀s ∈ S,∑
s∈S ps = 1.
(7.6)
We are now ready to prove Lemma 7.1. We need to verify that the Slater’s
condition [142, pp. 226] is satisfied, so that the optimal solutions to the two convex
optimization problems (7.5) (7.6) exist with zero duality gap, given that θ˜ ∈ C
(strictly feasible region).
Since all the constraints in (7.6) are linear equalities and inequalities, we only
need to verify that there exists a feasible p in the relative interior [142, pp. 23] of
the domain D of the objective function −∑s∈S ps loge ps, which is D = {p|ps ≥
0,∀s ∈ S}. The relative interior of D is relintD = {p|ps > 0, ∀s ∈ S}. Since θ˜ ∈ C,










s = 1. By
letting p = pθ˜ ∈ relintD, we find a feasible p which satisfies all the constraints in
(7.6). Therefore, the Slater’s condition is satisfied.
As a result, the optimal solutions to the two convex optimization problems (7.5)
(7.6) exist with zero duality gap. Moreover, the dual optimal value is attainable, i.e.,
there exists a finite r∗ such that F (r∗; θ˜) = maxr F (r; θ˜). Therefore, the first order
condition [142, pp. 457] of the unconstrainted differentiable convex optimization
problem in (7.5) is satisfied at r∗, i.e.,



















s∈S sips = θ˜i−θ∗i = 0,∀i ∈ N .
(7.8)
Therefore, for any θ˜ ∈ C (strictly feasible region), the log-likelihood function
F (r; θ˜) attains its maximum value at a finite-valued r = r∗ ∈ RN . At the optimal
solution r∗, the first-order optimality condition (7.7) is satisfied, which corresponds
to θ∗i (r
∗) = θ˜i,∀i ∈ N . It is further shown in [150] that F (r; θ˜) is strictly concave
in r. Therefore, the optimal solution r∗ is unique. 
Lemma 7.1 suggests that, if θ˜ ∈ C, then a unique solution r∗ exists such that
θ∗i (r
∗) = θ˜i,∀i ∈ N . On the other hand, the above proof also suggests that we
can solve for r∗ by maximizing the concave function F (r; θ˜). This is useful for the
design of our game iteration algorithm presented in Section 7.3.2.
7.2.3 Feasible Throughput Region Under ICN
Previously we have defined the feasible throughput region for any given set of fea-
sible system states. The shape of the polytopes derived from the ICN model owns
a property which will be discussed here.
We first introduce a binary relation “” between two real-valued vectors ϑ˜ and
θ˜, which is defined as component-wise less than or equal to, i.e.,
ϑ˜  θ˜ ⇔ ϑ˜i ≤ θ˜i,∀i ∈ N . (7.9)
We now establish the following theorem which will be useful when presenting our
proposed games.
Theorem 7.1. In the ICN model, given that θ˜ ∈ C¯ (θ˜ is in the feasible region),
then any desired throughput ϑ˜, where 0  ϑ˜  θ˜, is also in C¯.
Proof : A first glance at Fig. 7.1 may lead to the thought that the theorem is
trivial, but this is not true. Fig. 7.2a shows a convex set A1 in the two-dimensional
space. For a θ˜ ∈ A1 as shown in Fig. 7.2a, it is easy to find a point ϑ˜ such that
ϑ˜  θ˜ and yet ϑ˜ is not within the convex region A1. On the other hand, it is not
difficult to figure out that the convex set A2 in Fig. 7.2b owns the property stated
in Theorem 7.1.
In the ICN model, for a target throughput vector θ˜ where θ˜ ∈ C¯, there exists a




ss according to (7.1).
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(a) Convex Polytope A1 without Property in
Theorem 7.1










(b) Convex Polytope A2 with Property in
Theorem 7.1
Figure 7.2: Examples of 2-Dimensional Convex “Polytopes”
To prove that ϑ˜  θ˜ ∈ C¯, we need to similarly show that there exists another
probability distribution pϑ˜ = {pϑ˜s ,∀s ∈ S} such that it fulfills (7.1). However, it
is difficult to obtain the distribution pϑ˜ directly from pθ˜ since it depends on the
underlying link topology.
Our approach is to define an orthotope B whose “vertices” are obtained by pro-
jecting θ˜ on all the coordinate planes. An example for the 3-dimensional illustration
is shown in Fig. 7.1. The problem is now becoming equivalent to showing that all
the “vertices” of B are in C¯. Finally, because ϑ˜  θ˜, ϑ˜ is within the cuboid and
hence within C¯.
We first perform a projection parallel to the i-th axis. Consider a throughput
vector ψ˜, with the setting of ψ˜i = 0, ψ˜j = θ˜j,∀j 6= i, i.e., the i-th link has zero
throughput. It is intuitive that ψ˜ is one of the “vertices” of B. In order to show
that ψ˜ is in C¯, we need to show that we are able to obtain its state probability
distribution {pψ˜} from {pθ˜}, and ψ˜ can be expressed in the form as in (7.1). This
can be done in the following way.
For θ˜ ∈ C¯, its state distribution pθ˜ satisfies θ˜ = ∑s∈S pθ˜ss, pθ˜s ≥ 0,∀s ∈ S and∑
s∈S p
θ˜
s = 1. We next describe how to construct the state distribution p
ψ˜ for ψ˜.
For those states in S with si = 1, choose pψ˜s = 0 and pψ˜s−ei = pθ˜s−ei + pθ˜s. For the
remaining states, choose pψ˜s = p
θ˜
s. In other words, those states s with si = 1 should
now have state probability pψ˜s = 0. The “removed” state probability p
ψ˜
s should now
be attributed to the state s − ei. It is not difficult to verify that, by doing so, the
total probability remains one and the throughputs of all unaffected links remain the
same as before. This state probability distribution pψ˜s clearly satisfies (7.1), hence
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we conclude that the vertex ψ˜ is within C¯ and so are other vertexes of B.
It is not difficult to verify this by using the example shown in Fig. 2.3. Assume
that we have a throughput θ˜ = [θ˜1, θ˜2, θ˜3] ∈ C¯. We now show that ψ˜ = [ψ˜1, ψ˜2, ψ˜3] =
[0, θ˜2, θ˜3] is also in C¯. Note that the throughput ψ˜ is equivalent to the case in which
link 1 powers off and stops transmitting. In such a case, there are only three feasible
system states left: 000, 010, 001. In other words, the states 100 and 101 disappear
and are merged into the states 000 and 001 respectively, since link 1 is no longer
transmitting. State 010 remains unchanged. Merging the state probability p101 with
p001 will ensure the throughput for link 3 remains the same, since θ˜3 = p001 + p101.
Merging the state probability p100 with p000 will not affect the throughput of any
remaining links. Since the total probability still sums up to be one, link 1 will
not be transmitting and both link 2 and link 3 transmit as before. Therefore, the
throughput ψ˜ resulting from the above state merging operations is still in C¯.
Other vertices of B can also be similarly shown to be in C¯. Since C¯ is a convex
set and the convex combination of these “vertices” are all in C¯, we have B ⊂ C¯.
Since ϑ˜  θ˜ is enclosed in the hyperrectangle (N -orthotope), ϑ˜ should also be in C¯.

A remark to make is that Theorem 7.1 is not generally true for any con-
vex set. It is true since the values of si are chosen from 0 and 1 only; and
the subset of feasible states induced by a maximal independent set is a com-
plete partially ordered set [2] based on how ICN is modelled. For the example
in Fig. 2.3, the maximal independent set {1, 3} induces the subset of feasible states
Q = {[0, 0, 0], [1, 0, 0], [0, 0, 1], [1, 0, 1]}, which is a complete partially ordered set,
with the least element [0, 0, 0] and the largest element [1, 0, 1] under the partial
order “”. Hence the use of the theorem needs to be carefully dealt with.
Theorem 7.1 will be used in Section 7.3.3 to show that the pricing problem is a
valid quasi-convex optimization problem.
7.2.4 D2D Network Model
The discussion in this subsection is on how to efficiently model the resulting D2D
network if the CSMA channel access mechanism is adopted by all D2D links. If
the objective of the network is to maximize the sum-rate of all transmitting links,
and the BS gives no control on the admission and transmission of links, then [92]
has successfully solved this problem. The solution is computed in a completely
distributed manner. However, as pointed out earlier in Section 1.4.3, such a fully
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cooperative model is too idealistic and there is no consideration on the utility het-
erogeneity and selfish behaviors of the links. It may be better to build a pricing
framework so that each link tries to maximize its payoff function when competing
for resources, rather than someone tries to take advantage when the network is in
operation and drive the network to unstable states. Furthermore, maximizing the
sum-rate may not distribute the resources according to demand because links with
low demand may be assigned to transmit at higher rates due to its spatial location.
In this chapter, we feel that the BS can take a more proactive role to assist in
D2D transmission. In fact, the problem can be formulated separately in terms of
the objectives of the D2D links and the BS. The objective of the BS is to maximize




s.t. θ˜ ∈ C, (7.10)
where θ˜i is the target rate the network has to support link i, and the solution must
fulfill the CSMA channel access constraint, i.e., the final rates to support all D2D
links must be in the strictly feasible throughput region defined in (7.2).
Each link is a player of a non-cooperative game. Each player tries to maximize
its payoff vi(θi, θ−i) while satisfying the physical layer constraints.
max vi(θi, θ−i),∀i
s.t. θ ∈ C. (7.11)
In (7.10), θ˜i is used to represent the rate demand from the utility point of view
and should be differentiated from θi in (7.11) or (2.11) used in the ICN model
as a result of competing for channel access. At the equilibrium state, these two
quantities have to be the same and the pricing mechanism aims to achieve this
objective.
There are two challenges in the formulation. The above two optimization prob-
lems both involve the constraint defined by the strictly feasible throughput region
C. From Lemma 7.1 we know that, for any desired throughput θ˜ in the strictly
feasible region C, there exists an operating point r such that θ(r) = θ˜. However, in
order to obtain C as in (7.2), we need to know all the feasible system states, which
correspond to all the independent sets [86] in the contention graph. As is shown
in [86], to compute all the independent sets (include the maximal independent sets)
is a NP-hard problem. Hence it is practically difficult to obtain C. The second
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challenge is how to align the solution of (7.10) with the involvement of (7.11).
Our approach is to develop a simple mechanism which does not require a-prior
knowledge of C and yet the radio resource can be allocated to the heterogeneous
D2D links efficiently while satisfying the objectives of both the BS and D2D links.
A pricing mechanism is introduced to achieve this purpose. The payoff function of
each link is made to be dependent on the resource price. The BS will broadcast
the resource price and use it to control the transmission behavior of each link.






where θ˜i(M) is the target rate of D2D link i under the service price M , which will
be presented in (7.13). The D2D links are the followers in the overall Stackelberg
game, each of which chooses its transmission strategy so that their individual payoff
is maximized under the service price chosen by the BS, i.e., the Stackelberg leader.
In the next section, we describe how our proposed Stackelberg game model can
achieve the above purposes.
7.3 Stackelberg Games for Non-Cooperative D2D
Links
Stackelberg games [33] are a class of non-cooperative games in which a leader, who
makes the first move in the game, anticipates the actions of the followers based on a
model of how the followers would respond to its actions. We propose a Stackelberg
game, in which the BS in the cellular network acts as a Stackelberg leader to regulate
the transmission behaviors of all the D2D links by broadcasting a proper service
price M . The D2D links are the followers, each of which responds to the price M by
choosing its transmission strategy in an attempt to maximize its individual payoff.
In Section 7.3.1, we first define the utility functions for the D2D links, each
of which characterizes the individual service requirements and willingness to pay.
In Section 7.3.2, we study the non-cooperative behaviors of the D2D links under
a given network price M , which defines the follower-subgame in the Stackelberg
game. The Stackelberg game is analyzed in Section 7.3.3. Based on the analysis,
the pricing strategies of the Stackelberg leader are proposed in Section 7.3.4.
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7.3.1 D2D Link Utility Function
We modify the traffic model used in [60] to our system. Suppose D2D link i has a
target rate θ˜i in the range of [γi, pii], where γi ≤ θ˜i ≤ pii. If θ˜i ≤ γi, link i achieves
zero utility, and each link has no intention to go beyond θ˜i ≥ pii. The exact target
rate value θ˜i is controlled by the service price M through the following relationship
θ˜i(M) =
{
0, M > mi,
min{γi − bi(M −mi), pii}, 0 ≤M ≤ mi,
(7.13)
where γi, pii and mi together decide how link i is willing to pay for the transmission.
For simplicity, we have adopted a monotonically decreasing linear function for θ˜i(M)
in the range γi ≤ θ˜i ≤ pii, where bi is a positive coefficient and −bi is the slope.
Eq. (7.13) is interpreted as follows. The parameter mi is the highest price that
link i is willing to pay for its transmission. When M = mi, link i will only desire
a minimum throughput of γi. When the price is too high (i.e., M > mi), link i
chooses not to transmit, and thus its target rate drops to zero, i.e., θ˜i(M) = 0. Over
the range 0 ≤M ≤ mi, link i is willing to pay for its transmission, and the lower the
price M , the higher throughput it desires, unless it has already reached its maximum
desired throughput pii. In this range, we have used a linear function to simplify the
above monotonic relationship. Other function forms such as hyperbolic, parabolic,
cubic · · · can also be used, as long as the monotonic relationship is preserved. As
a result, the relationship in (7.13) is a piecewise linear function. In the special
case where the minimum desired throughput is γi = 0 and the maximum desired
throughput pii ≥ bimi, the piecewise linear relationship in (7.13) simply reduces to a
linear relationship. A smooth monotonic curve can be similarly obtained when other
function forms are adopted. Note that our algorithm works if only the monotonic
function property holds.
The utility function is designed to provide differentiated treatment for the links
based on their actual demand and willingness to pay for the desired transmission
rate. For the example given in Fig. 7.3a, D2D link 1 and link 3 have the same range
in their target rates, i.e., pi1 = pi3 and γ1 = γ3, and link 3 has a higher willingness
to pay, i.e., m3 > m1. When the price M continually decreases from a large value
until zero, link 3 will be admitted into the system first.
From the game theoretic perspective, link i will try to choose its target rate θ˜i
in order to maximize its own payoff vi(θi) = Ui(θi) −Mθi (utility minus cost). To
be compatible with such an incentive, we can reversely derive the utility function of
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(a) Target Rates of the CSMA Users under
the Price M



















(b) Utility Functions of the Three CSMA
Users
Figure 7.3: Target Rates and Utility Functions of the CSMA Users
D2D link i as follows. If the utility function Ui(θi) is concave, then the θi value that
maximizes vi(θi) is given by the first-order condition v
′




Equating with the example of (7.13) and we can reversely derive the utility function
for D2D link i:
Ui(θi) =

miθi, 0 ≤ θi < γi,
miθi − (θi−γi)22bi , γi ≤ θi < pii,
mipii − (pii−γi)22bi , pii ≤ θi ≤ 1.
(7.14)
The utility functions for the three links’ example in Fig. 7.3a are plotted in Fig.
7.3b. If we take the derivative of Ui(θi) on θi in (7.14), it can be seen that a higher
mi value corresponds to a steeper slope, which suggests a higher willingness to pay.
This can be seen from Fig. 7.3b, in which the utility function of link 3 has a steeper
slope than that of link 1.
7.3.2 A Subgame of Noncooperative CSMA Users
The Stackelberg game at the l-th iteration begins with the BS broadcasting a price
M (l). Each D2D link i (i ∈ N ) aims to maximize its payoff vi(θi) = U(θi) −
M (l)θi. According to the analysis in Section 7.3.1, link i’s objective is equivalent to
attaining a target rate θ˜
(l)
i under the service price M
(l), as given in (7.13). Whether
these target rates are achievable still depends on whether the underlying CSMA
mechanism can support these transmissions. The D2D links therefore play a CSMA
game among themselves to determine their individual TAs to make the throughput
θi as close to θ˜
(l)
i as possible. This CSMA game is therefore the follower-subgame
in the Stackelberg game. To avoid the links from transmitting too aggressively and
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driving the network to unstable states as a result of congestion, a simple approach
is to let M begin with a large value and then gradually decrease.
We formally state the CSMA subgame as follows:
Players : Distributed Tx-Rx pairs (D2D links), i ∈ N , who compete to transmit
in the ideal CSMA network.
Strategies : Each player i chooses its TA ri ∈ R, ∀i ∈ N .
Objectives : Each player i (i ∈ N ) aims to achieve its target rate θ˜(l)i set by
maximizing its payoff
vi(θi) = U(θi)−M (l)θi (7.15)
under the given service price M (l).
Note that the throughput θi that player i can achieve is determined by its own
TA ri and the TAs of all the other players r−i based on the relationships in (2.11).
The equilibrium solution of the CSMA subgame is a NE [33], which is defined as a
strategy profile r∗ = [r∗1, · · · , r∗N ]) in which player i’s strategy r∗i is a best response
to the strategies of all the other players r∗−i , i.e.,
r∗i = arg min
ri∈(−∞,+∞)
|θ˜(l)i − θi(ri, r∗−i)|,∀i ∈ N , (7.16)
where θi(r) is the achieved throughput of D2D link i in the ICN model, as given in
(2.11).
It is clear that the objective of the subgame is to find the equilibrium TAs for
all D2D links so that every link achieves throughputs that are as close to what are
desired. According to Lemma 7.1, if the target rate θ˜ is in C, i.e., it is achievable,
then there exists a unique TA r∗ such that θ∗i (r
∗) = θ˜(l)i ,∀i ∈ N . On the other
hand, if the target rate θ˜ is beyond C, during the myopic best response updates,
all players will eventually achieve r∗i = +∞, ∀i if there is no further control taken,
i.e., all links transmit aggressively and result in undesired network congestion. The
existence and uniqueness of the NE in the CSMA subgame can then be established
in the following proposition.
Proposition 7.1. For the target rate θ˜ ∈ C (strictly feasible region), there exists a
unique finite-valued NE r∗ ∈ RN in the CSMA subgame. Moreover, the target rate
θ˜ is achieved at the NE, i.e., θ∗(r∗) = θ˜.
Proof : From Lemma 7.1, if the target rate θ˜ ∈ C (strictly feasible region),
then there exists a unique finite-valued r∗ ∈ RN such that θ∗(r∗) = θ˜. As can be
seen from (7.16), there exists a unique NE r∗, since the payoff of each player is
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maximized when θ∗(r∗) = θ˜ and no player has the incentive to deviate from this
NE unilaterally. 
In practice, the strategies of all the other players r−i are usually not known
by player i if we assume that there is no explicit information exchange among the
players. We therefore design some distributed updating method for the players to
arrive at the NE. Let each player update its strategy by measuring its own local
statistics, e.g., measured throughput θˆi. For the k-th measurement period τ(k),
player i keeps a record of the accumulated transmission time, Ti(k), and obtains
the empirical average throughput as
θˆi(k) = Ti(k)/τ(k),∀i ∈ N . (7.17)
A distributed way for player i to update its strategy can be
ri(k + 1) = ri(k) + α · (θ˜(l)i − θˆi(k)),∀i ∈ N , (7.18)
where α is a small positive step size. The conditions for the convergence of the NE
in the CSMA subgame are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 7.2. For the target rate θ˜ ∈ C (strictly feasible region), the iteration
dynamics in (7.18) with a small enough step size α and a long enough measurement
period τ will always converge to the NE r∗ ∈ RN in the CSMA subgame.
Proof : We apply the same idea used when proving Lemma 7.1. Given a θ˜ ∈ C, we
use the maximum log-likelihood method to estimate the parameters r∗ which result
in θ(r∗) = θ˜, or equivalently, result in the desired state probability distribution




ss. The log-likelihood function F (r; θ˜) is given in (7.4).
It has been shown in Section 7.2.2 that F (r; θ˜) is a strictly concave function in r
and attains its maximum when θ(r∗) = θ˜. Therefore, we can use the subgradient
method [152] to obtain the optimal solution r∗, where θ˜(l)i − θˆi(k) is an estimation of
the gradient ∂F (r;θ˜)
∂ri
(see (7.8)) in the k-th measurement period. Since the objective
function F (r; θ˜) is differentiable and concave in r, the subgradient method with
constant step size α yields convergence to the optimal value, provided the step size
α is small enough and the measurement period is long enough [152]. In summary,
the above proposition follows. 
As mentioned above, under the myopic best response update approach, if the
target rate θ˜ is beyond C, all players will eventually achieve r∗i = +∞,∀i, and the
network will be pushed into the totally congested situation. To overcome this prob-
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lem, we impose a upper limit rmax on ri,∀i ∈ N as an implementation constraint.
The iteration dynamics in (7.18) then become:
ri(k + 1) = min{ri(k) + α · (θ˜(l)i − θˆi(k)), rmax},∀i ∈ N . (7.19)
The physical meaning of imposing the rmax constraint is to refrain the D2D links
from transmitting too aggressively, so that the local congestion at some links will
not affect the whole network. The outcome of introducing such a restriction is that
the feasible throughput region will shrink into a subset of the original one. Hence
the solution obtained with this constraint imposed is always ensured to be within
C. During the myopic play, if any link arrives at rmax, the BS will be informed.
Then the price M is frozen and the whole D2D network functions at the boundary
of the “shrunken” feasible throughput region. If this happens, not all users are able
to achieve their desired rates or even admitted, as the network is in “congestion”.
7.3.3 Analysis of the Stackelberg Game
In this subsection we analyze the game structure of the Stackelberg game. From
Proposition 7.1 and Proposition 7.2, to satisfy θ˜ ∈ C, it is equivalent to checking that
the CSMA subgame converges to the unique subgame NE r∗ defined in (7.16) under
the given service price M . Therefore, the leader problem in (7.12) is equivalent to






equality constraint (7.13),∀i ∈ N ,
equality constraint (7.16),
r∗i < rmax,∀i ∈ N ,
(7.20)
where r∗i is the TA of D2D link i at the NE of the CSMA subgame, as given in
(7.16). The constraint r∗i < rmax,∀i ∈ N implies that the target rate θ˜ as given in
(7.13) is strictly feasible at the subgame NE, i.e., the throughput will converge to
θ∗(r∗) = θ˜ in the CSMA subgame.
To distinguish from the NE r∗ in the CSMA subgame, we call the equilibrium
solution (M opt, ropt) of the Stackelberg game as the Stackelberg Equilibrium (SE)
[153], where M opt is the optimal solution to (7.20) and ropt is the subgame NE under
the price M opt.




i=1 θ˜i(M) is non-concave in M and the equality constraints (7.13) and
(7.16) are nonlinear. Fortunately, the problem can be converted into a quasi-convex
optimization problem [142, pp. 144] and the solution can be iteratively evaluated
by solving a sequence of convex optimization problems. It can be interpreted in the
following way. Since the target rate θ˜i(M) of each D2D link i is non-increasing with
the price M , the chain of prices M (0) > M (1) > · · · > M (l) > M (l+1) induces a chain
of target rates θ˜
(0)  θ˜(1)  · · ·  θ˜(l)  θ˜(l+1). Therefore, the objective function
g(M) =
∑N
i=1 θ˜i(M) is also non-increasing with M , and hence is quasi-concave in
M . Regarding the constraints in (7.20), from Lemma 7.1, if the target rate θ˜
(l) ∈ C
(strictly feasible throughput region, which is the interior of the feasible throughput
region C¯), then it is achievable with finite-valued TAs r∗. On the other hand, from
Theorem 7.1, if the target rate θ˜
(l) 6∈ C¯, then any target rate θ˜(l+1)  θ˜(l) is not
in C¯, i.e., it is not achievable and the constraints in (7.20) are not satisfied. The
crossing from within C¯ to beyond can be detected by the use of rmax. Therefore,
the superlevel set {M |g(M) ≥ G} is convex, which is equivalent to the line segment
{M |g−1(sup g) ≤ M ≤ g−1(G)}, where G is a constant, g−1 is the inverse function
of g(M), and sup g is the optimal value of (7.20).
In summary, the problem in (7.20) is quasi-convex [142, pp. 144], since the
objective function g(M) to be maximized is quasi-concave, and the superlevel set
{M |g(M) ≥ G} is convex. As a result, the problem in (7.20) can be reduced into a





equality constraint (7.13),∀i ∈ N ,
equality constraint (7.16),
r∗i < rmax,∀i ∈ N .
(7.21)
If the problem (7.21) is feasible, then the maximum total throughput sup g is not
less than G. Conversely, if the problem (7.21) is infeasible, then we can conclude
sup g < G. In order to find the optimal value sup g to the problem (7.20), we can
test different superlevels G in the feasibility problem (7.21).
For each superlevel G, from the proof of Proposition 7.2, the feasibility problem
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equality constraint (7.13),∀i ∈ N ,
M = g−1(G),
ri < rmax,∀i ∈ N ,
(7.22)
where F (r; θ˜) is the log-likelihood function defined in (7.4). In other words, if the
problem (7.21) is feasible, then there exists a price M = g−1(G), such that the
target rate θ˜(M) is achievable with finite TA ri < rmax, ∀i ∈ N . Therefore, we can
use the max-log-likelihood method to estimate the parameters r which achieve the
target rate θ˜(M)|M=g−1(G), as given in (7.13). Notice that given the constant G, the
price M and the target rate θ˜ become constant values as well. Moreover, as shown
in the proof of Proposition 7.2, the log-likelihood function is concave in r. As a
result, the max-log-likelihood problem in (7.22) is a convex optimization problem,
and can be solved by the subgradient updating method in (7.19).
If the iteration dynamics converge to a subgame NE with r∗i < rmax,∀i ∈ N ,
then the optimal solution to (7.22) exists, i.e., the problem (7.21) is feasible. Other-
wise, if the iteration dynamics in (7.19) converge to a subgame NE with r∗i = rmax
and θ∗i < θ˜i for some D2D link i, then the optimal solution to (7.22) does not exist
and the problem (7.21) is infeasible, i.e., not all D2D links’ target rates are being
achieved.
In summary, the problem in (7.20) can be reduced into a sequence of convex opti-
mization problems. A simple bisection method can be used to choose the superlevels
G (or equivalently, the price M = g−1(G)) and test the feasibility problem (7.21).
Alternatively, we can borrow ideas from the feasible direction method [154, Chap.
10] which avoids testing in the infeasible region, and design the pricing strategies
so as to keep the network operating in the feasible region while tuning the price M .
7.3.4 Pricing Strategies of the Stackelberg Leader
We call each round of CSMA subgame under a certain price M as a stage in the
Stackelberg game. In each stage, the leader needs the feedback from each D2D link
i about its target rate θ˜i, and the converged TA r
∗
i and throughput θ
∗
i . Notice that
the leader only has knowledge about the monotonicity of the D2D link’s target rate
with the price M and no information about (7.13) of all links is required.
Under some low load situations, all links achieve their maximum desired through-
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put pii,∀i ∈ N , if for all links i ∈ N , the target rate θ˜i > 0 and remains unchanged
between two consecutive prices M (l) and M (l+1). Under heavy load situations, the
pricing strategies of the Stackelberg leader need to be carefully designed to converge
to the optimal price M opt.
To detect convergence, we define ∆i = rmax−r∗i as the “margin” of transmission
aggressiveness for each D2D link i ∈ N . When the achieved target rates are close to
the capacity boundary, the leader can make use of ∆min = min{∆i,∀i ∈ N} as an
indication of how close the current throughput θ∗ is to the boundary of C. Since the
total throughput g(M) is non-increasing with the price M , the leader can gradually
decrease M to increase g(M) until the constraint r∗i < rmax is “critically” satisfied
for some D2D link says i, i.e., ∆min ≤ , where  is a small positive threshold.
The algorithm at the BS works as follows. In the 0-th stage, the leader can
start with a large price M (0) so that the network starts with low load. Similar to
the Newton method [142, pp. 488] which applies line search to narrow down the
searching region before using Newtonian steps to refine the optimal solution, the
adjustment of our price strategies consist of two phases as well. In the first phase the
leader uses a relatively large decrement step φ to decrease price M until ∆min ≤ η,
where η >  is a threshold before entering the second phase. In the second phase,
the decrement steps are refined using ∆min since ∆min is getting smaller as the
target rates are approaching the boundary of the feasible throughput region.
In summary, the leader can update its price M based on ∆min at the end of the
l-th stage as follows:
M (l+1) =
{
M (l) − φ, ∆min > η,
max{M (l) − β ·∆min,Mlower}, ∆min ≤ η,
(7.23)
where φ is a positive constant, β is a positive parameter. Mlower is initially set
at 0 and is updated to take the value of current M (l) once it is detected that the
solution for the target rate θ˜ is outside the feasible region. Its purpose is to ensure
that subsequent M (l+1), · · · should not go below this value. The parameter β can
be chosen to be small enough so that the price gradually decreases until ∆min ≤ .
However, for faster convergence, it might happen that the initially chosen β is too
large such that the new price M (l+1) pushes the target rate θ˜ to be outside the
feasible region, i.e., r∗i = rmax but θ
∗
i < θ˜i for some D2D link i. In such cases,
the leader stores the current unachievable price as the new lower bound Mlower,
resets the price to the previously found achievable price Mprev, and reduces β by a
discount factor σ, e.g., σ = 0.9.
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The pricing strategies of the leader and the CSMA subgame are summarized
in Algorithm 7.1. Through Algorithm 7.1, the Stackelberg game is guaranteed to
gradually converge to the optimal price M opt under which the total throughput of
the CSMA users are maximized while their heterogeneous target rates can all be
satisfied.
Algorithm 7.1 Iteration Process of the Stackelberg Game
1: Initialize:
2: The BS chooses the initial price M = M (0) and informs the D2D links in the control
plane;
3: Each D2D link i ∈ N chooses the initial TA ri(0);
4: repeat:
5: In the l-th stage:
6: for i = 1, · · · , N D2D links do:
7: Set the target rate θ˜
(l)
i based on the price M




11: In the k-th measurement period:
12: for i = 1, · · · , N users do:
13: Estimate the empirical throughput θˆi(k), as in (7.17);
14: Update the TA ri(k + 1), as in (7.19);
15: end for
16: k ← k + 1;
17: until r converges to the subgame NE r∗.
18: Each user i ∈ N informs the BS about θ˜(l)i , r∗i and θ∗i ;
19:
20: At the BS:




(rmax − r∗i );
22: if ∆min >  then:
23: set M (l+1) as in (7.23); Mprev = M
(l); ∆prev = ∆min.
24: else if 0 < ∆min ≤  or (θ˜(l)  0 and θ˜(l) = θ˜(l−1)) then:
25: The Stackelberg game converges with Mopt = M (l); go to END.
26: else if r∗i = rmax but θ
∗
i < θ˜i for some user i then:
27: Mlower = M
(l); β ← σ · β; M (l+1) = max{Mprev − β ·∆prev,Mlower}.
28: end if
29: l← l + 1;
30: until The Stackelberg game converges. END.
An important side-information which can be provided by the proposed algorithm
is the identification of the bottleneck link in the heterogeneous D2D networks. Upon
convergence of the Stackelberg game, the D2D link L = arg min{∆i,∀i ∈ N} =
arg min{rmax− ropti ,∀i ∈ N} is the bottleneck link to the network since any further
decrease on the price M opt would drive the target rate θ˜ to be outside the capacity
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region and link L can no longer achieve its target rate. The identification of such
bottleneck links can be of valuable information, for example, in data oﬄoading, to
re-assign these links back to the cellular network when necessary. A possible way to
improve system performance is to remove the bottleneck link L in the D2D network
and port link L’s traffic towards the conventional cellular mode. How to achieve
optimal trade-off remains as interesting future work.
7.3.5 Complexity of Algorithm 7.1
Algorithm 7.1 consists of two loops. In the outer loop, the BS chooses a service
price M (l) at the l-th stage according to the pricing strategies in Section 7.3.4. In
the inner loop, for each given service price M (l), the D2D links play the CSMA
subgame distributively and iteratively until converging to their respective target
rates. We analyze the complexity in terms of the number of iterations required,
first for the CSMA subgame, then for setting the pricing strategies.
For the CSMA subgame, assume that the target rate θ˜ under the given service
price M (l) is in the strictly feasible region C. According to Proposition 7.1 and
Proposition 7.2, the distributed strategy updates of the CSMA users in (7.18) are
equivalent to the gradient method in maximizing the log-likelihood function F (r; θ˜)
which is differentiable and strictly concave in r. In particular, the gradient of F (r; θ˜)
is ∇F (r; θ˜) = θ˜ − θ(r), as shown in (7.8). Since the maximum value of F (r; θ˜) is
finite and attained at r∗, hence θ∗(r∗) = θ˜ can be solved by setting the gradient
∇F (r∗; θ˜) = 0.
Since the norms of the throughput θ(r) and its gradient∇θ(r) are both bounded,
it can be shown that ∇F (r; θ˜) is Lipschitz continuous [155] in r, i.e., ‖∇F (ra; θ˜)−
∇F (rb; θ˜)‖ = ‖θ(ra) − θ(rb)‖ ≤ H‖ra − rb‖, ∀ra, rb ∈ RN , where H is a positive
constant. According to Theorem 1 in [155, Section 1.4] and Theorem 2.1.14 in [156,
Section 2.1.5], for small enough step size α (0 < α ≤ 1/H), the number of iterations
to reach ‖∇F (r; θ˜)‖ = ‖θ˜− θ(r)‖ < ξ is O(1/ξ) (i.e., no more than a fixed multiple
of 1/ξ).
It is worth to mention that although this complexity O(1/ξ) on the number
of required iterations is independent on the number of users, we have inherently
assumed that the measurement period τ is long enough to provide an accurate
estimation of throughputs. In fact, the choice of τ depends on the number of users
and the underlying topology. The purpose of choosing a large τ is to ensure that
the Markov chain corresponding to the updated r reaches its stationary distribution
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to allow for an accurate estimation of throughputs. In general, a larger number of
users requires a larger value of τ . More comparisons and discussions on how to
choose τ for a given number of users and different topologies can be found in [150].
We now briefly discuss how to estimate the number of pricing stages required
in the outer loop. This analysis is complicated by the fact that the step sizes
for M are changing each time. Assume that the maximum value of the price is
Mmax. In phase 1 of the price setting, since the price is decreasing at a large
constant step φ, the number of pricing stages in phase 1 is capped by dMmax/φe,
or dMmax/φe/2 on average. In phase 2, the TA margin ∆min ≤ η, and the price is
already close to the optimal. In the algorithm, we refine the price change δM (l+1) =
M (l+1) − M (l) at stage l according to δM (l+1) = −β∆(l)min progressively until the
TA margin gradually approaches the required precision , i.e., ∆min ≤ . Assume
that the interval  < ∆min ≤ η is small, through simulations we find that the
relationship between the TA margin ∆
(l+1)






min+B · δM (l+1), where B is a positive constant. Since
we set δM (l+1) = −β∆(l)min, hence ∆(l+1)min = ∆(l)min + B · (−β∆(l)min) = (1− βB)∆(l)min.
The TA margin then follows a geometric progression and we can estimate the value
of h, so that δM (l+h) ≤ . Hence it can be easily shown that the number of stages
for ∆min to decrease from η to  is approximately
log10 η/
log10 1/(1−βB) , or O(d log10(η/))
for some suitable choices of β and B (0 < βB < 1), where d = 1
log10 1/(1−βB) . Note
that β can be chosen according to the value of B, but B is topology and utility
dependent. As a result, the total number of stages required for convergence is
O(1/φ) +O(d log10(η/)).
In summary, the number of iterations required for convergence in the proposed
game is given by the number of iterations per stage multiplied by the required
number of stages, i.e., O(1/ξ) · (O(1/φ) +O(d log10(η/))).
7.4 Simulation Study
In this section we demonstrate the Stackelberg game via an example. Consider the
8 D2D links’ contention graph in Fig. 7.4a. Assume that the relationships between
the links’ target rates and the price M are given as in Fig. 7.4b. In the ICN model,
we assume that the links’ transmission time is uniformly distributed with mean of 1
ms in the range [0.5, 1.5] ms. Further assume that link i’s backoff time is uniformly
































(b) Target Rates under Price M
Figure 7.4: Topology and Target Rates of 8 D2D Links
7.4.1 CSMA Subgame
Assume that the current price M = 30, then from Fig. 7.4b we know that the
D2D links’ target rates are θ˜ = [0.270, 0.297, 0.347, 0.315, 0.242, 0.176, 0.132, 0.220].
Assume that the initial TAs ri = −2,∀i ∈ N . The CSMA subgame is then played
according to Lines 10 to 17 in Algorithm 7.1. In the k-th measurement period, we
apply a simple averaging filter to smooth the measured throughput as:
θˆi(k) = (1− δ) · θˆi(k − 1) + δ · Ti(k)/τ, ∀i ∈ N , (7.24)
where δ is the weight of the new measurement. In our simulations, we choose
δ = 0.05 and the measurement time τ = 200 ms. A smaller value of δ makes
the measured throughput more smooth, but also increases the convergence time.
To update TAs as in (7.19), we choose the step size α = 0.4 and the maximum
allowable TA rmax = 3. Note that a smaller value of α guarantees the convergence
of the CSMA subgame, but also increases the convergence time. The iteration
process of the CSMA subgame is then plotted in Fig. 7.5. The CSMA subgame
converges to 99% of the target rates (ξ = 1%) in around 150 iterations. According
to the complexity analysis in Section 7.3.5, the number of required iterations is
O(1/ξ), i.e., in the order of a fixed multiple of 1/ξ = 100. Thus our simulation
result is in the same order as the above prediction.
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Figure 7.5: CSMA Subgame of the 8 D2D links under M = 30
7.4.2 Stackelberg Game
Assume that the initial price M (0) = 55, φ = 5, β = 5, η = 1,  = 0.1, σ = 0.9, and
the rest of the parameters are the same as in Section 7.4.1. The iteration process
of the Stackelberg game is shown in Fig. 7.6. The game converges after 11 stages,
in which ∆min = rmax − r3 = 3− r3 and gradually approaches 0. The first 6 stages
undergo a constant price decrement (φ = 5), i.e., M = 55, 50, 45, 40, 35, 30 until
∆min ≤ η = 1 is detected. After the CSMA subgame converges under the price
M = 30, we have ∆min = rmax − r∗3 = 3− 2.4 = 0.6 and hence 0.1 =  < ∆min < η.
Therefore, the Stackelberg game enters the second pricing phase, which consists of
5 stages (M = 27.10, 25.00, 23.68, 22.73, 22.12), according to (7.23). We consider
the game converged when ∆min ≈ 0.08 <  and the optimal price is M opt = 22.12.
After convergence, the average error of the measured throughputs as compared to
the target rates is around ξ = 1%. Notice that we cannot decrease M any further
since the network is already close to the capacity boundary (r∗3 = 2.92 ≈ rmax = 3).
In other words, any further decrease on M would drive the target rate ~˜θ to be
outside the capacity region and some D2D links (e.g., link 3) can no longer achieve
their target rates. In summary, the proposed Stackelberg game is able to maximize
the total throughput of the CSMA users while the target rates of the heterogeneous
users can all be satisfied.
The number of required stages before convergence is consistent with the analysis
in Section 7.3.5. In the above simulations, the maximum value of the price is
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Figure 7.6: Stackelberg Games of the 8 D2D Links
Mmax = 60, and the constant step φ = 5. Therefore, the maximum number of stages
in phase 1 is dMmax/φe = 12, or 6 on average. In the simulations, phase 1 actually
consists of 6 stages before entering phase 2. In phase 2, the required precision
 = 0.1, η = 1 and the required number of stages is O(d log10(η/)), where d =
1
log10 1/(1−βB) . The value of B can be estimated by using (∆
(l+1)
min −∆(l)min)/(M (l+1) −
M (l)), which is approximately 0.07 in the small interval  < ∆min ≤ η. Since we
have chosen β = 5, hence 0 < βB = 0.35 < 1 and d = 1
log10 1/(1−βB) = 5.3, and the
required stages in phase 2 is in the order of a fixed multiple of d log10(η/) = 5.3.
In the simulations, phase 1 actually consists of 5 stages before convergence. Note
that a smaller β could be used to guarantee βB < 1, however, it also increases
d and hence requires more stages for convergence. Finally, the total number of
iterations required in the Stackelberg game is O(1/ξ) · (O(1/φ) + O(d log10(η/))),
which is in the order of 100 · (6 + 5.3) = 1130. In the simulations, the Stackelberg
game actually converges in around 1000 iterations, which is in the same order as
the above prediction.
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Figure 7.7: Effect of Parameter rmax
7.4.3 Effect of Parameter rmax
In the above simulations, we have used the parameter rmax = 3, and obtained the
optimal price M opt that maximizes the total throughput g(M) for the 8 users in
Fig. 7.4 with heterogeneous rate requirements. As is discussed at the end of Section
7.3.2, by introducing the rmax constraint, the feasible throughput region will shrink
into a subset of the original one. In this subsection, we apply different values of
rmax to the network and obtain the optimal price M
opt that maximizes the total
throughput g(M) for the 8 users in Fig. 7.4a. To see the effect of parameter rmax
only, we assume that the 8 users are homogeneous in their rate requirements, i.e.,
γi = 0.05, pii = 0.55, bi = 0.0125,mi = 50,∀i ∈ N .
The optimal price M opt and the corresponding total throughput g(M opt) under
each value of the parameter rmax are plotted in Fig. 7.7. From Fig. 7.7 we can
see that, as the value of rmax increases, the achievable total throughput g(M
opt)
also increases, moreover, the rate of increase gradually slows down. In particular,
when rmax = 3, the achievable total throughput is 2.39. For rmax > 3, the total
throughput curve becomes almost flat and approaches the upper bound 2.65 when
rmax tends to infinity, under which the shrunken capacity region stretches back to
the original feasible throughput region C¯. The corresponding bound on the optimal
price is M opt = 27.5. In other words, we cannot further reduce the price M below
27.5 to increase the target rate θ˜, as it is already on the boundary of the feasible
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throughput region C¯.
It is observed from Fig. 7.7 that a larger rmax value leads to a larger capacity
region, but this also allows for longer transmission durations. However, the trans-
mission duration should not be too long in practice, otherwise it would lead to large
access delay (where the access delay refers to the time between the onset of two
consecutive successful transmissions of a link) and large variations of the delay. The
readers are referred to [95, Sec. IV] for more discussions. As a result of the above
observations, we have adopted rmax = 3 in the above two subsections.
7.4.4 Performance Comparison with Generalized Aloha Game
under BS Pricing
We have studied the generalized Aloha game in Chapter 3. Here we compare the
performance with the Stackelberg game for spatial CSMA under the same setup.
In the CSMA setting the BS assists in the resource allocation by controlling
the service price of the D2D users. If slotted Aloha is used by the D2D users
under the same pricing framework, we can compare the performance difference of
these two techniques. Here we assume that the BS does not know the contention
graph and cannot predict the optimal price by centralized computation. Instead,
the BS receives feedback from the users about the convergence results of the CSMA
subgame or slotted Aloha subgame (i.e., the generalized Aloha game with a profile
of target rates controlled by the service price), and then tunes the price to maximize
the total D2D throughput.
For the 8 users’ example in Fig. 7.4a, to focus on the performance comparison,
we assume that the users have the same target rate requirements, as given in Section
7.4.3. The results in Fig. 7.7 plot the maximum total throughput in the CSMA
setting under different rmax parameter values. In particular, when rmax = 8, the
maximum total throughput approaches the upper bound 2.65. The corresponding
optimal price is M opt = 27.5.
In the slotted Aloha setting, to achieve the target rate y under a given network
price M , the users play the generalized Aloha game in Chapter 3. Recall that the








, 1}, ∀i ∈ N . (7.25)
Since in the CSMA subgame each player updates its transmission parameter TA
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based on measured throughput, we also update the MAP in the generalized Aloha
game based on measured throughput. Suppose each iteration in the generalized
Aloha game consists of 2000 slots and each slot takes 0.1ms. Then each iteration
takes 200ms, which is the same as in the CSMA subgame. In them-th iteration, each
Aloha player i counts the number of successful packets and estimates its throughput
θˆ
(m)






(1− q(m)j ) ≈ θˆ(m)i /q(m)i , ∀i ∈ N . (7.26)











, 1}, ∀i ∈ N . (7.27)
If the target rate y under a given network price M is within the feasible target
rate region of the generalized Aloha game, then the generalized Aloha game will
converge to a throughput equal to the target rate y. To detect whether the game
has converged, each player needs to analyze the characteristics of its measured
throughput. First, it applies a simple averaging filter to obtain a smoothed version
θ¯
(m)





i = 0.95 · θ¯(m−1)i + 0.05 · θˆ(m)i , ∀i ∈ N . (7.28)
Then player i keeps a record of θ¯
(m)
i in the recent 40 iterations. If the average
value and standard deviation of these θ¯
(m)
i values are below a certain threshold
respectively, then it suggests that the game converges. On the other hand, if all
players are dead-locked in a situation with q = 1, then the game diverges.
The BS can then tune the price M to maximize the total throughput of all
players. Such a price tuning process along with the generalized Aloha game as a
subgame can be seen as a Stackelberg game similar to that in this chapter. Here
we demonstrate a simple pricing strategy. We can start with a high price (e.g.,
M = 50) so that the network starts with low load. Then we gradually decrease
the price by a constant step size δM = 1 until the generalized Aloha game cannot
achieve the corresponding target rate and diverges to q = 1. Then we reset the price
M to previously feasible price M and gradually decrease the price by a smaller step
size δM = 0.1 until the refined price is no longer achievable. We can continue to
refine the optimal price by using even smaller step size. For illustration purpose,
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Figure 7.8: Behavior of User 1 in the Stackelberg Game with Slotted Aloha
we refine the price up to the precision of δM = 0.1.
The Stackelberg game with spatial Aloha converges in around 600 iterations,
shown in Fig. 7.8. There are 10 pricing stages (M= 50, 49, 48, 47, 46, 45, 46,
45.9, 45.8, 45.9) until the optimal price M opt = 45.9 is found. The maximum
total throughput achieved is 0.81. The distance to Pareto front is dPareto = 1.01,
suggesting that achieved target rate is very close to the Pareto front (the residue is
due to the step size of pricing and the effect of estimation errors on the stability).
The throughput ratio between Stackelberg game with slotted Aloha and Stackelberg
game with CSMA is 0.81/2.65 ≈ 0.305.
7.5 Conclusions
We study a group of D2D links which share a dedicated inband overlay channel via
CSMA. The ICN model is leveraged on to analyze their behaviors and interactions
under spatial reuse. We further assume that the D2D links have heterogeneous
rate requirements and different willingness to pay, and they act non-altruistically
to achieve their target rates and maximize their own payoffs. To manage such non-
cooperative user dynamics, we propose a Stackelberg game in which the BS in the
cellular network acts as a Stackelberg leader to regulate the D2D link transmissions
by modifying the service price, so that the total throughput is maximized while
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the heterogeneous target rates of the D2D links can all be satisfied. The problem
is shown to be quasi-convex and can be solved by a sequence of equivalent convex
optimization problems. The pricing strategies are designed so that the network
always operates within the capacity region. The results are verified by simulations.





Conclusions and Future Work
8.1 Conclusions of the Thesis
This thesis focuses on the spectrum sharing problems among a group of spatially
distributed Tx-Rx user pairs in a spectrum commons. The users are equipped with
built-in intelligence and are able to make intelligent decisions on choosing trans-
mission parameters by learning the spectrum dynamics and their competitors’ deci-
sions. As a result of their autonomous interactions, stability issues arise concerning
whether the whole network would converge to an equilibrium solution. We there-
fore study how to manage the spectrum access problem for such autonomous and
spatially distributed Tx-Rx pairs with the objective to achieve efficient spectrum
sharing with fairness and scalability.
As an initial attempt to solve these challenges, we first investigate slotted-Aloha-
type random access with spatial reuse. We propose the generalized Aloha games
and obtain the stability conditions for the unique NE in terms of MAPs. Based
on the stability conditions, we first develop a fully autonomous algorithm for the
distributed users to heuristically search for a fair and close-to-Pareto-front operat-
ing point. Then we further design a control theoretic scheme to approach global
optimization of network throughput through limited local information and yet can
achieve quick convergence and operational stability. After investigating the single-
channel scenario, we then extend to multi-channel spatial Aloha networks and pro-
pose a multi-leader Stackelberg game to solve the joint MAP tuning and spatial
channel selection problem. Finally, we leverage on the ICN model in the context
of overlay D2D communications, and investigate how the commons spectrum can
be efficiently and fairly shared among the self-interested spatial CSMA users with
heterogeneous rate requirements.
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In summary, this thesis provides theoretical guidance for managing the shared
access to a spectrum commons, with insights into how the spatially distributed Tx-
Rx pairs can share the commons spectrum with stability, efficiency, fairness and
scalability.
8.2 Future Work
8.2.1 Apply PI Controller in Multi-Channel Spatial Aloha
In the single channel case, the PI controller is used to control the MAPs of the
Aloha users, which is more ready for implementation since the users stay on the
same channel and can exchange local information with neighbors via piggy-backing
with low overhead. The addition dimension of channel selection in the multi-channel
case makes the problem more challenging. The control theoretic approach has the
potential to be applied in the multi-channel case. In this thesis we first look for an
efficient and reliable mechanism to search for a stable solution, which is the focus
of Chapter 6. The use of control theoretic approach is an implementation issue.
While it will still work at each of the updates, the controlling process is a two-
parameter adjusting process and the approach might not be so direct and requires
future investigations.
8.2.2 Exact Characterization of Throughput in Spatial CSMA
Networks
Due to the simplicity of slotted Aloha, the throughput performance of spatial Aloha
networks can be exactly characterized by the MAPs of the users, as given in (2.1).
The major challenges lie in the modeling of the self-interested strategic interac-
tions among the heterogeneous users, and the investigation of the properties of the
equilibrium solutions, e.g., existence, uniqueness, convergence, stability, efficiency,
fairness, etc. Moreover, since the users are spatially distributed and have only local
information, it is worth designing distributed algorithms to approach global opti-
mization of network throughput through limited spread of local information and
realize the model’s quick convergence and stability.
However, in the presence of spatial reuse, it is extremely difficult to exactly
characterize the throughput performance of CSMA users. We have adopted the
ICN model in Chapter 7 to compute the user throughputs. Although the ICN
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model captures the essence of CSMA and indeed yields good approximation of the
user throughputs, an exact throughput characterization for spatial CSMA is still
lacking. The idealized assumption made in ICN is that the backoff countdown
process is in “continuous-time” and carrier sensing is instantaneous. As a result,
there is no collision in ICN. In practical CSMA protocols such as IEEE 802.11,
the users count down in “mini-timeslot” and the process is hence a “discrete-time”
process. In [94], Kai and Liew proposed a generalized ICN model for a perturbation
analysis that tries to capture the effects of backoff collisions. However, they still
rely on some strong assumptions, e.g., the transmission time is of the same fixed
length for all users. Therefore, the exact characterization of user throughputs in
spatial CSMA networks still awaits future work.
8.2.3 Non-Saturated Throughput
In the system model in Section 2.1, we have assumed that every user’s transmission
queue is continuously backlogged, i.e., the transmitter of every user always has a
packet to transmit to its designated receiver. In other words, we have only con-
sidered the saturated throughput performance, which well models the behavior of
links that always have traffic to send, e.g., Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)
traffic arising from long-lasting peer-to-peer (P2P) file downloads.
For networks with unsaturated links, there are two possible extremes. The first
is the bursty traffic case in which each link becomes saturated and idle alternatively,
with the saturated and idle periods each lasting a long time. This case can be viewed
as one in which the network topology changes dynamically. At any instance, the
network consists only those links with saturated traffic. As time progresses, there is
a sequence of effective network topologies. The second is the intermittent traffic case
in which the input traffic of links (i.e., their offered load) is below their saturated
throughputs, but the traffic arrives to the links intermittently. This case is more
challenging, particularly if we are interested in not just the access delay, but also the
overall queuing delay which includes the buffer delay at a link. These challenging
issues would require further investigations.
8.2.4 Quality of Service
In this thesis we have mainly focused on throughput as the performance metric.
Future work could consider other Quality-of-Service (QoS) metrics such as packet
loss, delay, jitter, retry rates, etc.
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In particular, for spatial CSMA, beyond the throughput optimality, designing a
CSMA algorithm which is optimal in both throughput and delay remains quite open.
In [157], the authors show that the task is very difficult for arbitrary interference
topology. However, the interference topology arising in practice is not arbitrary, but
has certain geometric properties [158] or bounded degrees [159]. Therefore, design-
ing and analyzing CSMA algorithms toward delay optimality is still a challenging
subject to be further investigated.
Based on future improvements of design and analysis on the medium access
characterizations, we can further consider the incorporation of the QoS require-
ments into the users’ utility functions to provide service differentiation and better
contention control. A proper utility function should take system parameters into
account, including QoS requirements, user’s priority, user’s queues status, channel
conditions, power limitations, priorities of packets, etc. Therefore, it is still a chal-
lenging issue to propose a general framework to design utility and cost functions
for the heterogeneous users, which are convergent toward optimal equilibrium point
that meets different users’ QoS requirements.
8.2.5 Implementation Issues
Theories depend on a mathematical crystallization of the engineering system under
study. For the mathematical tractability, we have made simplifying assumptions in
the system models, which in turn deserve a closer look during implementation.
In this thesis, we have not considered detailed physical channel conditions, such
as ambient noise or time-varying channels. In particular, time-varying channels
would cause perturbations to the interference relationship among the wireless links.
Time-varying channels also generate packet loss induced by channel degradation,
which is not considered by the current theory. Stability issues of perturbations
caused by ambient noise, measurement errors or time-varying channels are impor-
tant in practice and will be the subject of future study.
In the system models, we have assumed that both link channel conditions and
link interference relationship are symmetric and fixed. However, wireless links are
often asymmetric in practice because signals propagate differently between two
links. Furthermore, link asymmetry can be also time-varying. These issues would
need to be further investigated.
Other implementation issues also deserve a closer look, such as asynchronism
of device operations, overhead within the protocol stacks, retry limit and retrans-
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mission schemes, packet designs, etc. Implementation studies should also bridge
the gap between theory and practice, and bring a sharper understanding of what
theory has assumed away or analyzed only loosely so far, e.g., granularity of control
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